United Arab Emirates University

Scholarworks@UAEU
Dissertations

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

11-2017

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF CYBERSECURITY
EFFECTIVENESS OF ABU DHABI GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
Abdulla Rashed Ali Mohamed Alnuaimi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/all_dissertations
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Alnuaimi, Abdulla Rashed Ali Mohamed, "A FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF CYBERSECURITY
EFFECTIVENESS OF ABU DHABI GOVERNMENT ENTITIES" (2017). Dissertations. 94.
https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/all_dissertations/94

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at
Scholarworks@UAEU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholarworks@UAEU. For more information, please contact mariam_aljaberi@uaeu.ac.ae.

iii

Copyright

Copyright © 2017 Abdulla Rashed Ali Mohamed Alnuaimi
All Rights Reserved

vii

Abstract
Cyberspace has become one of the new frontiers for countries to demonstrate
their power to survive in the digitized world. The UAE has become a major target for
cyber conflicts due to the rapid increase in economic activity and technology.
Further, the widespread use of internet in the region to the tune of 88% by the end of
2014 has exposed the critical infrastructure to all forms of cyber threats.
In this dissertation, the researcher presents a detailed study of the existing
cybersecurity defences globally and an investigation into the factors that influence
effectiveness of cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi government entities. Further,
the role of cybersecurity education, training and awareness in enhancing
effectiveness of cybersecurity and the role of senior management in providing
strategic direction to government entities on cybersecurity are evaluated in addition
to determining the contribution of strategic planning and technology level in ensuring
an effective cybersecurity system.
The study has evaluated the level of Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE) in
Abu Dhabi Government Entities and the results show that Science and Technology
entity performed better than all other Entities with CSE Mean = 4.37 while Public
Order showed the least performance with CSE Mean = 3.83 and the combined model
of six factors with R-square value 0.317 after multiple regression implying that 32%
change in CSE in the government entities is occurring due to the six (6) independent
variables used in the study. Further, results show that management has the
responsibility of putting in place strategies, frameworks and policies that respond
appropriately to the prevention, detection and mitigation of cyberattacks. Results
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further indicate that culture sensitive training and awareness programmes add to the
quality and effectiveness of cybersecurity systems in government entities.
Further, study findings reveal that qualified and experienced personnel in
government entities show greater understanding of cyber and information security
issues. Finally, the researcher proposes a cybersecurity framework and a checklist,
with checkpoints, for evaluating the effectiveness of cybersecurity systems within
government entities and future research interventions.

Keywords: Cyberspace, cybersecurity system, cybersecurity checklist, cybersecurity
effectiveness (CSE).
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

إطار لتقييم مدى فعالية األمن اإللكتروني في الجهات الحكومية بإمارة أبوظبي
الملخص

أصبح الفضاء اإللكتروني واحداً من المجاالت الجديدة التي تستغلها الدول إلظهار قوتها
وقدرتها على البقاء في العالم الرقمي ،وقد أصبحت دولة اإلمارات العربية المتحدة هدفا ً رئيسيا ً
للصراعات اإللكترونية بسبب االرتفاع السريع في النشاط االقتصادي والتكنولوجي فيها ،إضافة
إلى هذا ،ساهم االستخدام الواسع لإلنترنت في المنطقة ،والذي وصل إلى  %88بحسب
إحصائيات عام  ،4102في تعريض البنية التحتية الحيوية إلى كافة أشكال التهديدات
اإللكترونية.
في هذه األطروحة يقدم الباحث دراسة مفصلة حول دفاعات األمن اإللكتروني الموجودة
حاليا ً حول العالم ويحقق في العوامل التي تؤثر على فاعلية دفاعات األمن اإللكتروني لدى
الجهات الحكومية في أبو ظبي .إضافة إلى هذا ،يعمل الباحث في هذه الدراسة على تقييم دور
جهود التثقيف ،والتدريب ،والتوعية في مجال األمن اإللكتروني في تعزيز فاعلية األمن
اإللكتروني وكذلك دور اإلدارة العليا في توفير توجيه استراتيجي للجهات الحكومية حول
موضوع األمن اإللكتروني ،إلى جانب تحديد مساهمة التخطيط االستراتيجي ومستوى
التكنولوجيا في ضمان كفاءة وفاعلية نظام األمن اإللكتروني.
قامت الدراسة بتقييم مستوى فاعلية األمن اإللكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية في أبو
ظبي وأظهرت النتائج أن الجهات العلمية والتكنولوجية قدمت أدا ًء أفضل من كافة الجهات
األخرى بمتوسط فاعلية أمن إلكتروني مقداره  ،4.37في حين حقق قطاع النظام العام أقل
بمتوسط فاعلية أمن إلكتروني مقداره  3.83باإلضافة إلى النموذج المكون من ستة عوامل
بمعامل تحديد  0.317بعد انحدار متعدد أشار إلى أن ما نسبته  %24من التغيير في فاعلية
األمن اإللكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية ناتج عن المتغيرات المستقلة الستة ( )6المستخدمة في
الد راسة .إلى جانب ذلك ،تظهر النتائج أن اإلدارة تتحمل مسؤولية تنفيذ استراتيجيات ،وأطر
عمل ،وسياسات تستجيب بشكل مناسب لعمليات الوقاية من الهجمات اإللكترونية وكشفها
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والتخفيف من آثارها .كما تُشير النتائج إلى أن برامج التدريب والتوعية القائمة على الثقافة
تساهم في تعزيز جودة وفاعلية أنظمة األمن اإللكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية.
كما تُظهر نتائج الدراسة أن الموظفين المؤهلين ذوي الخبرة العاملين لدى الجهات
الحكومية لديهم قدرة أكبر على فهم مشاكل وقضايا أمن اإلنترنت والمعلومات مقارنة بغيرهم.
وفي نهاية الدراسة يقدم الباحث إطار عمل وقائمة تحقق خاصة بموضوع األمن اإللكتروني
بهدف تقييم فاعلية أنظمة األمن اإللكتروني لدى الجهات الحكومية والجهود البحثية المستقبلية.
مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية :األمن االلكتروني ،نظام األمن اإللكتروني ،قائمة التحقق الخاصة
باألمن اإللكتروني ،فاعلية األمن اإللكتروني ،اإلدارة االستراتيجية.

xi

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my profound appreciation to my
DBA supervisors, Dr. James Thomas the advisor and Dr. Abderrahmane Lakas the
co advisor as well as the entire DBA staff at the UAEU, for their continuous
guidance, inspiration and patience, and for having given me the opportunity to
conduct this research on cybersecurity. Without their advice and support I am sure I
would not have been able to come to this point in my dissertation. In addition, I
would like to thank my colleagues in the DBA programme for their friendship, help
and useful discussions, to my professional colleagues in the cyber and information
security practice for their endless encouragement and support over the entire research
period. We pray that Almighty Allah rewards you abundantly.

xii

Dedication

First and foremost, I dedicate this manuscript to my beloved wife, Hanan, and
children, Khalid, Reem, Khalifa and Fatima, for their diligent contributions, second
to my late father, my mother, my sisters and my brothers, for their positive
encouragement, third to all my professional colleagues, the “Big Data Group”, and
the “Power Team”, for the efforts they put into cyber, physical and information
security in the UAE. Finally to HRH. Sheikh Khalifa, the President of the UAE and
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and all other UAE Rulers for upholding the vision of this country

xiii

Table of Contents
Title .....................................................................................................................................i
Declaration of Original Work ........................................................................................... ii
Copyright ......................................................................................................................... iii
Advisory Committee .........................................................................................................iv
Approval of the Doctorate Dissertation ............................................................................. v
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... vii
Title and Abstract (in Arabic) ...........................................................................................ix
Acknowledgements ...........................................................................................................xi
Dedication ....................................................................................................................... xii
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... xiii
List of Tables................................................................................................................ xviii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................xxi
List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................... xxii
Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Research Background ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 Research Problem .................................................................................................. 5
1.4 Objectives of the Study ......................................................................................... 6
1.4.1 Specific Objectives ................................................................................... 6
1.5 Research Questions ............................................................................................... 7
1.5.1 Research Questions ................................................................................... 7
1.5.2 Research Variables .................................................................................... 8
1.6 Significance of the Study..................................................................................... 11
1.7 Scope of the Study ............................................................................................... 12
1.8 Justifications for the Research ............................................................................. 12
1.9 Research Limitations and Delimitations ............................................................. 13
1.9.1 Research Limitations............................................................................... 13
1.9.2 Research Delimitations ........................................................................... 14
1.10 Definition of terms of interest ........................................................................... 14
1.11 Outline of the Dissertation................................................................................. 17
1.12 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 19
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................... 21

xiv
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 21
2.2 The Cyber Threat Landscape ............................................................................... 24
2.3 Challenges to the Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Defences ............................... 29
2.4 Types of Cyberattacks ......................................................................................... 33
2.4.1 Malware .................................................................................................. 35
2.4.2 Mobile Malware ...................................................................................... 37
2.4.3 Phishing Attacks ..................................................................................... 38
2.4.4 Competence/ Knowledge of Staff and Cybersecurity
Effectiveness (H1) ............................................................................... 40
2.5 Senior Management Support and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H2) .................. 42
2.5.1 Evidence of Senior Management Support .............................................. 46
2.6 Level of Technology and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H3) .............................. 47
2.6.1 Effective Technologies for the Prevention of Cyberattacks ................... 47
2.6.2 Software Solutions .................................................................................. 52
2.6.3 Hardware Solutions ................................................................................. 54
2.7 The Role of Cybersecurity Training Programmes (H4) ...................................... 57
2.7.1 Training and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H4)...................................... 64
2.7.2 Effective Training Methods .................................................................... 72
2.7.3 Results of Effective Training Programmes ............................................. 81
2.8 Strategic Planning and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H5) .................................. 82
2.8.1 Strategic Management Theories and Principles ...................................... 82
2.9 Role of Cybersecurity User Awareness Programmes (H6) ................................. 87
2.10 Regulatory Framework and Cybersecurity Effectiveness ................................. 89
2.11 Existing Cybersecurity Models and Frameworks.............................................. 94
2.11.1 NIST Technology Framework and Cybersecurity
Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 102
2.11.2 The ISO 27000 Information Security Management
Standards............................................................................................ 106
2.11.3 The UAE National Electronics Security Authority (NESA)
Standards............................................................................................ 107
2.12 Research Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 112
2.13 Research Gap ................................................................................................... 112
2.14 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 114
Chapter 3: Research Methodology ................................................................................. 115
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 115

xv
3.2 Definition and Measurement of Variables ........................................................ 119
3.2.1 H1 Theoretical Definition ..................................................................... 119
3.2.2 H1 Operational Definition .................................................................... 120
3.2.3 H2 Theoretical Definition ..................................................................... 121
3.2.4 H2 Operational Definition .................................................................... 121
3.2.5 H3 Theoretical Definition ..................................................................... 122
3.2.6 H3 Operational Definition .................................................................... 122
3.2.7 H4 Theoretical Definition ..................................................................... 123
3.2.8 H4 Operational Definition .................................................................... 124
3.2.9 H5 Theoretical Definition ..................................................................... 125
3.2.10 H5 Operational Definition .................................................................. 125
3.2.11 H6 Theoretical Definition ................................................................... 126
3.2.12 H6 Operational Definition .................................................................. 126
3.3 Research Paradigm ............................................................................................ 126
3.4 Research Strategy .............................................................................................. 127
3.5 Research Design ................................................................................................ 129
3.5.1 Population of the Study ......................................................................... 130
3.5.2 Respondent Sample Selection Methodology ........................................ 131
3.5.3 Definition of the Respondents............................................................... 133
3.6 Methodological Approach ................................................................................. 135
3.6.1 Research Instrument .............................................................................. 135
3.6.2 Questionnaire Design ............................................................................ 137
3.7 Analysis Tool..................................................................................................... 142
3.8 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument ......................................... 142
3.8.1 Content validity ..................................................................................... 143
3.8.2 Internal validity ..................................................................................... 143
3.8.3 Convergent validity ............................................................................... 144
3.8.4 Reliability of the Research Instrument .................................................. 145
3.9 Research Limitations ......................................................................................... 146
3.10 Ethical Issues ................................................................................................... 147
3.11 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 147
Chapter 4: Analyses and Interpretations of the Data ..................................................... 149
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 149
4.2 Data Screening................................................................................................... 151

xvi
4.2.1 Missing Value Analysis ........................................................................ 151
4.2.2 Aberrant Values .................................................................................... 152
4.2.3 Normality of Data ................................................................................. 152
4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) ................................................................... 155
4.3.1 Total Variance Explained...................................................................... 160
4.4 Respondents’ Characteristics............................................................................. 161
4.4.1 Sector Representation ........................................................................... 161
4.4.2 Respondents’ Managerial Level............................................................ 162
4.5 Group Comparisons of Demographic Variables ............................................... 163
4.5.1 Respondents' Managerial Level and Education .................................... 163
4.5.2 Respondents' Industrial Category and Size ........................................... 164
4.6 Reliability Analysis and Correlation Matrix ..................................................... 165
4.7 Study Hypotheses .............................................................................................. 166
4.8 Hypotheses Testing ........................................................................................... 168
4.8.1 Competence/Knowledge of Staff and Cybersecurity
Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 168
4.8.2 Support from Management and Cybersecurity Effectiveness............... 171
4.8.3 Role of Technology and Cybersecurity Effectiveness .......................... 176
4.8.4 Training of staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness ................................ 179
4.8.5 Strategic Plan and Cybersecurity Effectiveness.................................... 184
4.8.6 Awareness of Users and Cybersecurity Effectiveness .......................... 187
4.9 Multiple Regression Analysis ............................................................................ 189
4.10 Summary of Hypotheses Testing..................................................................... 191
4.10.1 Comparison of Departments based on Cybersecurity
Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 195
4.11 Summary of the Results................................................................................... 197
4.12 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 198
Chapter 5: Discussions and Implications of the Study .................................................. 199
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 199
5.2 Discussion.......................................................................................................... 201
5.3 Contributions ..................................................................................................... 203
5.4 Study Implications ............................................................................................. 206
5.4.1 Theoretical Implications ....................................................................... 206
5.5 Proposed Framework ......................................................................................... 207
5.5.1 Cybersecurity Checklist ........................................................................ 209

xvii
5.6 Limitations and Future Research Directions ..................................................... 221
5.7 Summary of the Study ....................................................................................... 222
References ...................................................................................................................... 224
Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire ................................................................................ 237
Appendix 2: Ethics Application ..................................................................................... 251
Appendix 3: Letter of Introduction ................................................................................ 247
Appendix 4: Consent Form ............................................................................................ 248
Appendix 5: Statistical Tables and Analysis ................................................................. 251

xviii

List of Tables
Table 1: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2016 .......................................... 35
Table 2: Study Variables .......................................................................................... 130
Table 3: Definition of the Study Population, source: Primary Data ........................ 134
Table 4: Questionnaire Structure ............................................................................. 136
Table 5: Showing Sample Questionnaire Items for the Variable
Competence/ Knowledge of Staff .............................................................. 139
Table 6: Questionnaire Items for the Senior Management Support Variable .......... 140
Table 7: Convergent Validity of Scale Items ........................................................... 144
Table 8: Reliability of Scales ................................................................................... 146
Table 9: Case-wise Missing Value Analysis ............................................................ 152
Table 10: Test of Normality ..................................................................................... 153
Table 11: Values of Skewness and Kurtosis ............................................................ 154
Table 12 : KMO and Bartlett's Test ......................................................................... 155
Table 13: Exploratory Factor Analysis .................................................................... 157
Table 14: Total Variance Explained ........................................................................ 161
Table 15: Respondents' Managerial Level and Education ....................................... 164
Table 16: Respondents’ Representation by Sector and Size .................................... 165
Table 17: Mean, Standard Deviation, Reliability and Correlations ......................... 166
Table 18: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Staff competence) ........................... 168
Table 19: ANOVA for staff competence (sector-wise) ........................................... 169
Table 20: ANOVA for H1........................................................................................ 170
Table 21: Model Summary for H1 ........................................................................... 170
Table 22: Coefficients for H1 .................................................................................. 171
Table 23: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (support from management) ............ 171
Table 24: ANOVA for support from management (sector-wise) ............................ 172
Table 25: Tuckey HSD............................................................................................. 172
Table 26: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management ............................ 173
Table 27: ANOVA for H2........................................................................................ 175
Table 28: Model Summary for H2 ........................................................................... 175
Table 29: Coefficients for H2 .................................................................................. 176
Table 30: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Role of Technology)....................... 176
Table 31: ANOVA for Role of Technology (sector-wise)....................................... 177
Table 32: Multiple Comparisons for the Level of Technology................................ 177
Table 33: ANOVA for H3........................................................................................ 178

xix
Table 34: Model Summary for H3 ........................................................................... 179
Table 35: Coefficients for H3 .................................................................................. 179
Table 36: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Training of Staff) ............................ 180
Table 37: ANOVA for Training of Staff (sector-wise)............................................ 180
Table 38: Multiple Comparisons for Training of Staff ............................................ 181
Table 39: ANOVA for H4........................................................................................ 183
Table 40: Model Summary for H4 ........................................................................... 184
Table 41: Coefficients for H4 .................................................................................. 184
Table 42: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Strategic Plan) ................................ 185
Table 43: ANOVA for Strategic Plan (sector-wise) ................................................ 185
Table 44: ANOVA for H5........................................................................................ 186
Table 45: Model Summary for H5 ........................................................................... 186
Table 46: Coefficients for H5 .................................................................................. 186
Table 47: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Awareness of Users)....................... 187
Table 48: ANOVA for Awareness (sector-wise) ..................................................... 187
Table 49: ANOVA for H6........................................................................................ 188
Table 50: Model Summary....................................................................................... 188
Table 51: Coefficients for H6 .................................................................................. 189
Table 52: ANNOVA for the Multiple Regression Test ........................................... 189
Table 53: Model Summary....................................................................................... 190
Table 54: Multiple Regression Coefficients ............................................................ 190
Table 55: Department Wise Effectivity of Cybersecurity System ........................... 196
Table 56: Summary of Results ................................................................................. 198
Table 57: Competence/Knowledge of Staff Checklist ............................................. 212
Table 58: Support from Management Checklist ...................................................... 213
Table 59: Level of Technology Deployed Checklist ............................................... 216
Table 60: Training of Staff and CSE Checklist ....................................................... 218
Table 61: Checklist for Strategic Planning Pillar ..................................................... 219
Table 62: Awareness of Staff and CSE Checklist .................................................... 220
Table 63: Descriptive Statistics-Education Background Vs Managerial
Level ........................................................................................................ 251
Table 64: Descriptive Statistics- Gov't Sector vs Number of Employees ................ 251
Table 65: Descriptive Statistics-Education Background vs Managerial Level ........ 252
Table 66: Descriptive Statistics-Gov't Experience Vs Managerial Level ................ 252
Table 67: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Education
Background .............................................................................................. 252
Table 68: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Major .................................. 253

xx
Table 69: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Education by
Experience ............................................................................................... 253
Table 70: Descriptive Stats - Correlation Results .................................................... 254
Table 71: Descriptive - Stats (Mean and Standard Deviation) ................................ 254
Table 72: Reliability Statistical results: Cronbach Alpha and PCA ........................ 255
Table 73: Component Transformation Matrix-Varimax Rotation ........................... 256
Table 74: Reliability Statistics-Rotated component Matrix-Cumulative
Variance ................................................................................................... 257
Table 75: ANOVA Group Comparison Results for Competence of Staff
(CK) ......................................................................................................... 258
Table 76: Regression analysis Results for Competence of Staff – CK .................... 259
Table 77: Post Hoc Test Results for Competence of Staff- CK............................... 260
Table 78: ANOVA and Regression Results for Level of Technology (RoT) .......... 262
Table 79: Multiple Comparisons with Post hoc Test for Level of
Technology (RoT) ................................................................................... 263
Table 80: Regression and ANOVA Test Results for Awareness of Users
(UA) ......................................................................................................... 265
Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE ............................. 265
Table 82: ANOVA and Regression Results for Training of Staff ........................... 267
Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff ............. 268
Table 84: ANOVA and Regression Results for Support from Management ........... 270
Table 85: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Support from Management ........ 271
Table 86: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management ............................ 271
Table 87: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for User Awareness ......................... 272
Table 88: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Cybersecurity
Effectiveness Variable ............................................................................. 272
Table 89: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Cybersecurity
Effectiveness (CSE) ................................................................................. 272

xxi

List of Figures
Figure 1: Design of Chapter One ................................................................................. 2
Figure 2: Design of Chapter Two .............................................................................. 23
Figure 3: Cyber-criminal Cases in Dubai .................................................................. 28
Figure 4: Information Delivery Techniques. .............................................................. 80
Figure 5: Porous Security Perimeter Source .............................................................. 94
Figure 6: A Framework for Assessing Cybersecurity Challenges ............................. 96
Figure 7: Cybersecurity Situational Awareness Model. ............................................ 98
Figure 8: Decision Flows in an Organization .......................................................... 101
Figure 9: NIST Technology Framework .................................................................. 103
Figure 10: NESA Information Security Standard .................................................... 109
Figure 11: Modified Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Model ........ 111
Figure 12: Design of Chapter Three ........................................................................ 116
Figure 13: Proposed Study Framework ................................................................... 118
Figure 14: Sample Selection Methodology .............................................................. 132
Figure 15: Distribution of the Study Population in Abu Dhabi .............................. 135
Figure 16: Design of Chapter Four .......................................................................... 150
Figure 17: Scree Plot showing Factors to Retain ..................................................... 160
Figure 18: Sector-wise Distribution of Respondents Managerial Level .................. 162
Figure 19: Managerial Level of Respondents .......................................................... 163
Figure 20: Departmental Cybersecurity Effectiveness comparison ......................... 197
Figure 21: Design of Chapter Five ........................................................................... 200
Figure 22: Proposed Theoretical Framework ........................................................... 208
Figure 23: Proposed Research Framework .............................................................. 209

xxii

List of Abbreviations

ADSIC

Abu-Dhabi System and Information Centre

ATM

Asynchronous Transfer Mode

CERT

Computer Emergency Response Team

CIO

Chief Information Officer

CISO

Chief Information Security Officer

CSPP

Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures

CSSP

Cybersecurity Strategic Plans

ENEC

Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation

ENISA

European Network and Information Security
Agency

EU

European Union

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigations

G2C

Government-To-Citizen

GCA

Global Cybersecurity Agenda

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council

HR

Human Resources

ICT

Information and Communication Technology

IoT

internet of Things

ISMS

Information Security Management System

ISO

Information Security Officer

ITU

International Telecommunication Union

MENA

Middle East and North Africa

PII

Personal Identity Information

xxiii
PIN

Personal Identification Number

PWC

Price Waterhouse Coopers

QECSP

Qualifications and Experience of Cybersecurity
Professionals

RFID

Radio Frequency Identification

ROI

Return on Investment

SEM

Structural Equation Modelling

SME

Small and Medium Enterprises

SPSS

Statistical Package for Social Scientists

SWOT

Strength Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats

TAP

Training and Awareness Programmes

TNA

Training Needs Assessment

ToT

Training of Trainers

TRA

Telecommunications Regulatory Authority

UAE

United Arab Emirates

USA

United States of America

VEDP

Virginia Economic Development Agenda

1

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter provides an insight into the study concerning the identification of
factors that influence or affect cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government
entities. After an initial review of the literature, it is revealed that lack of
cybersecurity effectiveness presents a management problem that needs critical
attention (Kritzinger and Von Solms, 2010; Al Bawaba, 2012; and Rotvold, 2008).
This critical literature review together with the researcher’s professional experience
in the practice of cyber and information security in the region made it possible to
identify several management problems and the research gaps that justify the research
topic, which would allow further analysis and the identification of key strategies to
close these gaps. In this chapter, the research problem is illustrated followed by lists
of the study objectives and underlying research questions. The remaining part of the
chapter contains a brief discussion of the research variables, presentation of the
research hypotheses, an estimate of the study’s significance, overview of the research
limitations and delimitations, presentation of terms of interest and finally a
discussion of the outline of the dissertation. The outline of this chapter is indicated in
the Figure 1 below.

2
Introduction

Research Background

Research Problem

Objectives of the study

Research Questions &
Hypothesis
Research Variables

Research Hypotheses

Significance of the Study

Scope of the Study

Limitations & Delimitations

Definition of Terms of Interest

Outline of Dissertation

Conclusion

Figure 1: Design of Chapter One
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1.2 Research Background
The Middle East and the whole world have witnessed an increase in
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, especially on such financial and energy sectors
as banks and major oil firms (Saeed et al., 2014). These attacks have targeted major
national security symbols, for instance, military and law enforcement departments.
Preventing such attacks is a management issue that requires critical government
attention and senior management support requiring high levels of understanding and
knowledge. Furthermore, cybercrime has been cited as an escalating threat to the
economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and their plans for
digital transformation as well as the creation of smart cities. Therefore, failure to
tackle the issue would impede the strategic development of the region if adequate
policies are not formed and legal frameworks across member states are not more
fully developed (Hakmer, 2017).
The latest emerging trends reveal that by the year 2020 over 25 billion
devices will be connected globally and this Internet of Things (IoT) block chain will
bring out the security challenges and cyber risks inherent in these technologies
(KPMG Report, 2017). In spite of this, the report reveals that globally the numbers of
skilled cybersecurity professionals are meagre to overcome these threats.
Additionally, the Emirate of Dubai is working steadily towards achieving smart city
status by the year 2020, which requires engagement in smart policies and
frameworks for cyber defence such as tabling cybersecurity as a key stakeholder
smart defence policy for the UAE through the creation of enough knowledge to
assess cyberattacks (Efthymiopoulos and Christopher, 2014). This seems an
additional justification for the present study.
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Moreover, many global industrial cyberattacks have successfully defeated
technological security solutions through preying on human weaknesses in knowledge
and skills, and the manipulation of insiders within organizations into unsuspectingly
delivering entry and access to critical organizational assets (Uchenna et al., 2016).
This ever-expanding knowledge gap on cyber and information security issues among
organizational managers and employees in different organizations justifies a study
that will explore strategies for cybersecurity training, awareness and education in
Abu Dhabi government entities.
Since cyber-criminal activities can be initiated anywhere in the world to
target organizations within the UAE and neighbouring GCC states, it is difficult to
control the number or sophistication of such attempts. However, senior management
has the responsibility of putting in place strategies and structures in response to these
attacks. In addition, the UAE is expected to double its cybersecurity budget to $10
billion within the next decade to bolster cybersecurity defences.
While this study is limited in scope to Abu Dhabi government entities, the
results may easily be applicable to private sector organizations as well. As the
cybersecurity effectiveness of government agencies is critical to the maintenance of
services to the public, the researcher intends through this study to propose framework
that can be used by management not only to evaluate how effective current measures
are but also to prevent attacks that emanate from the internet. This framework was
developed after a thorough review of the current literature that identified several
variables. These include the competence of information security staff, effective user
training programmes;

effective user awareness

programmes;

cybersecurity strategic plans and the type of technology deployed.

presence of
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1.3 Research Problem
Over recent years, cyberattacks and threats have become a major problem
facing a number of countries. The UAE in particular has become a major target for
cyberattacks, due to the rapid increase in its economic activity, technological
advances and the rise of the oil, gas and energy sectors (Andrew and Gotz, 2013).
Furthermore, the extensive use of the internet in the region to the tune of 88% of the
population by the end of 2014 has exposed the critical national assets vulnerable and
left the prevailing cybersecurity defences and critical government infrastructure at
the mercy of sophisticated cyberattacks. To mention a few of them, the destinations
of such attacks include Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 2012 and 2013 respectively and
the Iranian Green revolution in 2009 (Saeed et al., 2014; Cressey and Hayfer, 2012).
In order for residents and citizens to access e-government services, the UAE
government has required each person to own an Emirates Identity card comprising an
electronic chip embedded with key information about him/her (Al-Khouri et al.,
2011; Al-Khouri, 2012). This card is necessary to access important services across
the country. While it has been designed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information for the user, it cannot guarantee that the existing
cybersecurity defences will not be compromised by any attacker’s tactics. A number
of strategies have been devised to resolve cybersecurity issues globally. For instance,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) presented a cybersecurity
framework for critical infrastructure in February, 2014, after the declaration of
President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13636 of 2013, to formulate a
framework that would harmonize consensus and standard industry best practices to
provide a flexible and cost effective approach to enhancing cybersecurity

6
(Shackelford et al., 2014 and Shen, 2014).
The NIST framework proposes technological functions to resolve cyber
threats through identification, protection, detection, response and recovery from
cyberattacks. Despite these technological precautions, intruders may break into
existing security systems by concentrating on their weakest link, the uninformed
users who lack the basic cybersecurity training and awareness programmes that
would equip them for newer forms of attack. Meanwhile, NESA issued new cybercrime legislation for the UAE in 2012, with a major focus on defending against
military attacks and critical infrastructure. However, it is uncertain how many
government entities across the world have incorporated similar laws in their strategic
planning processes, policies and operations. Therefore, a study to identify the factors
that influence or affect the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government
entities can be justified.

1.4 Objectives of the Study
The overall objective of the study is to identify the factors that influence or
affect the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities and to
propose a framework and a checklist that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of
their existing cybersecurity defences.
1.4.1 Specific Objectives
To achieve the overall goal of the study and to enable the researcher to address
individual areas of concern, the research is specifically intended to investigate and
determine:
i. The factors that contribute to the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu
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Dhabi government entities.
ii. The role of management in the prevention of cyberattacks in Abu Dhabi
government entities.
iii. The role of training and awareness in the prevention of cyberattacks in
Abu Dhabi government entities;
iv. The role of the technology level in the prevention of cyberattacks in Abu
Dhabi government entities.

1.5 Research Questions
This section discusses the research questions and hypotheses that form the
foundation for this study.
1.5.1 Research Questions
Since the Abu Dhabi government continues to invest and depend on egovernment services, several questions can be raised. In this research, the researcher
raises and investigates the following questions, as the basis for this study:
i.

How effective are the existing cybersecurity defenses in stopping
cyberattacks and response to breaches?

ii.

To what extent does senior management support the establishment and
implementation of cybersecurity defense strategies?

iii.

Are the existing information security professionals in government entities
well qualified and experienced to detect and stop cyberattacks?

iv.

How effective are the implemented staff training programs in various
departments?
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v.

Does cybersecurity strategic planning contribute to organizational
cybersecurity effectiveness?

vi.

How effective are the existing user awareness programmes in various
departments?

1.5.2 Research Variables
In order to conduct this study, several variables have been identified as
necessary for developing a robust framework for cybersecurity effectiveness.
Cybersecurity effectiveness in an organization is made up of all the technologies,
processes, procedures, policies, strategies and personnel that work together with the
sole purpose of preventing cyberattacks from doing damage and responding to any
threats against its information systems. Cybersecurity effectiveness is considered the
dependent variable in this study. In order for the cybersecurity of any organization to
become effective, the study theorizes that the conditions forming the independent
variable are met as discussed below.
First, there has to be evidence of senior management support. Evidence of
senior management support includes the presence of a senior officer at the rank of
Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) with
well-defined authority on information security matters in the organization and the
presence of cybersecurity strategic plans for the entire organization or department.
Further, this person must have demonstrated an understanding of cybersecurity
matters in the organization through the deployment of well-qualified information
security teams, supplemented by on-going continued-education programmes;
implementation of effective policies and procedures; training and awareness
programmes and deployment of appropriate technologies for all users; and adoption
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by the organization of international best practices, (Kritzinger and Von Solms, 2010;
Al Bawaba, 2012; Nigel and Rice, 2011).
Operationally, senior management support can be demonstrated in several
ways. In a government department that takes cybersecurity seriously, the day-to-day
operations of issues related to cybersecurity are governed by clear and wellarticulated policies and procedures. These policies and procedures govern the
behaviour of those who use the organization’s information systems. The policies
developed and implemented may range from those relating to email, internet use,
password strength, mobile computing devices, to such issues as access, the
distribution and destruction of documents, visitor management, etc. Employee
awareness of these policies and procedures is a strong indication that the
organization has an effective cybersecurity programme, (Knapp, 2009; Herath and
Rao, 2009; Kritzinger and Smith, 2008; Rotvold, 2008; and Frank et al., 2008)
Second, further evidence that cybersecurity matters are taken seriously by the
organization can be shown by the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans. Well
thought out strategic plans are distributed and properly diffused throughout the
organization and can be described by the senior staff who are responsible for matters
of information security. These plans act as guides for the development of policies
and procedures, training and awareness programmes, (Elbanna, 2010; Grant, 2003;
Dutton and Duncan, 1987; and Andrew, 2014).
The third independent variable is the presence in the organization of
competent information security staff. Evidence for this includes the possession of
academic and industry certifications in the cybersecurity/information security
domain. Moreover, there has to be strong evidence of continuing reminders that
cyber-threat is an ever-changing phenomenon. Awareness of trends in the domain,
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including a knowledge of the current threats, tools and techniques used by cybercriminals, vulnerabilities in the organization’s infrastructure, and the mitigation
strategies used are clear evidence of the seriousness of the agency regarding
cybersecurity. Additionally, these personnel should exhibit deep understanding and
commitment to cybersecurity policies and procedures, (Rowe et al., 2011 and Cisco,
2017 and Siponen et al., 2014).
Fourth, the organization should conduct effective and culturally sensitive
staff training programmes for all its employees; and fifth, it should carry out
adequate number of user awareness programmes. Effective training and awareness
programmes are comprehensive, measurable and regular. An organization that is
serious about cybersecurity needs to put great emphasis on training and awareness
programmes conducted by knowledgeable individuals for all users in the
organization at set intervals during the year. For these training programmes to be
effective, they should be culturally relevant to the audience. Further, measurements
and evaluations should be used to determine the effectiveness of the training and the
measures taken to improve them, (Greitzer et al., 2007; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012;
McCrohan, 2010; Hight, 2005; Kruger et al., 2011; Siponen, 2000; Da Veiga and
Eloff, 2010; and Aloul et al., 2012)
The sixth and final independent variable is the level of technology. It is
believed that government entities that have invested in modern cybersecurity
technologies demonstrate their understanding of cybersecurity risks. There are many
kinds of software and hardware technology already deployed by Abu Dhabi’s
government entities. The most common technologies used globally include different
forms of firewall, data encryption, anti-malware, anti-spyware and anti-virus
scanners, among others. For these tools to be effective, the human element that
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supports and maintains these systems cannot be ignored, since most of these systems
have limitations. From these variables, the following hypotheses are derived for
testing, (Symantec 2016; Hunter, 2013; Choo, 2011; Aloul, 2010; Knapp, 2009; and
Uchenna et al., 2016) among others.

1.6 Significance of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence or
affect the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities and
propose a framework as well as a checklist that can be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of their existing cybersecurity defences. Such a framework and
checklist could be standardized further to provide a benchmark or baseline measure
of cybersecurity effectiveness in many public and private sector organizations. The
researcher investigates the factors that contribute to cybersecurity effectiveness from
both the literature and practice to provide a wider context for the subject. These
factors are then collated into a framework that could easily be applied by the senior
management of such departments to measure their readiness to defend them against
attacks and also respond to attacks should they occur. This is important because
society, specifically UAE society, continues to depend on government services that
are accessible by information systems such as the internet. Any failure of such
systems due to cyber-attack will negatively impact government services ranging
from the immigration services at airports, visa processing for professionals and the
routine issue or renewal of drivers’ licenses to the disruption of critical national
infrastructure, such as electricity, telecommunications and banking.
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1.7 Scope of the Study
In this study, a critical review of the literature regarding cyber and
information security mechanisms in the UAE, the GCC countries and globally is
conducted. Emphasis has been put on identifying the factors needed to evaluate the
effectiveness of cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi’s government entities with a
broad global perspective in mind. The role of senior management in the design and
implementation of appropriate cyber and information security strategic plans,
policies, training and awareness programmes is looked into. Further checks on the
numbers (if any) of competent cyber and information security professionals in Abu
Dhabi’s government entities are needed, as a first step in mitigating the cybersecurity
problem. Additionally, an investigation of the importance of cybersecurity training
and awareness programmes in the prevention of cyberattacks has been critically
pursued. Finally, a framework and checklist are proposed that could be used to assess
the effectiveness of cybersecurity defences for Abu Dhabi’s government entities.

1.8 Justifications for the Research
Cyberattacks on critical National Infrastructure have grown in complexity
globally over the recent years with a focus on the United Arab Emirates, ( Saeed et
al., 2014 and Neuneck and Weizmann, 2013) with recent trends showing a 42%
increase in global cyberattacks by the end of 2015 (Symantec, 2016). Additionally,
global attacks have successfully defeated existing technological solutions by
exploiting human weaknesses within organizations due to ever increasing knowledge
gaps in Cyber and Information security (Uchenna et al., 2016). Further, the Abu
Dhabi Government continues to depend on e-government platforms such the
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Emirates ID to enhance service delivery, however, the drawback to such a system
could be the attraction of more sophisticated attacks from multiple sources of the
world especially from those who may want to exploit the same platform for personal
gains and so seriously cripple government services that range from, immigration
services at airports, visa processing for experts, routine issuing or renewal of driver’s
licenses to disruption of critical national infrastructures such as electricity,
telecommunications and banking (Shackelford et al., 2014 and Shen, 2014).
Therefore, with the above input from available literature and consultations
with subject matter experts in Abu Dhabi government, a study is required to develop
a non-technology based framework as well as checklist for evaluating cybersecurity
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities hence justifying the reason for
conducting this study.

1.9 Research Limitations and Delimitations
1.9.1 Research Limitations
Limitations are potential weaknesses or constraints in a study out of the
researcher’s control that could affect the outcome of the study. This study was
conducted with the following limitations:
i.

Though cybersecurity is a global challenge that affects public and private
organizations, this study is limited to Abu Dhabi’s government entities with
participations from the users, administrators, ICT management and senior
management

ii.

The study concentrates on the effectiveness of the existing cybersecurity
strategies and frameworks employed within these government entities. A
census study approach was taken to gather the research findings about these
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entities but the study results cannot be generalized to other sectors of the
emirate, such the private sector.
iii.

Though many studies have been conducted on cybersecurity globally, little
has been surveyed in the UAE, especially regarding government entities. This
study draws on the few empirical studies that have centred on the Emirate and
also on global contributions in the area of cyber and information security to
generate the theoretical foundation and hypotheses for the study.

1.9.2 Research Delimitations
This study on cybersecurity effectiveness within the Abu Dhabi’s government
entities is based on a series of hypotheses grounded on literature, practice and related
theory. The implementation of the proposed framework and cybersecurity checklist
is not considered to be within the scope of the study. Furthermore, as highlighted by
Birtwhistle and his team (2002), survey instruments are distributed with time
constraints limiting the possibility of maximum response rates. Moreover, the study
was limited to a population of 535 respondents from Abu Dhabi’s government
entities.

1.10 Definition of terms of interest
In this study, some interesting terms were encountered frequently and are
applied in several of its discussions. Some of these terms may be defined as follows:
i.

Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity involves the organization and collection of resources,
processes and structures used to protect the cyberspace and cyberspace
enabled systems from occurrences that are mis-aligned from de facto
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property rights (Craigen et al., 2014).
ii.

Cyberspace
Cyberspace comprises networks, computer hardware, software and other
devices capable of storing and exchanging information across borders
(Kritzinger and Smith, 2008; Obama, 2009).

iii.

Cyber threat
The possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a computer
network or system.

iv.

Cybersecurity Framework
A platform for measuring or evaluating how well a security system
operates. Such frameworks can be used for measuring and or mitigating
the risks involved in cyberattacks on a country’s critical infrastructure
(National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity
Report, 2014).

v.

Training and Awareness Programmes
This represents formal programmes designed for educating employees of
an organization about existing global, national or organizational issues,
such as cyber and information security, corporate policies and procedures.

vi.

Role of Management
The overall responsibilities of management operate through functions
such as planning, organizing, staffing, directing, monitoring and control
to address the critical issues pertaining to an organization, for example,
cybersecurity issues.

vii.

Technology
The application of science and use of practical as well as intellectual
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resources to develop systems and products that address organization-wide
problems.
viii.

Cybersecurity effectiveness
Effective response to global and national cybersecurity challenges.

ix.

Experience
Experience in this context refers to the knowledge or maturity of a subject
gained through involvement or exposure leading to the acquisition of
relevant skills over a period of time.

x.

Strategic Planning
Refers to an organization’s process of defining its strategy or direction to
allow the efficient allocation of resources.

xi.

Qualification of users
Denotes the fitness for purpose of users shown by their fulfilment of all
the necessary conditions, for example, completion of the required skillsbased training or academic level.

xii.

Assets
In the context of this study, assets represent any organization’s
information resources that could be subjected to cyberattacks for example
all forms of data, software, hardware, networks and utility programs that
require monitoring in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.

xiii.

Critical Infrastructure
Represents all sectors whose assets are very vital to the UAE’s national
security. Destruction or attacks on such sectors would pause a devastating
effect on national security and economic drawback. Examples of UAE
Critical Infrastructure includes the communications sector, the Energy
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sector (Oil and Gas sector), International Airports, Transportation systems
among others.

1.11 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation has been organized into five major chapters arranged as
follows. Chapter One introduces the study on cybersecurity globally and in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. A research problem is defined which is
grounded on the fact that the UAE has become a target for many cyberattacks in the
region, as a result of the ever increasing numbers of technologies, economic
activities and people connected to the internet. The broader goal of the study is to
propose a framework and checklist for the evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness
in Abu Dhabi’s government entities. Keeping in mind the goal of the study, the
following specific and measureable objectives emerge in this chapter: 1) examining
the factors contributing to an effective cybersecurity system; and 2) setting research
questions and hypotheses. Hypotheses are developed to build a comprehensive
theoretical framework and underlie the quantitative analysis of this study. In parallel,
the importance of this study is defined and a summary of the entire thesis is offered.
In Chapter Two, the literature from several existing studies, journals, and
published conference papers among others concerning the subject matter is reviewed.
The researcher examines the cyber threat landscape, defining stages of a typical
cyberattack and a cyber-forensic cycle. Moreover, the chapter considers the most
recent cyberattacks in the region and globally, such as the Saudi Aramco and Stuxnet
worm of 2009 (Cressey and Hayfer, 2012; Pepitone, 2011; and Symantec, 2013)
among others, as notable references. Furthermore, the literature on existing global
cybersecurity frameworks and strategies are reviewed to provide a strong foundation
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for this study, the research design and formulation of the security framework
(Burgers et al., 2013; Nambiro et al., 2014; NIST, 2014; and Abraham and Nair,
2015), among others. Additionally, the chapter elaborates the role of strategic
planning, technology and cybersecurity legislation in the UAE and the GCC
countries (Choo, 2011; Cisco, 2017; Hunter, 2013; Aloul et al., 2012; Elbana, 2010;
Grant, 2003, Liedtka, 2000; and Gercke, 2014) are some of the notable references. In
addition, the researcher reviews challenges to the effectiveness of cybersecurity
defences globally and seek to provide an insight into some of the solutions to address
these challenges. Examination of the role of cybersecurity training, awareness and
education in the prevention of cyberattacks is assessed in detail and the role of the
culture in the understanding of cyber and information security issues pertaining to an
organisation is looked into (Siponen, 2000; Kritzinger and Smith, 2008; Rezgui and
Marks, 2008; Kalberg and Bhavani, 2012; Vroom and Solms, 2004; and Leach,
2003), among others. Finally, after a critical review of other study contributions, the
researcher identifies six study hypotheses to guide further analysis and a research gap
that formulates the basis for further investigation and analysis.
Chapter Three presents the methodological approach undertaken to address
the research questions and study hypotheses. A detailed discussion of the research
strategy, tools and the research design is presented. The chapter further presents
various tests conducted to validate and ensure the reliability of the research
instrument, which include the presentation of the instrument to subject-matter
experts, reliability statistics involving the examination of values of Cronbach’s alpha
for all the predefined constructs, and principal component factor analysis against the
research hypotheses to examine the factor loading scores. In the same chapter,
previously existing frameworks such as NIST for assessing cybersecurity
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effectiveness are scrutinized (Tin, 2010). This scrutiny as well as the theoretical
foundation grounded from literature review contributed to the formation of the
proposed framework for the evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness of the Abu
Dhabi’s government entities. Finally, the study analysis tool and justification for
choosing it is briefly discussed, together with a description of the pilot survey
conducted on a midsized organization in Abu Dhabi. In the conclusion of the chapter,
study limitations and ethical issues are discussed.
In Chapter Four can be found the data analysis and study results including the
method of analysis, reliability and validity checks, demographic statistical results,
and correlation results are presented. Finally, Chapter Five discusses the research
contributions, presents a checklist for cybersecurity assessment with the aid of key
check points to evaluate the effectiveness and readiness of a department’s
cybersecurity programme and suggests recommendations as well as directions for
future research.

1.12 Conclusion
Grounded on the primary review of literature and the researcher’s
professional experience in the practice for a period of over 17 years, problems were
identified concerning cybersecurity effectiveness from a management perspective.
Further, the research problem and research gaps were identified for further analysis,
the research questions and variables for the study were also presented. In this way,
the researcher argued to fill these gaps fulfilled by the present study. The main
research contributions were consequently established. A general outline of the
research dissertation was added, to provide insight into the research study, analysis
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and findings. The next chapter presents a detailed review of literature related to the
study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, problems affecting the cybersecurity effectiveness of
organizations and factors that seemed to contribute to organizational cybersecurity
effectiveness were proposed for this study. In this chapter, the researcher presents the
research hypotheses showing the different study relationships examined, further a
critical review of literature on the factors for evaluating the cybersecurity
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities is conducted as a basis for the
theory behind the research study and to identify gaps for further investigation.
Specifically this chapter is divided into seven sections with each successive section
narrowing down the ideas to reveal the gaps that exist and the possible ways of
filling them. In section one, an overview of the cyber-threat landscape is presented
and various terminologies relating to cybersecurity are defined. It considers the view
that cybersecurity is a management issue that requires well-defined senior
management approaches. The impact of cybercrime on organizational performance is
highlighted in this section. Further, the most recent trends and research relating to
cybersecurity threats, defences, and training and awareness programmes developed
around the world are examined. These provide a wide view of the research problem
and hence an insight into the factors that can be proposed for the evaluation of
cybersecurity in Abu Dhabi’s government entities.
Section two looks at the role of Qualifications and Experience (the
competence of staff) in building an effective cybersecurity programme for an
organization. Meanwhile, section three examines the role of management in the
prevention of cyberattacks while section four discusses the common types of
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technology and their role in cyber-crime prevention. In section five the role of staff
training of n the prevention of cyberattacks against an organization is presented.
Section six looks at strategic planning and cybersecurity effectiveness. In
this section, the use of strategic planning tools in addressing uncertain conditions is
emphasized. Section seven discusses the role of cybersecurity user awareness
programmes, followed by a discussion of the regulatory issues and various
cybersecurity frameworks. The literature review chapter ends with an overview of
the existing research gaps for further investigation in this study. The design of this
chapter is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
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2.2 The Cyber Threat Landscape
The present information age has brought many advantages to society, from
ease of access to services through Internet enabled devices to communication and
collaboration over long distances. The UAE Government in particular increasingly
depends on the power of the Internet to provide services to the people and to other
governments across the globe (Al-Khouri, 2012). Most financial institutions charge
extra fees for services provided over the counter, as the expectation is that customers
should access the same services easily online. This dependency on the information
infrastructure has brought new and dangerous risks (Kritzinger and Von Solms,
2010).
Although the Internet has brought new opportunities to society, it has also
brought new opportunities to others whose goals are to exploit inbuilt weaknesses
through cyberattacks (Choo, 2011). A cyber-attack can be defined simply as “any
crime that employs a computer network in any phase of the crime” (Kshetri, 2005).
Senior management’s understanding of the cyber threat landscape is critical to
government operations as a necessary step in developing corrective and preventive
measures. The importance of national cybersecurity strategies was captured in a
speech by President Obama in 2009. He remarked:
“This world cyberspace is a world that we depend on every single day. It is
our hardware and our software, our desktops and laptops and cell phones and
Blackberries that have become woven into every aspect of our lives. It is the
broadband networks beneath us and the wireless signals around us, the local
networks in our schools and hospitals and businesses, and the massive grids
that power our nation. It is the classified military and intelligence networks
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that keep us safe, and the World Wide Web that has made us more
interconnected than at any time in human history. So cyberspace is real and
so are the risks that come with it. It is the great irony of our information age,
the very technologies that empower us to create and to build those who would
disrupt and destroy. And this paradox seen and unseen is something that we
experience every day”, (Obama, 2009).

Numerous attacks, for example, malware, phishing, corrupted programs,
password manipulation, computer session hijacking, denial of service among others,
have increased greatly in the UAE and the GCC in recent years. Examples of such
attacks include the August, 2012 attack that affected ARAMCO, the major oil and
gas company in Saudi Arabia, the Stuxnet worm of 2009 which targeted the
Programmable Logical Controllers (PLC) of the Iranian nuclear industry, the Lulzec
Sony pictures attack that seized the bio data of many people (Cressey and Hayfer,
2012; Pepitone, 2011), the Shamoon Virus that infected over thirty thousand
(30,000) stations and destroyed business processes for almost a week, among others.
These ever increasing information security vulnerabilities in vital or critical
government infrastructure and industrial data can partially be attributed to the large
amounts of data moving into data centres, increased numbers of mobile subscribers
and massive Internet connectivity in the GCC region amounting to 88% by the end of
June 2014.
Furthermore, Cressey and Hayfer (2012) argue that real time threats are more
sophisticated and so require continuous monitoring by government and all other
stakeholders due to the massive threat to data and proprietary information. Much as
governments try to keep pace with these threats, they have not integrated their
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security strategies to provide a more complex solution to cyberattacks. These everincreasing information security threats call for the development of complex
cybersecurity defences for Abu Dhabi’s government entities, the UAE and the entire
GCC region.
Aloul et al. (2012) have looked at the security concerns of the UAE
traditional electrical power grid which will soon evolve into a smart Grid system.
They analyze the vulnerabilities and debate the current and needed security solutions.
Power Grids normally face attacks on intelligent devices and physical connections
attacks such as IP spoofing and denial of service attacks. Therefore, if the UAE grid
fell under a cyber-attack it would pose great danger and loss to the government and
the entire economy. Furthermore, Kwangjo and Kaist (2012) stress that nuclear
power plants are very important infrastructure for providing efficient and
uninterrupted electricity and so require continuous government vigilance and
protection. The use of such digitized systems brings new vulnerabilities and threats
over cyber space due to the unbroken dependence on software and networks.
Therefore, there is need to develop security frameworks that would provide
guidelines or checklists to users of such critical infrastructure in the UAE’s
government entities.
At the same time Assante and Tobey (2011) provide an insight into educating
the cybersecurity workforce by proposing the need to devise ways of producing
competent information security professionals who can build, manage and secure
reliable digital infrastructures as well as effectively identifying plans for such threats.
They present a model for developing the next generation of cyber workers which
combines assessments, simulations, customization and support systems. However,
their model suitability to Abu Dhabi’s government departmental setup may not be
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assured, since it was found to be less effective for interconnected networks. There is
need to build a framework which can aid the robust UAE interconnected network
systems to enable joint detection and control cyber threats; this is the major
contribution of this dissertation.
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research report (2013), asserts
that government efforts to protect critical infrastructure and undertake law
enforcement in the cyber sphere are complicated, due to the fact that most of the
infrastructure and assets involved are owned and operated by private sector
organizations with diverse motivations and competing impartialities to protect. This
complicates the entire legislation and law enforcement process. For instance, civil
liberties may be mostly concerned about protecting people’s rights instead of
protecting people’s privacy online.
Additionally, attackers have raised their levels of organization and research,
especially in the area of cloud security and desktop virtualization which are
envisioned to be the hub for the next generation of data storage areas for critical
organizational data. The cyber criminals have been much inspired by recent political
instabilities, especially in the Arab region, and monetary support from some
hacktivist groups. In addition, most recent statistics show a dramatic increase in UAE
cybersecurity threats; for instance official statistics from the Dubai police show a
dramatic 88% increase in the number of electronic crime cases reported in 2013 as
compared to the year before (https://securelist.com/the-rise-of-cybercrime-in-dubaiand-uae/63682/, accessed, 22nd September, 2017). The cyber investigation
department of Dubai Police received a total of 1,820 reports in 2015, representing an
increase of 15% over the previous year (Symantec, 2016). This trend validates a
continued increase in cybercrime within the United Arab Emirates which signifies a
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major requirement for cybersecurity research in the region to reduce the existing
knowledge gap. The trend in Dubai’s cybercriminal cases can be seen in Figure 3
below:
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Figure 3: Cyber-criminal Cases in Dubai Source: Symantec, 2016

From Figure 3 above, the number of cybersecurity threats reported by the
Dubai police was analysed for a period of five years, from 2011 to 2015. While the
data show that cyber-crimes have been on the increase in the UAE, they are not
conclusive as the increase could be attributed to other causes such as increase in
awareness of the crime, hence more victims reporting it. Still, such data provide the
justification for the UAE government and Abu Dhabi’s government entities in
particular to advance their cybersecurity defences.
The Middle East has been recognized as the most attacked region in the
world, especially due to the recent shift in economic growth from southwards to
eastwards. For instance, according to Symantec, 1.5 million people or about 17% of
the entire population of the UAE were victims of cyber-crime in 2011 and it is
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claimed that each of the victims suffered an average loss of $283.00 making an
estimated loss of over $400 million (Symantec, 2016).
A still more worrying trend has been identified by information security
researchers in the region/ It is suspected that cyber-criminals were able to record
magnetic information and PINS from bank ATM machines to create replica cards
which were used after to scam customers, leading to exposure of their critical
financial information and losses Hunter (2013). It is further revealed that since bank
ATM networks are not always connected to the Public Internet, most of the
fraudsters uploaded the malware codes through insiders Choo (2010). Therefore,
more work needs to be done by the government to install state of the art technologies
to cub insider attacks. Further, more work needs to be done especially in training
innocent users in the importance of protecting critical organizational assets and
personal data from any form of unauthorised access. A number of challenges exist
for both space and cyber domains against the existing defensive strategies
implemented by organizations; daily threats posed by attackers require senior
management in organizations to set the right priorities especially in resource
allocation, governance, decision making and the right security culture for all
employees. Some of the major challenges to cybersecurity defences are presented in
the next section.

2.3 Challenges to the Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Defences
The cybersecurity issue has been critically analysed as a global challenge.
While there are multiple ongoing efforts that seek to enhance cybersecurity, an
integrated governmental strategy to meet the challenges has only begun and has not
been fully implemented. It is envisaged that all strategies demand recognition of risk
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and the prioritization of resources. Therefore, governments need to focus on key
national security problems and provide solutions for the enhancement of
cybersecurity defences.
The International Telecommunications Union report (2012) revealed a
number of challenges in the prevention of cybercrime globally. First was
organizations’ over-reliance on ICTs for the control and management of security
functions in buildings, cars, aviation services, water and energy supply, which has
made the systems more vulnerable to different forms of cyber-attack. This overreliance means that a cyber-attack could lead to catastrophic results that might be life
threatening. A good example is the recent “Wannacry” attack affecting several
London hospitals in May, 2017. The second challenge is the fact that

there has

been an overwhelming increase in the number of Internet users to the tune of 3
billion users world-wide, representing 50% of the global population (Source: Internet
Live Stats (www.InternetLiveStats.com)). The large number of the public connected
to the Internet poses a huge challenge to the authorities in designing and
implementing adequate preventative measures from attacks that emanate literally
from anywhere in the world (Aloul et al., 2012; Kwangjo and Kaist, 2012). While
there are delays in establishing regulations and effective measures in response to
such threats as they emerge, attackers are able to adjust their techniques quickly to
combat any technological advancements.
Elbanna (2010) argues that whereas it is cheap to mobilize cyberattacks,
technologies for guarding against such crimes have become more and more
expensive. Therefore, the war against cybercrime should be jointly handled by all
stakeholders in the UAE region with major support from government. Furthermore,
the problem can be eliminated by a combination of defensive technologies,
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continuous in-depth analysis, traditional diplomacy and culturally sensitive
cybersecurity training and awareness programmes. More still, top management in the
various government entities, especially the chief executive level (C-Level), need to
be very vigilant in the planning stages for their organizations by incorporating
cybersecurity in their strategic plans.
It has been revealed that new approaches to cybersecurity have emerged,
based on the analysis of data on successful attacks to replace the counter reactive
network security methods used in the past. These new approaches encourage
continuous monitoring of the health of networks with relatively straightforward
mitigation strategies to provide a basis for better cybersecurity. It is further conveyed
that most governments have not agreed on the “rules” which can be applied to
cyberspace nor how to apply the existing “rules” for espionage, crime and warfare.
Most attackers take advantage of the Internet’s ability to seamlessly cross borders
and so reside in countries that tolerate their activities and therefore sit outside the
grasp of national law enforcement (Andrew, 2014).
It should also be noted that improving primary level security may not solve or
isolate the cybersecurity problems completely, but merely make them more
manageable and ultimately easier to solve. Therefore, the prevention of cyberattacks
against critical national infrastructure should be a continuous effort by all
stakeholders in government entities. Most organizations that fall prey to attacks are
found to possess exploitable weaknesses in their operations and security systems.
Lydon (2013) further reveals that 96% of the breaches occurring in the year 2012
could have been avoided if the victims had put in place simple or intermediate
controls. 85% of the penetrations took months to be discovered and if discovered
were often reported by third parties rather than the victims.
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The nature of cyberattacks is comparable to the nature of conventional attacks
by the military. Just like conventional wars, such as the recent Iraq and Afghanistan
wars, cyberattacks are launched with specific goals in mind. Understanding these
goals would help management to know who the enemy in cyberspace is.
Another challenge is the need to understand the motivations and the
propagators behind cyberattacks. Kshetri (2005) draws from the psychology and
economic literature to identify the motivations for cyberattacks. He splits the
attackers into two broad groups: those with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The
theory of intrinsic motivation assumes that an individual does something because of
the enjoyment derived from the activity, and not for the result to be achieved in the
end. In cyberspace this could be compared to an individual or group of individuals
who enjoy developing malware or viruses for the sake of it. Extrinsic motivation
maintains that human behaviour is driven by a goal external to people. Extrinsically
motivated individuals are then likely to attack organizations to steal information of
financial value, or target banks and even individuals to divert funds to accounts
within their jurisdiction.
Most human behaviour is probably some variant of the two motivators. A
report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission of 2013
identified perpetrators of cyberattacks from China as falling into four categories,
namely: Military groups, the Intelligence service, Independent actors such as; 1.
“activists”, 2. “for profit hackers”, 3. “purely criminal hackers”; and 4. “Corporate”
actors. It is also noteworthy that widely available reports indicate that Russian
government backed actors were responsible for hacking attempts to influence the
2016 U.S. Presidential elections (United States Congress, 2017)
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Whereas two of the groups, military and intelligence, are state sponsored, the
Independent actors may not be directly sponsored by the state but its members are
often hired by the state to conduct cyberattacks on its behalf. With the increase of
state owned companies in the military-industrial complex and telecommunications
industries, cyber-attackers in industry aim at gaining intellectual property from their
Western counterparts illegally.

2.4 Types of Cyberattacks
Discussions of the cyber threat landscape in the UAE cannot be accomplished
without considering the types of attack launched by cyber-criminals as in Table 1.
Understanding various attacks is particularly critical to those trusted as the guardians
of data and the infrastructure they use. Furthermore, senior management who head
government organizations in Abu Dhabi’s government entities should have a high
level of understanding of how the various forms of cyberattacks happen and their
effect on critical national infrastructure. This would aid the development of
appropriate strategic plans, policies and procedures in the departments to protect
against cyberattacks and malicious activity. While there are many types of cyberattack, most of the disastrous activities are species of Malware and Phishing.
Cyberattacks increased by 43% worldwide between 2014 and 2015 according
to Symantec (2016). However, while some forms of attack increased, there were
noticeable reductions in others. Such changing and extreme changes in the attacks
imply that senior management needs to be familiar with the ever changing cyberlandscape to allow effective resource allocation and timely responses. The table
below summarises the attack landscape for the period 2014 to 2015 as shown in the
Symantec Report of 2016. Meanwhile, a report by McAfee in 2014 indicated that
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more than 307 new security threats were generated every minute and that mobile
malware samples had grown steadily to about 16 percent during the first quarter of
2013, while overall malware surging grew by 76 percent over the same year
(McAfee, 2014). The researchers acknowledged new attempts to attack which take
advantage of Internet trust models, e.g. secure socket layer (SSL) susceptibilities
such as Heart bleed and the continued abuse of digital signatures to cover malware as
legitimate code McAfee Report (2014). Furthermore, the report predicted that in
2015 and beyond malicious parties would seek to extend their ability to avoid
detection over long periods, by adopting cyber espionage capabilities for monitoring
and collecting valuable data over extended targeted attacks. It added that more
aggressive efforts to identify application, operating system and network
vulnerabilities were needed, and so was an increasing focus on the limitations of
sandboxing technologies as hackers attempt to evade applications and hypervisorbased detection.
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Table 1: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2016
Attack Type

2014

2015

Trend

Overall Email Virus Rate

1-in-244

1-in 220

Increasing

Overall Email Phishing Rate

1-in-965

1-in-1846

Decreasing

Mobile Malware Families Increase
(% Increase over previous year)

32%

214%

Increasing

Crypto-ransomware

269,000

362,000

Increasing

Web Attacks Blocked / Day

493,000

1.1 Million

Increasing

New Mobile Vulnerabilities

168

528

Increasing

From Table 1 above, the results show a considerable decrease in Email
Phishing Rates from 1 in 965 in 2014 to 1 in 1846 in 2015. However, attacks
increased via mobile malware to the tune of 214% over the year 2014. Results also
showed an increase of crypto-ransomware from 269,000 in 2014 to 362,000 in 2015
Symantec (2016). Detailed discussion of the types of malware follows next.
2.4.1 Malware
In recent years, it has become evident that the most significant pieces of
suspect code are used in many computer systems sitting on critical information
infrastructure. Abu Dhabi’s government needs to strengthen its security defences by
establishing and maintaining strong malware incident response strategies, especially
for critical national infrastructure. Malware is defined as malicious software such as
a virus, specifically designed to disrupt or damage a computer system or any critical
communication networks. Malware is ranked as the greatest threat to business,
government critical infrastructure and individuals Choo (2010). It can be divided into
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two broad forms; (a) generic malware that targets the general population; (b)
customized information stealing malware which targets specific institutions. These
two forms can further be divided into three major categories. This is mainly based on
the way in which they enter a computer system and their behaviour once they have
attacked. These broad categories are as follows

a. Viruses
A virus is a software program that enters a computer system through selfreplication by inserting copies of itself into host programs or system data files.
Viruses are often triggered through user interaction processes such as the opening of
files, running of programs, or exchange of USB storage devices. They can be divided
into compiled Viruses that are executed by an operating system like file infectors,
boot sector viruses that affect the Master Boot Record (MBR), multipartite viruses,
which combine the characteristics of file infectors and boot sector viruses and
interpreted viruses which are normally executed by running applications.

b. Worms
Worms are self-replicating programs that execute themselves without user
intermediation. They are divided mainly into Network Service Worms, which exploit
vulnerabilities in a network service and Mass Mailing Worms, which are selfcontained such as Trojan horses. Several types of attacker tool may be delivered to a
system as part of a malware infection or other system compromise. These tools allow
attackers to gain unauthorized access to or use of infected systems and their data, or
to launch additional attacks. A popular type of attacker tool is a backdoor. A
backdoor allows attackers to perform a certain set of actions on a system, for instance
authenticating themselves by acquiring passwords or executing arbitrary system
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commands. Typical backdoor malware includes zombies that are installed on a
system for the purpose of attacking other systems; remote administration tools,
which are installed on a system to enable a remote attacker to gain access to the
system’s functions and data as needed; and E-Mail generators which generate
programs that can be used to create and send large quantities of e-mail, such as
malware, spyware, and spam.

c. Trojan Horses
A Trojan horse is a program in which malicious or harmful code is contained
inside apparently harmless programming or data in such a way that it can get control
and do its chosen form of damage, such as ruining the file allocation table on a hard
disk or any other form of external storage device. Progressively, Trojan horses
constitute the first stage of an attack and their primary purpose is to stay under cover
while replicating themselves within systems by downloading and installing stronger
threats, such as a bot. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojan horses cannot spread by
themselves. They are often distributed to a victim in an email message through
deceptions such as images or jokes; or through a malicious website, which installs
the Trojan horse on a computer through vulnerabilities via web browser software
such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or Mozilla. After it is installed, the Trojan horse
lurks silently in the infected system, invisibly continuing its misdeeds, such as
downloading spyware, while the victim continues innocently with normal activities.

2.4.2 Mobile Malware
The ever rising popularity of mobile devices in payment systems and across
the counter has increased their value to attackers; hence the increasing attacks
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outside unregulated third party app stores. While mobile malware continues to
remain an emerging threat, software that uses aggressive advertising frameworks,
known as adware, is more persistent. The threats will continue to grow as attackers
find ways to avoid the protection of the mobile eco-system. Attacks such as the
Android defender in 2013 are very common for mobiles. Other attacks continued in
2014, including OlegPliss, an attack on Apple’s iCloud that locked victim’s phones
by using the “Find-My-iPhone” functionality. Attacks on smart phones have
increased recently because they present more capabilities in data storage and
application features (Symantec, 2016). The UAE’s government entities, therefore,
need to implement strategies for controlling the mobile devices used in all
government entities.
2.4.3 Phishing Attacks
Aloul (2010) looks at “Phishing” as a form of “Social Engineering” Internet
fraud, aimed at stealing valuable user information such as credit card information,
social security numbers and user credentials. Such fraudulent activities start by
creating a fake website that looks exactly like that of a known legitimate organization
but with a slightly different URL address. In many cases, the attackers target
financial institutions such as banks, and other big firms dealing in e-commerce
transactions. An email is sent to thousands of Internet users asking them to access the
counterfeit websites, which are replicas of the trusted sites, to update their records by
entering their personal details, including security access codes. These pages
generally look genuine and the email seems to have come from addresses that are
identical to the original organization address. However, such email can be falsified
by a hacker and actually comes from the hacker’s computer.

39
According to Choo et al. (2007) cyberattacks can be “syntactic”, “semantic”
or “blended”. Syntactic attacks are those that develop computer code in the form of
a virus, Trojan horse or worm which is then used to infect other computers by
exploiting weaknesses in their software or hardware. Attacks of this kind using
malware are “syntactic”. Semantic attacks take advantage of human social behaviour
and weaknesses to gain personal information which are then used in the cyberattacks.
Blended attacks, for their part, use “technical tools to facilitate social engineering in
order to gain privileged information”.

Phishing attacks are a type of social

engineering. They represent online scams that frequently use unsolicited messages
purporting to originate from legitimate organizations, particularly banking and other
finance services, to deceive victims into revealing financial or Personal Identity
Information (PII) to commit or facilitate other crimes (Choo, 2010).
The United Arab Emirates was in the frontline of phishing attacks in the
Middle East and North African countries (MENA) in 2014, with one-third of
attempts aimed at stealing money according to the latest data collected by the
Kaspersky Lab study on “Financial Cyber Threats in 2013”. The study reveals that
over 38.38 percent of phishing attacks in the region were targeted at UAE followed
by Saudi Arabia (29.31 percent), Egypt (10.16 percent), Qatar (9.64 percent), Kuwait
(6.29 percent) and Oman (6.21 percent). To combat such complicated cyber and
information

security challenges,

organizations

need

to

recruit

competent

cybersecurity staff with the right knowledge and experience to resolve cyberattacks.
Next we investigate if any relationship exists between the competence of
cybersecurity staff and the effectiveness of their organization’s cybersecurity
programmes (Wunderle, 2006).
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2.4.4 Competence/ Knowledge of Staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H1)
In order to bridge the existing cybersecurity skills gap and the ever changing
cyber threat landscape in most organizations, the experience and qualifications of
professionals should be emphasized. Evidence of quality cybersecurity support staff
includes the possession of hands on skills in cybersecurity and relevant academic
qualifications and industry certifications in the cyber and information security
domain. Further, there has to be strong evidence of continuing education, given that
the cyber-threat is an ever changing one with unique attacker profiles created and
published to the global networks from time to time. Awareness of trends in the
domain includes knowledge of the current threats, tools and techniques used by
cyber-criminals; vulnerabilities in the organization’s infrastructure and mitigation
strategies used; these are clear evidence of the seriousness of the agency in
cybersecurity.
The personnel will exhibit deep understanding and commitment to
cybersecurity policies and procedures in place to ensure the optimum protection of
the innocent users. However, certification alone should not be the yardstick in
determining how well a potential candidate will fit into an organization’s
cybersecurity programme, since many professionals pass the tests and earn the
certificates but lack experience and job skills. At the end of the day, experience as
well as certification (qualifications) should be the criterion for hiring most
cybersecurity professionals. Rowe et al. (2011) reveal a shortage of about 20,00030,000 qualified cybersecurity specialists in the US public sector alone, yet it is one
of the most financially facilitated countries in its cybersecurity. Authors reveal that
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only graduates with the right skills and experience will be able to resolve the ever
rising level of international cyber conflict.
According to the new cybersecurity workforce study by ISACA’s
Cybersecurity Nexus (ISACA and RSA Conference, 2016), as enterprises invest
more resources in data protection, their main challenge still remains that of finding
top-flight security practitioners with the right skills for the job. “When positions go
unfilled, organizations have a higher exposure to potential cyber-attack, in “a race
against the clock”, according to Christos Dimitriadis, ISACA board chair and group
director of Information Security. The report further reveals that most job applicants
do not have the hands-on experience and or certifications required to combat today’s
corporate hackers, leaving the organizations vulnerable to all forms of cyber-attack.
It is therefore recommended that organizations invest in performance-based
mechanisms for recruitment, create a culture of talent maximization and staff
retention and groom employees with tangential skills to fill the available
cybersecurity positions. (www.isaca.org/Cybersecurity Skills Gap Leaves 1 in 4
Organizations exposed).
Evidence of quality cybersecurity support staff includes the possession of
academic and industry certifications in the cybersecurity/information security
domain. Further, there has to be strong evidence of continuing education, given that
the cyber-threat is an ever changing one. Awareness of trends in the domain,
including knowledge of the current threats, tools and techniques used by cybercriminals; vulnerabilities in the organization’s infrastructure and the mitigation
strategies used are clear evidence of the seriousness of the agency in cybersecurity.
Additionally, these personnel will exhibit deep understanding and commitment to
cybersecurity policies and procedures. This research strongly contends that a strong
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relationship exists between the experience and qualifications of cybersecurity staff
(hereafter ‘the competence of staff’) and the cybersecurity effectiveness of their
organizations. On this basis, we formulate the following hypothesis: H1: There is a
positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of staff and cybersecurity
effectiveness.
Even if organizations recruit competent staff, senior management needs to
play a great role in the cybersecurity programmes of the organization. Sadly, many
organizations’ cybersecurity teams continue to struggle to convince senior
management of cybersecurity issues. Likewise, senior management also struggles to
effectively articulate cybersecurity strategy and policies to technical cybersecurity
personnel. It is as though two parts of the same organization were speaking a foreign
language to one another, and each party had a very little or no knowledge of the other
party’s language (Cisco, 2017). Therefore, the role of senior management in ensuring
the effectiveness of the existing cybersecurity programme and information security
strategy needs to be well understood. In the next section, the role of senior
management in the cybersecurity effectiveness of organizations is described.

2.5 Senior Management Support and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H2)
Senior management are required to exercise “due care” and “due process” in
ensuring the cybersecurity effectiveness of their organizations. To this end, they
have multiple tools at their disposal that range from the application of management
tools such as strategic planning to ensure a sufficient budgetary allocation for cyber
and information security. Strategic planning can be defined as a written plan used by
an organization to guide its activities so that certain predefined objectives can be
achieved to ensure improved performance in future (Elbanna, 2010). These plans
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usually take into account the prevailing economic and technological environment
under which the firm operates, its strengths and weaknesses which influence how or
whether to take advantage of the opportunities available under normal conditions as
well as mitigating any threats that it may encounter (Glaister and Falshaw,1999).
Organizations need to include mechanisms for detection, prevention, mitigation,
response, reconstitution and remediation against the different forms of cyber and
information security threat into their long term organizational strategic planning,
strategic policies and frameworks. In this study, we investigate whether senior
management in various Abu Dhabi government entities have incorporated
cybersecurity planning into their organizations’ strategic plans, policies and
frameworks.
Studies reveal that cyber-crime has an overwhelming effect on a company
and could damage its positioning in the market place Rees (2011). In the case of
government entities, it could lead to criticism and loss of public trust Zhao (2010).
As such, the prevention of cyber activities is considered a strategic management
issue for both the private and public sectors. Dutton and Duncan (1987) proposes that
strategic planning comprises “markets for strategic issues”. The authors contend that
these “strategic issues” can either represent problems to the organization if not acted
upon, or opportunities when acted upon.

Any department or organization that

expects cybersecurity as a strategic issue and takes appropriate action in response
will stand to benefit. Given the incidence of cyber-criminal activities in recent years,
stakeholders would rather deal with organizations that do not have the negative
publicity of losing massive amounts of sensitive data. The stakeholder’s opinion of
corporate readiness in addressing cybersecurity is therefore critical in the fight
against the varied forms of cyber and information security challenges globally and
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the UAE in particular. While an increasing number of organizations in the UAE
already use strategic planning as a management tool, they have not realised the
positive impression of its benefits Elbanna (2010) Their use is limited to what Brews
and Purohit (2007) name “symbolic” or “rational” planning. The former points out
the overall mission, vision and purpose of the organization. Rational planning starts
with high level statements set out in the symbolic planning and breaks it down
further into action plans, time lines and accountabilities. While this kind of planning
is common among organizations that conduct strategic planning, it fails to deal with
unpredictable situations that arise following a cyber-attack (Ginsberg, 1997).
The kind of strategic planning that is better positioned to deal with
cyberattacks would be either transactive or procreative. Transactive planning
requires constant feedback from management that further modifies and fine-tunes the
plan to suit the current situation.

Procreative planning instead “encourages

product/service innovation and the degree to which plans encourage internal process
innovation” (Brews and Purohit, 2007). Liedtka (2000) extends the procreative
planning model further. In her paper entitled, “Strategic Planning as a Contribution
to Strategic Change: A Generative Model,” an alternative model of the strategic
planning process is proposed. Her theory advocates separating strategic planning
into two features, cognitive and behavioural. The author argues that strategic change
begins with a cognitive framework in the minds of managers, with the creation of a
gap in their view of the current situation and the image of a future to which they
aspire. From the above argument, C-level management in various government
entities needs to create frameworks that incorporate cybersecurity changes and their
effects on organizations’ information assets.
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The second process of strategic management advocated by the same study is
the “behavioural” process, where organizational members must begin to act in new
ways according to the present situation. It is these new actions and the lessons
learned from the new routines that create capabilities which allow the organizations
to close the ever-increasing gap between “today’s reality and tomorrow’s vision”
(Liedtka, 2000, pp. 200). It is further argued that the application of the cognitive
process leads to an increased level of awareness and attitude changes necessary for
addressing the information security issues raised. Strategic planning has to be
thoughtful and conscious; it results in understanding the present situation, projecting
a desired future outcome and then applying a process to come up with concrete steps
in bridging the current gaps.
While the author confirms that many empirical studies show an association
between strategic planning and performance, as measured by economic indicators.
The findings of her study, paradoxically do not reveal any relationship between
strategic planning and cybersecurity. We intend to establish these relationships as
part of the findings of this study. Since strategic planning is a management tool that
guides organizations in the management of change in turbulent times and since
cyber-criminal events can have disastrous results to critical organization
infrastructure and information assets, we propose a framework that incorporates
strategic management into the cybersecurity planning for all Abu Dhabi’s
government entities.
Meanwhile Rohmeyer (2006) reveals that information security managers are
expected to work as information mediators between the general management
departments and the technical departments to ensure smooth information
dissemination. The authors further claim that high effectiveness in information
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security management is positively related to the skills and experience of the
information security officer. According to the (ISACA and RSA conference, 2016) a
global survey was conducted on 461 cybersecurity managers and practitioners,
suggesting that 75% of the respondents expected to fall prey to cyberattacks by the
end of 2016. This implies that Senior Management needs to demonstrate cyber
resiliency support through proactive measures in policy enforcement, budgetary
support for cybersecurity technologies and training programmes, among other
methods to ensure the effectiveness of the programmes. They highlight a struggle to
acquire enough skilled cybersecurity staff, with over 60% of the recruited individuals
failing to resolve complex incidents.
2.5.1 Evidence of Senior Management Support
Evidence of senior management support includes the presence of a senior
officer at the rank of Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Chief Information Security
Officer (CISO) with well-defined authority in information security matters in the
organization and the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans for the entire
organization. This person further should have demonstrated an understanding of
cybersecurity matters in the organization through the deployment of well qualified
information security teams supplemented by on-going education programmes; the
implementation of effective policies and procedures; training and awareness
programmes for all users; appropriate technologies; and the adoption of international
best practices.
Further evidence that cybersecurity matters are taken seriously by the
organization can be shown by the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans. Well
thought out strategic plans are distributed throughout the organization and can be

47
described by the senior staff which is responsible for matters of information security.
These plans act as guides for the development of policies and procedures, training
and awareness programmes.
In a government department that takes cybersecurity seriously, the day-to-day
operations of issues related to cybersecurity are governed by clear and wellarticulated policies and procedures. These policies and procedures govern user
behaviour in the organization’s information systems. The policies developed and
implemented may range from those relating to email, Internet use, password strength,
mobile computing devices, to issues such as access, distribution and destruction of
documents, visitor management, etc. User awareness of these policies and procedures
is a strong indication that the organization has an effective cybersecurity programme.
From this section we arrive at the following two hypothesis: H2: There is a positive
relationship between senior management support and cybersecurity effectiveness;
Next we evaluate the role of the technology level in ensuring an effective
cybersecurity platform.

2.6 Level of Technology and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H3)
2.6.1 Effective Technologies for the Prevention of Cyberattacks
Government entities that have invested in the latest cybersecurity
technologies demonstrate better understanding of cybersecurity risks than those
without cybersecurity investment budgets. There are numerous kinds of software
and hardware technology already deployed by Abu Dhabi’s government entities.
The most common technologies used globally include different forms of firewall,
data encryption, anti-malware, anti-spyware and anti-virus scanners, among others.
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For these tools to be effective, the human element that supports and maintains these
systems cannot be ignored, for most of these systems have limitations.
In the electronic world, even though the access problem has been greatly
resolved through advanced technologies, for example, the application of database
and electronic records of management systems when handling most of the business
transactions, a new encounter is generated when it comes to managing information
access. Furthermore, as software vendors increase the functionality of mobile
computing platforms and web services, the availability of data increases drastically.
However, this rapid increase leads to other challenging issues such as the
confidentiality and integrity of information. The early design of the Internet focused
mainly on shared access and trust, with security measures as an afterthought. Many
of the designed Internet protocols depend on trust between individuals to give their
services, which may not be very effective especially for today’s complex traffic,
involving highly sensitive transactions between people and institutions. Such
challenges pose significant demands for highly secure software and hardware
platforms to maintain the appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity and access to
critical data (Conklin, 2006).
Technological advancement is a key issue of concern, especially when it
comes to the prevention and mitigation of cyber and malware attacks. However, as
more vigilant corporations continue to implement more effective security defences in
the UAE, threat actors have progressively stepped up their attacks on government
entities, middle-tier and small organizations, many of which may not have security
devices to match those of larger businesses. Small firms often consider themselves
too insignificant to attract threat actors which is clearly a misperception. It is
important to note that sophisticated opponents often target small and medium-sized
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organizations as a means to gain a base on the interconnected business ecosystems of
the larger organizations that partner with the smaller ones. This dangerous situation
is compounded by the fact that big companies often make little effort to monitor the
security of their partners, suppliers, and supply chains, (Price, 2015). Organizations
need to invest heavily and periodically upgrade their cybersecurity technology if they
are to match the onslaughts of cybercrime.
It is critical for cybersecurity experts and C-Level officers within government
entities and the private sector to understand the risks associated with new
technologies deployed within their organizations. The ever increasing threats to
cyber and information security, at the level of the individual, the firm, and
government and critical infrastructure, make security everyone’s obligation. Abu
Dhabi’s government needs to ensure that the highest level of security is embedded in
all national identification documents such as the Emirates identity card, driver’s
licence and labour card. More still, management needs to determine appropriate
levels of risk tolerance, security requirements and the necessary technical safeguards
to ensure the protection of such highly sensitive documents.
Based on some great technological advances, the Cyberspace Policy review
by PwC identified vulnerabilities in cybersecurity as systemic risks introduced into
infrastructure, defence, and personal property resulting from the widespread adoption
of and dependence on various technologies. The more a nation relies on cyberspace
as a critical part of its national infrastructure, the more responsibility it has to protect
it. In addition, the Internet is constantly changing the way we live and conduct our
business. These changes occur both in ways that we currently experience (ecommerce, real-time information access, e-learning, expanded communication
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options, among others) and in ways that we have yet to experience or understand
(Price, 2014).
A growing percentage of Internet and information access is through
broadband connections, now that most users and organizations are increasingly
interconnected across physical and logical networks. Network and system
connectivity has broadened; the volume of electronic information exchanged through
cyberspace has thus increased to include multimedia, process control signals and
other forms of data. Several software and hardware solutions to protect organizations
from cyber and information security vulnerabilities such as malware attacks have
been widely deployed in industry and government entities across the globe and the
UAE. However, the question whether these technologies are effective in doing their
job remains unanswered. It is critical to focus on the rapid detection of security
intrusions and an effective, timely response to malware incidents. Therefore to
address this concern, Abu Dhabi’s government needs to reposition its security
strategy by establishing a close link between technology, processes, people skills and
appropriate risk management activities. Several people including some in
government still see information security as mainly a technical problem and believe
that by simply buying the right software and hardware platforms, they will resolve
the issues and security concerns involved. However, this may not be the case, since
information security involves people, processes, and technology; hence, a balance
between these integral parties needs to be struck.
Most organizations are no longer certain if their present technologies,
methods and strategies are still adequate to prevent future cyberattacks. The
sophisticated technologies which have been developed globally by many
organizations may not be a solution to the prevention of low level attacks by new
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viruses that continually damage protected systems worldwide, affecting millions of
systems.
There are numerous kinds of technologies deployed to protect firms from
different forms of cyber and malware attacks. Some of these technologies like
biometric systems are meant to provide edge protection to entry points while others
provide assurances against data modification. The most common technologies used
globally include the different forms of firewalls, data encryption, anti-malware, antispyware and anti-virus scanners, among others. Other technologies provide means of
recovery in case of successful attacks being launched (Rees, 2011). Regardless of
these technologies deployed, their sole purposes include the following:

a. Confidentiality of information by ensuring that information or data is only
accessible by an authorized persons.
b. Integrity that is acquired by ensuring that information or data can only be
modified by only the authorized persons and no-one else and that no theft of
information occurs.
c. Availability by ensuring that information systems will not be disrupted or
users denied access as a result of malicious behaviour such as a cyber-attack.
Most of the cyberattacks across the Internet are opportunistic rather than
attacks targeting specific business entities or government entities. An opportunistic
attack occurs when an attacker targets several parties by using one or many of the
common ways to attack such parties, in the hope that some of them will prove
vulnerable. In an opportunistic attack, an attacker has many targets and will not care
much who the victims are, but how of them fall into the trap. Organizations have also
started realizing that new technologies assumed to prevent cyberattacks have their
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own drawbacks and vulnerabilities. It must therefore be acknowledged that more
than simply investing in new technologies, organizations must develop complete
strategies, solutions and methods to combat security problems. Furthermore, the
question of the adequacy of the available software and hardware solute, such as
password protection, secret key encryption, public key Encryption, Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) Access Control Lists (ACLs) and other security protocols still remains
an issue of great concern (Bronk and Eneken, 2013).
2.6.2 Software Solutions
Several software solutions exist globally which make a considerable effort to
detect, prevent, mitigate and protect organizations from different forms of cyberattack. We review some of the common ones below:

2.6.2.1 The Use of Encryption Codes
Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a
way that spies or hackers cannot read it. In an encryption scheme, the message or
information is encrypted by an encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable
code. This is usually done by means of an encryption key, which specifies how the
message is to be encoded. Encryption at a very primitive level protects data privacy
and their integrity. But more use of encryption brings more challenges to
cybersecurity. Encryption is also used to protect data in transit, for example, data
being transferred via networks (e.g. the Internet, e-commerce), mobile telephones,
wireless microphones, wireless intercoms, etc. Hence, by encrypting the code one
can know if any information has been leaked.
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According to the Emerging Cyber Threats Report (2015), encryption could be
a solution in online transactions, although it is still difficult to apply effectively, since
most governments have continued to resist its deployment due to their great fear of
failing to gather the necessary evidence. Furthermore, it is clear that while the
privacy concerns of most sensitive users and technology companies lie in data
collection, government officials and security conscious citizens are most worried
over the loss of visibility into the activities of malicious actors. The major concern is
the relationship between technology and privacy since every new technology poses a
new privacy threat to an organizations. Encrypting data before it moves into the
cloud may be a key solution for compromising data since the user could access them
only after a complete decryption process. However, we are not sure if the existing
encryption algorithms may not be easily compromised by attackers with superior
counter algorithms.

2.6.2.2 Anti-Virus Software
Antivirus software is a computer program that detects, prevents, and takes
action to deactivate or remove malicious software programs from host computers or
any other electronic devices. Such malicious programs include spyware, viruses,
worms and Trojan horses. The most common antivirus programs include an autoupdate feature that enables the program to download profiles of new virus definitions
so that it can check for them as soon as they are discovered. The antivirus software
products discover malware mainly by looking at certain characteristics of known
instances. Such sets of characteristics are known as signatures. Signatures are highly
effective for identifying known malware and are also often a good means of
identifying new modifications of known malware, such as a macro virus that has
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been altered slightly from the original. The major antivirus vendors usually release
signatures for a significant new threat within several hours, a remarkable feat
considering that each vendor must analyse the threat, write a signature, test it, and
distribute it, along with documentation. Because signatures are based on known
threats, they are not capable of identifying completely new malware. To address this,
antivirus software vendors have incorporated heuristic techniques into their products;
these techniques are designed to identify unknown instances of malware by
examining many characteristics of files.
2.6.3 Hardware Solutions
Several hardware solutions for the prevention, detection, response, counter
attack and surveillance to combat the various forms of cyber-attack have been
developed. The question is whether these existing technologies can be enough to
combat the cybersecurity problems in society. Some of these existing technologies
are discussed in detail in the next section of this study.
2.6.3.1 Firewalls
A firewall is a software program or piece of hardware that helps screen out
the hackers, viruses and worms that try to reach a computer over the Internet. All
messages entering or leaving the Internet pass through the firewall presented, which
examines each message and blocks those that do not meet the specified security
criteria. Hence firewalls play an important role in detecting malware. Today
Firewalls have become the staple of network security architectures, primarily
providing access control to network resources, and they have been successfully
deployed in the large majority of networks such as those of government
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organizations and individual users. Firewall and Intrusion Detection (IDS) together
are adopted more frequently. Network attacks are a crucial element in providing
networks with the reliability required in today's competitive environment. However,
while most firewalls provide effective access control, many are not designed to
detect an attack at the application level (Uchenna et al., 2016).
When most people think of network security, they think of firewalls.
Firewalls are widely deployed as a first level of protection in a multi-layer security
architecture, primarily acting as an access control device by permitting specific
protocols (such as HTTP, DNS, SMTP) to pass between a set of source and
destination addresses. Integral to accessing policy enforcement, firewalls usually
inspect data packet headers to make traffic flow decisions. In general, they do not
inspect the entire content of the packet and cannot detect or prevent malicious code
embedded within normal traffic. Firewalls offer excellent protection against network
threats, but they are less than complete protection against these threats by
incorporating physical security, host security, and user education into am overall
security plan.
2.6.3.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
Intrusion detection is a set of techniques and methods that are used to detect
suspicious activity at both the network and host levels. Intrusion detection systems
fall into two main categories: signature-based intrusion detection systems and
anomaly detection systems. Intruders such as computer viruses, have signatures that
can be detected using software. The IDS tries to find data packets that contain any
known intrusion-related signatures or anomalies related to Internet protocols. Based
upon a set of signatures and rules, the detection system is able to find and log
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suspicious activity and generate alerts. Anomaly-based intrusion detection usually
depends on packet inconsistencies present in the protocol header parts. In some cases
these methods produce better results than signature-based IDS do.
Network IDS products inspect the entire contents of every packet traversing
the network in order to detect malicious activity. This content inspection technique
provides deeper packet analysis than a firewall or a router. Intrusion Detection
Systems are effective when sophisticated attacks are embedded in familiar protocols,
such as an HTTP session, which would normally pass a firewall undetected. It is not
surprising that the processing power required for an Intrusion Detection System is an
order of degree higher the for a firewall product.
Just as a firewall has many shortcomings, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
also has many, such as low detection ability, lack of an effective response
mechanism, poor manageability, etc.

However, used together, the cooperation

between IDS and firewalls can improve the network security to a great extent. On the
one hand, IDS monitors the network, provides a real-time detection of attacks from
the interior and exterior, and automatically informs the firewall as well as
dynamically altering the rules of a firewall once an attack is found; on the other, the
firewall loads dynamic rules to hold up the intrusion, controls the data traffic of IDS
and provides security protection for it (Uchenna et al., 2016).
An extension of the IDS is the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) which is
used for both detecting intrusion activities or threats and managing responsive
actions in these systems throughout the network. IPSs monitor real time packet
traffic with malicious activities or which match specific profiles and will trigger the
generation of alerts; they can drop or block this traffic in real time as it passes
through the network. The IPS’s main counter measure is to stop an attack in
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progress. IPS can be termed the extension of IDS which exercises access control to
protect computers from exploitation. IPS is an intelligent device that is capable of
not only detecting malicious activities, but also taking preventive actions to secure
the host or the network.

Many organizations fail to address employee insider

vulnerabilities as well as the assessment of third party partners and supply chains.
This is specially demonstrated by their failure to strategically invest in cybersecurity
to ensure that it is in line with their business objectives (UNDP, 2012).
From this section we see that those departments that have invested in current
cybersecurity technologies demonstrate an understanding of cybersecurity risks.
Given that effective technology is necessary for the successful prevention of
cyberattacks, the following hypothesis can be formulated: H3. There is a positive
relationship between the technology deployed and cybersecurity effectiveness.
Apart from deploying state of the art technologies for protection against all
forms of cyber-attack, organizations need to put in place periodic training
programmes for staff to develop essential competences, reveal new attacker
techniques and security vulnerabilities and thus ensure continuous knowledge
sharing and development. Therefore, in the next section we discuss the role of
training for cybersecurity staff and the awareness of users in ensuring the
effectiveness of their organizations’ cybersecurity system.

2.7 The Role of Cybersecurity Training Programmes (H4)
Effective training and awareness programmes are comprehensive, measurable
and regular. An organization that is serious about cybersecurity needs to put great
emphasis on training and awareness programmes conducted by knowledgeable
individuals across all user departments in the organization at set frequencies during
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the year. For these training programmes to be effective, they should be culturally
relevant to the audience.
Meanwhile, the Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition of the key
words in the phrase “training and awareness” that helps in formulating the
conceptual foundation of this section. The dictionary looks at training as “the action
of teaching a person or an animal a particular skill or type of behaviour” and
“Awareness”

as

“knowledge

or

perception

of

a

situation

or

fact”

(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/). From the dictionary definitions of the two
concepts, it can be inferred that Information Security Training consists of thoughtful
activities conducted by an organization to teach skills or behaviours to its employees
so that they gain an understanding of threats against their electronic information and
the systems around them. This understanding helps them to take appropriate action
to prevent the threats from materialising. Since the “understanding” that leads to
appropriate action requires an attitude change, any initiative by a company to create
this awareness among its employees requires careful planning, implementing and
measuring for it to make the needed attitude change.
Employees are the weakest link when it comes to incidents involving
information security and the insiders of the organization (Vroom and Von Solms,
2004; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010; and Wilson and Hash, 2003). An “insider” is an
individual who currently or at one time had authorization access to an organization’s
system, data or network. While 48% of cybersecurity breaches were accidental, 17%
were intentionally committed and 35% malicious (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004).
According to these authors, companies ignore insiders and instead focus on external
threats. They spend money on the technical side but pay little attention to the human
factor. Focusing on technical solutions to prevent cyberattacks is, however, not
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enough since effective cybersecurity defences require users to be fully aware of and
to use the available security measures within the organization.
An increasing number of security breaches in organizations can be attributed
to insider attacks by employees by either neglect or choice. Most employees consider
information security issues to be the sole responsibility of the IT department (Dutton
and Duncan, 1987). However, there is no way that IT departments alone can ensure
data security. The failures to prevent or minimize security breaches due to end-users’
non-compliance are evidence of failed or non-existent programmes to promote
information security awareness. Still, since training and awareness programmes
issues are non-technical, it is easy for information security managers and senior
management to ignore their importance; they may instead focus on technologies such
as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (Rezgui and Marks, 2008).
The last two decades have seen advances in security technologies. Twenty
years ago, only one kind of firewall existed; today there are hundreds (Schultz,
2005). Given the abundance of useful technology that exists, one would then think
that achieving suitable levels of security would be minor. Surprisingly, however,
many organizations that have an abundance of technical controls nevertheless
experience a big number of security related breaches (Schultz, 2005, p.425). The
primary reason why there has been an increase in breaches of information security is
that information security is a people problem, not a technical one. While millions of
dollars to protect them from external cyberattacks are being spent by organizations,
the greatest threats to information systems are from within organizations whose users
lack basic knowledge and training. However, the focus should not change from the
external to the internal threat landscape, but rather that equal emphasis should be
placed on both. According to Leach (2003), 80% of major security breaches could
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result from poor security solutions.

An effective information security training

programme should take into account the fact that user behaviour and attitudes will
need to change if the incidence of insider attacks is to reduce.
Several surveys complemented by various media reports in the recent past
reveal that current or former employees and contractors are second only to hackers as
the main offenders behind the increased cyberattacks against USA organizations
(Greitzer et al., 2008).

The kinds of crime associated with these insider threats

include spying, disruption, terrorism, fraud, blackmail and dishonesty. The authors
contend that in order to help staff, management and personnel understand the risks
posed by insider attacks, training and awareness programmes targeting different roles
and responsibilities should be conducted. The methodologies to be used to design
effective training and awareness programmes should be drawn from “philosophical
and theoretical roots to theorists such as Jean Piaget, John Dewey and Lev
Vygotsky.” They argue that this is necessary because the effort requires complex
knowledge and skills to be communicated, such that the users “constructed” or
discovered meaning that was new to them. According to this view, a traditional
teacher-centred approach will not be successful, as it does not take into account the
behavioural or attitudinal changes necessary to have a long term impact.
The success of information security training and awareness programmes
depends on how effective they are in changing user behaviours towards information
security. According to Leach (2003) there are five behaviours that present internal
threats to organizations; (a) Lack of security common sense, where a user does
something “dumb” such as opening an executable file or email attachment; (b) a user
forgetting to apply simple security procedures such as failing to back up files; (c) a
user taking inappropriate risks because he did not accept the level of risk involved,
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e.g. leaving a laptop unattended in an open office; (d) Wilful acts of negligence
where users failed to follow necessary security processes, e.g. mailing a highly
sensitive document outside the organization without any protection; (e) Deliberate
attacks against the company’s interests. All these behavioural issues need to be
addressed through training and awareness programmes that may be organized from
time to time, especially for the less experienced users of the Internet and information
systems.
Several authors (Greitzer et al., 2007; Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012) agree that
the key to developing an effective information security training and awareness
programme requires an understanding of human behaviour.

In their paper

“Leveraging behavioural science to mitigate cybersecurity risk” they pose the
following questions:
(a) Which aspects of human behaviour offer the most promise in making
cybersecurity processes and products more effective?
(b) What role should education and training play?
(c) How can we encourage good security practices without unnecessarily
interrupting or annoying users? How can we create a cyberenvironment that provides users with all the functionalities they need
without compromising enterprises of national security?
Hight (2005) argues that training and awareness programmes explain the
employee’s role in the area of information security by showing the users what they
can do to protect their organization’s critical data and instilling in those who manage
critical information a sense of responsibility. A further analysis reveals that people’s
mistakes cannot be solved by the simple addition of technology but through a joint
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effort and participation between the IT communities of interest, the business
community and the nationals through training and awareness, along with critical
government and top management support. Meanwhile (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012)
maintain that in order to prevent cyber threats, the whole development cycle of
technologies from concept design, development, implementation and usage need
built-in information security components. They use insights from the behavioural
sciences to develop their theory in response to the questions raised above.
The areas of behavioural science which were found relevant to cybersecurity
included:

(a) Recognition easier than recollection
People are more likely to remember passwords consisting of images rather
than alpha-numerical characters. While this theory is currently being applied
for user-computer authentication, its use is still not widespread.
(b) Interference
This theory states that frequent changes to a memorized item always interfere
with recalling the newer version of the same item. This has been applied to
studies where it was shown that login failures increased with the frequency of
required password changes.

However, login failures fall where a system

allows for multiple trials to enter a password. A system that is less strict in the
number of attempts therefore experiences fewer login failures.
To further their theory, (Pfleeger and Caputo, 2012) investigated other areas
from psychology, behavioural medicine and other disciplines that affect the
behaviour related to reasoning and bias and have a potential for improving
cybersecurity. For example they found that a theory in cognition called the
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“identifiable victim effect” would have relevance to cybersecurity. This theory looks
at a tendency of individuals to “offer greater aid when a specific, identifiable person
(the victim) is observed under hardship, when compared to a large, vaguely-defined
group with the same need”. According to this theory, users are bound to choose a
stronger password for their online banking, for example, when they personally know
of someone whose bank account has been recently hacked.
The implications of this theory for training and awareness programmes was
captured in a study conducted by McCrohan (2010) provided insights into how the
security awareness of the organization can be improved by educating users about the
threats. They hypothesized that:
i.

If users have greater degree of awareness about threats to information
systems, they will engage in behaviours that enhance security.

ii.

An appeal based on threats to the online banking activities of the participants
will result in enhanced behaviour.
They further indicated that if individuals are; (a) informed of threats facing

their online activities; (b) informed of their ability to mitigate security threats; and (c)
provided with detailed information on how to create strong passwords, they will be
more inclined to do so. In this thesis we determine the role of information security
training and awareness programmes and their contribution to cybersecurity
effectiveness, especially in Abu Dhabi’s government entities.
To test the effect of threat awareness on weak passwords, an experiment was
created by employing two levels of threat information: High and Low. The primary
hypothesis of the study was that the strength of passwords at Time 1 would not differ,
but that high information treatment would have a greater effect on the strength of
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passwords at Time 2. Participants were randomly assigned to either the High or Low
information group. They were then asked to log into a website created for the study,
where they were directed to create passwords to access the information for the study.
The password created before any experimental manipulation was the key pretreatment dependent variable of the study. The low information security group was
then given basic information about security, while the high information security
group was treated with stories and evidence of the cybersecurity exploits of online
personal banking of millions of people worldwide. After two weeks the groups
resumed again and were directed to change their passwords as the old password had
expired. The study found that the group treated with high information on security
breaches improved the strength of their passwords by over 46% between Time 1 and
Time 2. They attributed this positive shift to the awareness training given to them. In
this study we conducted a pilot study on cybersecurity training and awareness by
training a selected target group on issues of cyber and information security. The
objective was to investigate the role of culture in the design of appropriate cyber and
information security training and awareness programmes, as well as checking the
impact of training on cybersecurity effectiveness.
2.7.1 Training and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H4)
The worldwide increase in ICT security threats has mostly been due to the
increased amount of electronic data, increased number of mobile terminals, well
organized groups, difficulties in tracing attackers and limited knowledge of IT
security amongst ordinary people (Aloul et al., 2012). This has led to the introduction
of cyber laws in many countries, including in the United States, the Middle East and
the UAE. Unfortunately, cyber threats are likely to succeed due to differences in
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cultural attitudes between different groups of people globally. The author argues
further that while organizations continue to train their professionals in technology
very little effort has been put into general cybersecurity training and awareness,
which creates a major risk to the employees when a cyber-attack occurs.
The Gartner Group reports that security training and awareness produces
more Return on Investment (ROI) than any other activity in information security, yet
most organizations have approached this area as one of low priority. Usually when a
budget crisis occurs in an organization the area of information security that is most
likely to be cut is that of information security training and awareness. Schultz (2005)
explains this to the difficulty of determining the direct benefit of training and
awareness. He claims that employees who receive security awareness sessions will
afterwards be less vulnerable to social engineering than others. This however does
not happen often, as most training programmes are inferior and not aligned to the
organizations’ business goals.
Information security effectiveness requires a change in organizational culture
and behaviour (Vroom and Von Solms, 2003). An information security culture can
be defined “as a way things are done in the organization to protect its information
security assets” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2010). Organizational culture includes the ideas
shared by work colleagues and communicated between each other. Culture is the
single most important factor which accounts for success or failure of an information
security programme. The ideal culture would be where it comes as second nature for
staff to follow the guidelines of the organization. Leach (2003) believes that the
behaviour of users can be improved through a variety of interconnecting methods
which together work to create a strong security culture and strengthen the way
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security influences the behaviour of others. We need to instil a security culture
amongst departmental employees as a way of improving cybersecurity effectiveness.
The contribution of culture to organizational change has been thoroughly
studied. For instance Schein (2004) defines culture as:
The pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered
or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and
internal integration and that have worked well enough to be considered valid,
and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to these problems (p 1).
Furthermore the author divides culture into three layers. The first level is the
“artefacts” of the culture. These are the visible elements that relate to that culture. In
the information security domain these would be the firewalls, monitoring tools,
published policies and procedures. Next are the “espoused” or shared values. These
are semi-visible. In information security these would the strategies dictated by senior
management (Vroom and Von Solms, 2003).
The final and deepest levels of culture are the basic tacit assumptions which
are hidden and occur at the individual level. These assumptions are the underlying
beliefs and values of the staff of the company. Between the various layers, there is
constant interaction. The organizational culture could therefore have a huge impact
on the information security of the firm. The benefits of changing culture to engage
in security automatically in daily life would positively affect the success of the
organization. Information security culture consists of a subset of information security
behaviours and information security components. This culture develops when users
interact with information security components. To cultivate an acceptable level of
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information security, organizations should ensure that a comprehensive and adequate
set of information security components is implemented. Examples of components
include the human element, the processes used and the technical controls
implemented. Organizations should furthermore ensure that employees’ interactions
are in line with the requirements of the information security policies implemented.
Katz (2005) carried out a comprehensive survey on wireless networks at
thousands of access points in Dubai and Sharjah between 2008 and 2010; the results
show that 32% of the access points were unprotected, while the others used weak
security techniques. The biggest threats to people are phishing attacks, where an
email may be sent to thousands of Internet users requesting them to access fake
websites which could be replicas of well-known trusted websites. Many people enter
their personal details in the belief that the sites are authentic when they actually came
from a hacker’s computer. It is taken for granted that Middle Eastern cyber criminals
are increasingly targeting innocent UAE residents with advanced hacking methods
such as phishing scams. This has led to increased IT security in major operators such
as telecom companies, banks and UAE government entities. However, people are the
weakest link in any security system and are still unprotected.
Governments need to play a leadership role in instituting a cybersecurity
culture amongst nationals through approaches that include training and awareness,
culturally sensitive cybersecurity policies and education. Meanwhile, Seibert (2002)
looks at culture as an organized group of learned responses with ready-made
solutions to problems faced by people through interactions with others in the same
society. This bond of interaction compels them to consider cultural awareness when
designing cybersecurity training and awareness programmes. It is further revealed
that culture shapes how people in a society respond to the effects of cyber-attack.
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Unfortunately, over 85% of the UAE population is foreign, which implies that
several cultures and cultural norms have been imported into the region. Such people
come from different regions, Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries, among others. As a result, a multi-cultural society has been created
in the UAE which necessitates a culturally sensitive cybersecurity training and
awareness programme.
Whitmer (2007) developed a cultural sensitivity and awareness checklist for the
medical field, but this checklist can be extended to culturally sensitive cybersecurity
awareness campaigns. It includes cultural identification, language barriers, selecting
a communication method that suits the target society, if possible incorporating a
language translator in the session who understands beliefs such as religious and
spiritual beliefs and trust, among others.
Different cultures have different training and awareness needs. Therefore, all
cyber and information security training programmes should be tailored to the cultural
setup of different communities in the region by carrying out a Pre-Training and
Awareness Needs Assessment for different groups of individuals or cultures in the
region. This would aid the design of appropriate training and awareness programme
with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Awareness programmes need to teach
people information security issues such as confidentiality, integrity, availability and
non-repudiation, the need to be aware of what needs to be protected. More still, they
need to understand why they need to take cyber and information security seriously,
why they should protect the critical national infrastructure, who the enemy in
cyberspace is, what they gain from proactive participation in the security of their
organizations and communities, how a secure environment assists them in the
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accomplishment of tasks and finally why they are key stakeholders in the fight
against cyber threats and cyber terrorism.
As organizations expand the use of advanced security technologies, hackers
attempt to break into their internal security by using the weakest links or lessinformed computer users. Users are the biggest security threat to the IT-security of
any organization and therefore continuous training and awareness programmes are
needed to help change their view of information security in the organization.
Business success depends upon the continuity of operations and information
provided to the business processes by information systems. The growth, excellence
and efficiency of the business could be damaged by threats to and misuse of
information. But awareness programmes would help in setting measures and ways of
educating users in how to behave and benefit from information without jeopardizing
its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Lack of awareness and mishandling of
information could expose it to competitors or corruption.
Cybersecurity training and awareness help individuals in decision making
especially during uncertain situations and promotes a security-aware culture within
organizations, hence reducing human error which could pose a major threat to the
security of most organizations. However, technical solutions are unlikely to prevent
security breaches and cyber threats within the government entities in UAE.
Therefore, we need to introduce and maintain a culture where positive security
behaviours are valued. The usability challenges associated with information security
need to be well understood and resolved. This means that security functions need to
be meaningful, easy to locate, visible and convenient to use. It is important to
acknowledge the influence of individual cultural differences, personality traits,
cognitive abilities, bias and heuristics which all affect how individuals perceive
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security risks. These are important because they explain why individuals make
certain decisions and why specific behaviours may be observed. The culture and
climate that people come from has a significant impact on values, attitudes and
behaviours as well as providing a great impact on the way they see cybersecurity
issues in the community and within their organizations.
Furthermore, Kruger et al. (2011) looked at how cultural factors impact the
security knowledge and behaviour of different people in society. It is argued that
cultural differences may manifest themselves at different levels of security
awareness. The authors assessed the level of awareness, knowledge and behaviours
amongst students in two selected universities in South Africa. Their main objective
was to identify how cultural differences affect students’ understanding of security
issues in society. Their findings revealed that some cultural factors such as one’s
mother tongue and place of origin show a significant impact on the awareness levels
of security issues among selected students. It is therefore worthwhile to perform a
study to investigate the validity of these findings and confirm that peoples’ culture
cannot be taken lightly when designing appropriate cyber and information security
training and awareness programmes in the UAE and throughout the globe.
The idea has been proposed that informal behaviour and acts of
communication have a fundamental role in disclosing the characteristics of people. It
is stated that the process of communication creates a central hub in any information
system. Furthermore, patterns of learning and culture as well as norms form
constituent elements of informal behaviour; therefore, complete management of
information security can only be ensured if the behavioural aspects of individuals
and groups have been well understood. This necessitates establishing the validity of
these findings, especially in a multi-cultural environment such as the United Arab
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Emirates where the largest percentage of the active labour force comprises
immigrants from several countries, notably from Asia, Africa and Europe.
As a preliminary, the researcher conducted a pilot study to investigate the role
that culture plays in cybersecurity. In this study a total of fifty (50) employees was
randomly selected from a mid-sized organization in Abu-Dhabi (UAE) representative
of the study population, and divided into two groups. The first group, comprising
employees from similar cultural backgrounds (in India only) was treated to a
cybersecurity training programme that was culturally sensitive conducted in their
first language (Hindi), while the other group, consisting of employees from a
multitude of different cultural backgrounds (Ugandans, Philippines and Nepalese)
undertook a generic training programme conducted in English. A pilot survey was
conducted following the above treatment. The pilot involved the provision of preand-post-training assessments with the help of questionnaires tailored to cyber and
information security awareness especially of various issues to do with the region.
Details of this survey are discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.
It is claimed that governments develop security policies which specify the
correct behaviour by employees even when they are not aware of the risks involved
and do not fully understand the correct security behaviour within their society
(Humaidi and Balakrishnan, 2013). Furthermore, the authors argue that the cultural
systems of a society shape a variety of their psychological processes. The values that
distinguish a country’s culture can be categorised into individualism versus
collectivism and power distance, among others. For instance, in the case of
individualistic cultures such as Western ones, people tend to describe themselves in
terms of their internal attributes, for example, goals, preferences and attitudes, while
in more collectivist cultures such as those typically found in the Middle East,
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individuals tend to express themselves in terms of their relationships and social
group memberships. These individuals tend to avoid behaviours that cause social
disruption. The behaviour of people can be changed by influencing what they
consciously think about or by shaping the behaviour that is focused on more
automatic processes of judgement and influence without changing people’s thinking.
It is revealed that influential tactics in specific situations may be counterproductive,
hence invoking fear amongst in many different people in a society. Too many
messages concerning certain security sensitive issues may hinder behavioural change
within a multi-cultural setup.
2.7.2 Effective Training Methods
According to Siponnen, (2000), several methods of conducting cybersecurity
training exist, for instance, “selling” information security to people through
campaigns which provide good measures for improving people’s attitudes although
they may lead to unwanted results in terms of motivation and attitude. For this
reason, they should be used carefully together with awareness programmes to
provide good incentives for end users and for refreshing people’s minds. Education
should increase people’s insights and answer the question, “why?” – this should
increase motivation. Training should increase skills and competence and corresponds
to “how?” Since the “why” part is important, employees should not be content with
answers such as “you just have to do it”, “this is our policy”, etc. Their motivation
and attitude are not likely to improve this way. The creation of an information
security awareness programmes as a means of minimizing end-user errors requires a
systematic approach.
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Several cybersecurity awareness campaigns have been carried out globally to
alleviate the cyber and information security awareness problem For instance, a
cyber-streetwise campaign (2014) was carried out in the United Kingdom (UK) to
concentrate on online users at home and some business ventures. In this campaign
businesses were advised to adopt five basic measures to boost their online security
and safety, for instance, the use of strong passwords, installation of strong antivirus
software, and checking privacy settings on social media, patching systems whenever
new updates became available, among others. In this campaign positive messages
were used to influence the behaviour of online users.
Similarly, a parents’ corner campaign was carried out in Africa with the
intention of coordinating the work done by governments, industries and civil
societies with the objective of protecting children and educating parents online. It
emphasized that “people are not always who they say they are”, the need to think
before posting anything online and also that “friends must protect friends”, among
others. All these efforts in the UK and Africa provide an insight into solutions to
online risk and behavioural change for UAE citizens online and for Abu Dhabi’s
government entities. It is extremely important to decide the target group of an
awareness campaign, match the cultural theme of the message recipients and their
cognitive and motivational characteristics with the intended contents. However,
simple transfers of knowledge and awareness campaigns alone may not be sufficient
to end the entire problem in the UAE. Therefore, an appropriate framework
incorporating all other mechanisms would be greatly valued if it allowed the
government to combat the ever escalating problems of cyber and information
security. The government needs to organize security campaigns, avoid tactics that
may cause fear among users, emphasize security education and provide a feedback
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mechanism for obtaining the real-time concerns of people as well as instituting an
online security culture amongst all UAE residents.
Meanwhile, Rezgui and Marks (2008) provides an insight into a study by
EDUCAUSE which found that higher education organizations with information
security awareness programmes were considered more successful and more advanced
in information security than those without. 39% of the higher education programmes
examined in the USA had an information security awareness programme. 75%
viewed their information security awareness programmes as among the top three in
this area. Based on this study of information security awareness programmes, the
authors made recommendations that could be applied to higher education in the
UAE.

(a)

Establish information security policies and procedures that are tailored to
the government policies which should be achievable and understandable.

(b)

Conduct campaigns of best practice in information security awareness and
advertise information security awareness and materials throughout the
campus.

(c)

Train all users in information security best practice. While training should
be regular, basic training for all users should be compulsory.

(d)

Practice reward and punishment management

(e)

Carry out continuous evaluation.

In the meantime, Herath and Rao (2009) conducted a study on the role of
penalties and perceived effectiveness on encouraging information security behaviour
in organizations. To do this, they developed a framework that evaluated the relative
importance of three incentive mechanisms: penalties, social pressure and perceived
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effectiveness. They observed that prevention measures are a useful primary strategy
for reducing computer crime, but as the level of punishment increases, individuals
become less likely to carry out the desired behaviour.

Increasing the level of

punishment from verbal warning to the employee to the threat of job loss or heavy
fines would seem to prevent wilful breach. They hypothesized therefore that
“Increased severity of penalty will be positively associated with intentions to comply
with organizational security policy.”
Furthermore, they observed that not only the promise of penalty but also the
certainty of it could have an impact on the security misbehaviour of an organization.
For this to be effective, a set of monitoring and detection mechanisms is necessary to
make certain that employees are acting according to information security policies.
Monitoring can be done through a combination of activities such as random walks,
computer history logs, network logs etc. If the employees are aware of monitoring
and detect the efforts being made, they are more likely to obey policies.

Leach

(2003) divides the factors that influence security behaviour into two distinct groups.
The first group are those that influence the users’ understanding of what behaviour
the company expects from them.

The second group of factors are those that

influence the user’s personal willingness to constrain his behaviour within the
accepted and approved norms. The user’s understanding of which behaviours are
expected of him is formed from what they are told; what they see being practised by
others around them and their experiences deriving from decisions they have made in
the past. What the users are told makes up the company’s body of knowledge. The
effectiveness of the body of knowledge in conveying what constitutes security
behaviour varies according to its accessibility; completeness; the clarity of the stated
security values; and the uniformity of those values.
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What employees see is heavily influenced by the behaviour of their peers.
They build their security attitudes and set their own security behaviour according to:
i.

The values and attitudes demonstrated in the behaviour of senior
managers.
The consistency between the companies’ stated values and the evident

ii.

behaviour of their peers.
iii.

Whether other company practices, e.g. HR, reflect its security values.

iv.

Whether the company demonstrates that good security practices are
important through a system that monitors security behaviours, rewards
good and punishes bad.
Users’ security common sense and decision making skills are seen over a

period of time. Each person builds his own personal history of security decisions
according to the feedback received.
The factors that influence the user’s personal willingness to constrain his
behaviour within these norms and his willingness to conform are affected by
personal values and standards; the users own sense of obligation and the difficulty in
complying.
Most employees believe in the high value of principles and agree to shared
values and sensible rules. Tensions arise when there is conflict between individual
values and company values. Employees feel a psychological pressure to behave
according to company expectations, to limit their behaviour willingly and to stay
within the bounds of accepted practice. If a member of staff feels that he is well
treated, recognized and rewarded, then he will gladly respond in kind and act in the
company’s best interests. Another factor is whether the company makes it easy to
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comply with its standards and procedures and whether there are temptations of
personal gain for people who do not comply. Even when staff recognize that security
controls are implemented for good reasons, they have very little tolerance for
controls that are not effective, efficient or clear. The author identified the following
keys to better security behaviour:
(a) Behaviours demonstrated by others - What people see in practice around
them influences their attitude and behaviour more powerfully than what they
are told.
(b) User’s security common sense and decision making skills - A user’s own
security decisions, once made, become a part of his personal body of
knowledge and are carried into the future.
(c) User’s psychological contract with their employers - If a company ensures
that its overt behaviour supports rather than opposes its body of knowledge,
and it helps staff to develop and strengthen their security common sense, it
will reduce the number and seriousness of users’ security errors.

Rotvold (2008) conducted a study to discover the current state of security
training within organizations by surveying 144 organizations of different sizes. Sixty
percent of the organizations surveyed reported that their organizations offered security
awareness training.

Of these, 44.7% reported that training was mandatory and

attendance was tracked 72.8% of the time. Given these reported numbers, the actual
percentage of employees receiving security awareness training may have been quite
low. Training was most frequently offered once a year (45%) and the training was
conducted by IT staff 58% of the time, followed by management, which conducted
the training 28% of the time. The top delivery methods for security awareness training
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were face-to-face sessions (54%), e-mail messages (53%), online training (47%),
presentations (32%), newsletters (29%), and posters/flyers (28%). The most common
general topic in information security training was security policy. The top training
topics were “acceptable use (89%), e-mail (85%), passwords (78%), backup and
recovery (71%), antivirus (70%), software installation and licensing (67%) and
disaster recovery (58.2%)”.
A study of the effectiveness of user awareness and training on cybersecurity
matters in Australia found that “information security awareness programmes and
campaigns can work to embed a collective culture of personal belief system that
promotes compliance with computer security policies, procedures and protocols”
(Nigel and Rice, 2011). It is this “personal belief” that Liedtka (2000) calls
“behavioural process” which is the internalization of the cognitive process that leads
to the increase in awareness and attitude changes needed for addressing the
information security issues raised. This “personal belief” shift can be effective only
where the strategic planning approach applies both the “cognitive process” that
creates a “gap” or awareness of the present status and the future expected status of
the cybersecurity situation of the firm. The first part will be a “top-down” push of
information security which begins with a proper regulatory framework, progresses to
executive decisions that create proper information security policies for the firm and
ends with user awareness that brings about the desired “personal belief” shift in the
user. These components work together to create enhanced protection from cybercrimes.
Meanwhile Abawajy (2014) emphasizes that as the number and frequency
increase of cyberattacks designed to take advantage of unsuspecting personnel, the
significance of the human factor in information security management should not be
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underestimated. Therefore, information security awareness programmes geared
towards human related vulnerabilities are of paramount importance. His study
analyses the effects of various methods of information security awareness, training
and delivery used to improve end users’ awareness of cyber and information security
related issues by looking critically at such methods as web based training material
and other training, with a major focus on determining the method most preferred by
the end users. Further analysis was put into text based, game based and video based
delivery schemes to determine user preferences. The study findings reveal that a
combination of such methods would yield greater results and it was stressed that state
of the art technology based security solutions alone would not provide overall
enough security measures to defend critical organization assets from a wide range of
ever changing security threats. Managing the human side of information security
should be just as carefully done as the technical side. Therefore, reducing human
related security vulnerabilities is of paramount importance to the organization’s IT
security posture.
Abawajy (2014) analyses several other delivery methods, which include
electronic resources and paper resources, instructor led delivery methods that involve
formal presentations, seminars and workshops facilitated by government, local and
external parties, online delivery methods such as email broadcasting, blogging,
simulation based and multimedia techniques, among others. The survey reveals that
only 5% preferred the game method, 50% preferred video based delivery methods
while 33% preferred the text based model of delivery. The drawback is that most of
the respondents preferred the video delivery of data followed by text based data
transfer. Video data delivery consumes most of the bandwidth and could cause a
major blow in case of cyberattacks as indicated by Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4: Information Delivery Techniques. Source: Abawajy (2014)

Other work was conducted by (Knapp, 2009), who identified the correlation
between user information security awareness programmes and perceived security
effectiveness. Their findings reveal that programmes need to make all the employees
of an organization share responsibility for the security of information and
information systems. Employees need to understand their responsibilities,
organizational policies and procedures to protect a government organization’s critical
assets. Abawajy (2014) though agreeing with this claim also stresses that security
awareness training provides the most cost effective method for handling
cybersecurity issues globally. Since employees are the weakest point in any security
programme, organizations should design appropriate cybersecurity training and
awareness programmes for their employees to ensure the effectiveness of the
available security defences and technologies.
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2.7.3 Results of Effective Training Programmes

Evidence has been provided in the literature for the importance of user
training and awareness, together with other factors for cybersecurity effectiveness.
An organization may have implemented the best technology and supported it by the
most experienced technical team, but without effective user awareness and training
programmes, its cybersecurity defences may still fail. The actions of a single user
can compromise the data and infrastructure of the entire organization. A successful
user training and awareness programme is said to comprise the following results and
traits:

(a) Users who are committed to the use of strong passwords as a matter of
routine.
(b) Users who exhibit behaviour and attitudes which are aligned to the
organization’s overall cybersecurity policies, procedures and guidelines.
(c) Users who possess general common sense in their security behaviour. For
example, they do not open email attachments with an executable file; they
back up their important files with a predefined routine schedule; they connect
personal devices such as smartphones, mobile phones and other electronic
devices to corporate networks; they do not email a highly sensitive document
outside the organization.
From these arguments, the following hypothesis is formulated: H4: There is
a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
Next we discuss how strategic planning contributes to an effective cybersecurity
programme.
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2.8 Strategic Planning and Cybersecurity Effectiveness (H5)
2.8.1 Strategic Management Theories and Principles
Several statistical studies reveal a positive association between strategic
planning and organizational performance. For instance Brews and Purohit argue that
the degree of instability of the environment increases the amount of planning a firm
does. They infer that “planning increases as instability increases” (Brews and
Purohit, 2007). The rapid increase of cyber-criminal activities worldwide presents a
kind of “unstable” environment which requires strategic planning (Grant, 2003).
Such instability in cyber-crime is assumed because attackers who commit cybercrime
can be anywhere in the world when their actions cause damage to an organization’s
information and communication infrastructure (Rees,

2011). An organization’s

ability to deal with such attacks requires flexibility and the capacity to respond
quickly to rapidly changing situations. Therefore, Abu Dhabi’s government entities
need to take proactive measures to protect critical infrastructure from such illegal
activities speedily. The organizations that would prevent the effects of cyber-crime
and malware attacks are those that “anticipate and address environmental turbulence
through strategic planning” (Rudd, 2008).
Given that the situations where most businesses and government entities face
many noticeable threats such as cyber and information security attacks on critical
national infrastructure, it has become necessary for entrepreneurs, top management
and the UAE government to dedicate greater effort and research to the explanation
and choice of the most adequate strategies and security frameworks. Doing so would
help respond to such critical challenges and ensure improved security thus making
investment in the region more competitive and the entire government safer. In the
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effort to construct robust and effective security frameworks and clear strategies, we
need to analyze and reason out many important issues.
Since cyberattacks can seriously disrupt or even paralyze segments of critical
infrastructure, governments including that of Abu Dhabi need to devise strategies to
combat their effects. This can be achieved through appropriate strategic management
theories and the application of principles or frameworks that guide the control and
prevention of these attacks. According to Finland’s Cybersecurity Strategic Report
(2013) government entities should mobilise the highest level of cybersecurity
management to provide political guidance and strategic guidelines. The authors of
this report argue that cybersecurity management represents strategic sensitivity,
collective commitment and resource flexibility from a government. They further
reveal that in order to prevent cyber threats that could endanger the security of the
state, it is important to review legislative restrictions as well as those arising from
international obligations. Such obstacles include obligations related to data
protection, disclosure and the exchange of information between authorities by paying
more attention to the basic rights of privacy, confidentiality and the integrity of
electronic communications. They also propose an annual review of cybersecurity
strategies by security committees but they provide no insight into the best
management principles and practices for performing such a review. Our hope is that
the findings of this thesis will contribute to the best management principles and
practices for reviewing cybersecurity policies and strategies periodically by the UAE
Government entities and Abu Dhabi’s government in particular.
Elbanna (2010) provides a detailed discussion of strategic planning in the
UAE. He focuses mainly on the importance of Strategic Planning to departments in
the public and private sectors and the development of a profile of organizations in the
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UAE with respect to their practices of strategic planning and management. However,
he does not consider the inclusion of cybersecurity threats in the strategic planning
and policy making topics. This creates a gap that we need to fill with the findings of
this study. Furthermore, Lydon (2013) claims that cyberattacks on industrial
operations have become of great concern, although industry management
increasingly demands real-time communication between automation and business
systems. From this submission, the requirement for robust management systems and
theories to shield these important systems from the cyberspace enemies becomes
important.
At the 4th Cybersecurity framework workshop, held in September 2013 at
the University of Texas, Dallas, it was agreed that an organization’s management of
cyber-risks required a major focus on key functions such as “Know”, “Protect”,
“Detect”, “Respond” and “Recover” as a major practice to combat cybercrime. Their
framework from the contributors recommended incentives such as cybersecurity
insurance, and grants for public recognition and cybersecurity research. The
European Network and Information Security Agency report (ENISA, 2012) notes
that several member states have developed cybersecurity strategies while others had
brought their strategies close to publication. Some of the completed frameworks
identified by the reports include Estonia, Finland and Slovakia in 2008.
The strategy guides the procedure for protecting critical information
structures. It explores existing regulations to clarify whether and where any
additional powers are required to secure IT systems. For instance, to mention
Germany alone, it provides basic security functions certified by the state and also
supports SMEs by setting up a new task force, among several other reported
initiatives.
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Gercke (2014) makes a detailed report on cybercrime to guide both developed
and developing nations towards the co-ordination of national legal frameworks and
an appreciation of the growing cyber threat to the stability of the state. He provides
detailed information on the way in which crimes are committed and the activities
undertaken by International and regional organizations in fighting them. This report
contains a detailed analysis of the legal approaches, procedure laws, digital evidence
and the responsibility of the Internet providers, as stated in the ITU Global
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA). The author focuses on strengthening international
cooperation in the fight against cybercrime, coordinating financial support for
training activities, the organization of meetings of law enforcement experts,
strengthening dialogue with industry and monitoring the changing threats from
cybercrime to evaluate the need for further legislation. Unfortunately the main focus
of this entire report was on the United States Government and Europe, leaving out
other important regions such as the Middle East. Given that the world economic
centres have been moving eastwards, most of the cyber and information security
vulnerabilities have shifted largely in the same direction. We therefore focus on the
existing cybersecurity defences in the Gulf States while putting major emphasis on
Abu Dhabi’s government entities, with the aim of filling any existing gaps that may
be cited regarding cyber and information security.
According to the latest world internet statistics, the United Arab Emirates
reached the tune of 91.9% by the end of 2016 (World Internet Statistics, 2016). This
percentage places the country third of all the Middle Eastern countries and
seventeenth globally in terms of Internet usage. Furthermore, the report shows that
the UAE had the highest rate of smart phone penetration in the world. Such statistics
present a major concern to national cybersecurity and require an urgent response
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from government, especially in terms of developing frameworks for appropriate
prevention of cyber-crime in the region. It is further revealed that UAE government
websites were attacked in July 2013, but that this attempt was successfully tackled by
the UAE Emergency Response Team (ae-CERT) which managed to minimise the
impact of these attacks. At the same time, it reveals a weakness in the existing
cybersecurity defences and security strategies in place. Since the government has put
more focus on delivering services to all residents mainly through e-government
portals, more attention should be given to securing cyberspace, possibly requiring
strong cybersecurity frameworks to be prepared for the government entities.
Lydon (2013) argues that, despite the rapid increase in the use of Information
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the expansion in Internet access, many
political, legal and societal aspects of cyberspace have not been fully understood by
most governments and military bodies. They show massive dependence on networks
which are major sources of vulnerability. The report reveals that many non-state
actors in cyberspace, such as politically motivated groups, have expanded to
complicate the many government efforts to end cybercrime. The report did not
suggest a framework for cybersecurity defences which could be applied by
government entities in this fight. In a later section, we review some of the best
practices from other countries to develop the best strategy for Abu Dhabi’s
government entities and ensure the effective implementation of our proposed
framework.
This section of the literature review argued that, since cybersecurity issues
are issues for management, there must be a relationship between the role of
cybersecurity strategic planning and the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s
government entities. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: H5: There is a
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positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity strategic plans and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
People are the new attack vector for any organization; therefore they need to
formulate the first line of defence for any security vulnerabilities. It is not easy for
users to be aware of all the potential cyber and information security pitfalls at work.
Even if they follow the right security protocols, they usually forget about the
simplest targets for cyber intrusion, such as Wi-Fi connected mobile phones, tablets,
computers and IT devices of all kinds used to access corporate data. Therefore,
continuous user awareness programmes need to be in place to remind employees of
their role in ensuring an effective cybersecurity programme for their organization, as
discussed further below.

2.9 Role of Cybersecurity User Awareness Programmes (H6)
Employee awareness is a fundamental component of every programme in an
organization. This comes down to how organizations engage their employees and
generate awareness through appropriate communications programmes. Effective
security awareness demands top-down commitment and communication, a tactic that
is often lacking in government entities.

While information security training and

awareness is a minor topic in information security research, it plays a critical role in
any organization’s defence against cyber-attack. Therefore, as organizations expand
their use of advanced security technologies, hackers attempt to break into their
security through the organization’s weakest security link, the less-informed computer
user (Whitmer, 2007). Users are the biggest threat to the IT security of any
organization, therefore, continuous cybersecurity awareness programmes must be run
to change their perception of cyber and information security. Furthermore, cultural
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and attitude changes in the operations of government employees are required to make
IT security and the ethical use of IT resources as ubiquitous as technology, since it
involves changing the way that employees perceive IT security (Aloul, 2010).
Siponnen (2000) defines information security awareness as “a state where
users in an organization are aware of their security mission”. A more comprehensive
definition is given by (Kritzinger and Smith, 2008) who state that “information
security awareness is about ensuring that all employees in an organization are aware
of their role and responsibility towards securing the information they work with”.
Meanwhile, Rezgui and Marks (2008) explore the factors that influenced user
security awareness at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates. Their main
intention was to identify how “thoroughness, cultural assumptions, beliefs, and social
conditions” affected the way that staff and students behaved towards information
security. Overall, the authors infer that while the university placed more emphasis on
perceived external threats, there were signs of “lack of information security
awareness in the institution indicated by the widespread acts of user errors, software
failures, social engineering problems and data leakage problems”. They assert that
these problems were likely to have had a direct relationship with the lack of
information security awareness programmes at the university. As a result of this
discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber security
and cybersecurity effectiveness.
Next we discuss the importance of legislation in strengthening an
organization’s cybersecurity programme.
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2.10 Regulatory Framework and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
Regulatory frameworks allow the establishment of laws and regulation
necessary for ensuring that public and national interests are protected. This is
especially important for critical national infrastructure such as major communication
lines (e.g. power smart grids, transport systems and public institutions) among others.
National laws on privacy, the confidentiality of personal information and data
provided to financial, health and government entities can be enforced only by
ensuring compliance among departments and nations. In addition, international
cooperation is required to effectively deal with cyber and information security
problems. For example the European Cybercrime Centre was created in Europe to
serve as the continent’s information hub on cybercrime through the development of
cutting edge digital forensic capabilities that support investigations for the EU and
capacity building to fight cybercrime through training, awareness raising and the
delivery of best practice on cybercrime investigations.
Regarding the UAE, it was not until 2006 that its Federal Government came
up with a law against cybercrime Federal Law No. 2, (2006). This law focused
mainly on the prevention of Information Technology Crimes. It came into existence
at a time when issues of information security were being recognized as a global
threat which required each country to legislate against cybercrime (Al-Bawaba,
2012). The International Convention on Cybercrime, which the UAE law complies
with, was established to harmonize cyber-laws among different countries, Councilon-Europe, (2002). In the case of the UAE, Federal Law No. 2, (2006) was amended
in 2012 to incorporate measures that support the investigation and prosecution of
cybercrimes. The new law criminalizes the use of any information communication
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and technology (ICT) tools or the World Wide Web (Internet) to commit an array of
crimes, punishable by imprisonment and or a fine from government through the law
enforcement departments and the monitoring team. The Articles in the Federal Legal
Decree No.5, 2012 on cybercrime covers content, conduct commercialism and
contact. Some of the primary offences include breach of privacy, defamation,
publication of illegal content, hacking and phishing attacks. Others include identity
theft, credit card fraud, and money laundering and threatening national security. It is
further reported that the United Arab Emirates government regularly examines the
Internet to blacklist all websites that may contain sensitive material such as
pornography or child abusive contents, improper religious statements, racial
statements, gambling materials, terrorist activities and anti – Islamic statements (AlBawaba, 2012; Seibert, 2002).
In the USA laws established following the crash of the giant Enron Company
late last century have resulted in executives being held fully responsible for
compliance to the laws and regulations that pertain to information security. If a
cyber-attack results in the loss and release of private health information, for example,
executives must demonstrate that both “due care” and “due diligence” were taken to
protect this information, for the failure of which they will be held personally
responsible and liable (Nigel and Rice, 2011).

It is senior management’s

responsibility in this country to ensure that their organizations are fully compliant
with the UAE Federal Laws on cybersecurity so as to demonstrate “due diligence”
and “due care”.

In this thesis, we ask if existing government entities have

incorporated awareness of the federal law in their strategic plans. While these laws
form one basis for cybersecurity policies to be established in the corporation, further
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steps must be taken to ensure that all employees of the company are aware of the
issues surrounding cybersecurity.
The UAE government has also established other agencies to support efforts to
prevent cybercrime. The national security awareness campaigns launched in
November, 2007 by the ae-CERT to protect citizens and information online and
provide an online identity platform tried to safeguard some of the government critical
information by blocking most of the immoral and illegal websites from access in the
region. This mechanism has temporarily reduced the issue of child abuse and
pornography. Furthermore, on 22nd July, 2013 the Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority (TRA) successfully defended users from a series of cyberattacks that
targeted some government websites. Meanwhile, the Computer Emergency Response
Team ae-CERT managed to neutralize the problem with minimal damage. However,
popups, phishing attacks, denial of service, ignorance of users about security threats,
among others, remain a major challenge that require urgent government intervention.
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) is mandated to
implement the Internet Access Management (IAM) policy on behalf of the UAE
government by monitoring the online content available to users in the UAE and
thereafter to alert the teams for website maintenance and implementation of the
traces and possible impact of anything that might create a security vulnerability in
any portal. The content proscribed by the IAM policy includes various forms of
malicious code and any Internet content relating to terrorist cybercrime, among
others. The TRA in its IAM enforcement role monitors advertisements online,
including the advertising of medical products and services. The TRA also regulates
the services of the major telecommunication operators in the UAE who are licensed
to provide users with access to the Internet. This is done through appropriate
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licensing clauses aimed at blocking online content that might be regarded as
offensive or show traces of malicious codes. A widely reported example of such
incidents was in 2009, when the TRA banned access to a cartoon clip on YouTube
which was alleged to contravene religious and nationalist sentiments.

Another agency that was recently established to oversee electronic
security is the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA). NESA is a federal
authority

responsible

for

developing,

supervising

and

monitoring

the

implementation of cybersecurity in the UAE’s strategies, policies and standards.
Their major role is to safeguard the UAE online environment and contribute to
the collective achievement of national goals. It is committed to ensuring that all
UAE government bodies are made fully aware of their responsibility to meet the
requirements of the stated polices of national interest. The regulation establishing
this agency is Federal Law No. 3, 2012, also known as the E-Security Authority
Law, which was created as a further reinforcement to the Federal Legal Decree
No. 2, 2006 on cybercrimes and other regulations and programmes, including the
establishment of the UAE Computer Emergency Response Team (aeCERT) and
various public awareness campaigns in the region (Lydon, 2013).
The UAE government through support departments such as NESA has also
established special cyber-crime units to confront cybercrime in and beyond its
territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the government established dedicated police
departments committed to solving high-technology crime in the UAE. Other
measures taken to challenge cyber-crime in both public and private sectors include
but are not limited to public awareness and the adoption of common agreements with
other countries, especially the GCC member countries, the European Union and the
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United States. If the cybersecurity problem is to be solved across Abu Dhabi’s
government entities, strict legal action against any form of malicious threat or crack
in information security should be implemented by the government authorities
concerned. In addition to regulation, there is a need to ensure that appropriate cyber
and information security frameworks are in place to help the government to
implement policies across various departments in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
Even with these new agencies and regulations, in the present technological
and social atmosphere, the UAE has suffered numerous challenges in the process of
striving to fight its cyber and information security problems in the region. One
challenge is to determine how cybersecurity investigations should be conducted.
Even with the governments’ computer law crimes, there are few prosecutions for loss
or damage caused by cybercrimes.
Most offenders take advantage of the anonymity of cyberspace to conceal
their identity. Moreover, it is challenging to apply these laws effectively in
prosecuting cases without deep insight and actual evidence of digital crime.
However, the Internet-of-things penetrates beyond territorial borders and so
legislators may not have full control over some criminals if they were protected by
laws in other territories. Cybercrime investigators need to acquire credible digital
evidence so that courts of law can prosecute the perpetrators (Vacca, 2002). A
number of models and frameworks exist to allow a choice of strategies for
cybersecurity effectiveness and readiness in various organizations. Some of these
models are discussed in the next section.
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2.11 Existing Cybersecurity Models and Frameworks
This section of the literature review sets the theoretical foundation for
proposing a cybersecurity framework. The use of “edge” devices, cloud applications
and the increase of regulatory requirements have created a need for most
organizations to advance their security frameworks and re-think traditional
approaches in order to stay ahead. Organizations need new strategic frameworks to
address numerous trends across the IT landscape that will secure data, mobile
devices and cloud computing environments, among others. The major challenge is to
address disruptive technologies and trends, for example, everything connected with
social computing and at the same time manage inherent risks (Burgers et al., 2013;
CGI Group Report, 2014).

Figure 5: Porous Security Perimeter Source: (Source: CGI Group Report, 2014,
page 5)

Figure 5 illustrates an intensively connected IT infrastructure environment,
which combines data flows from mobile devices, critical infrastructure and cloud
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computing. All these combined deliver sensitive data to internal and outsourced data
centres along a common backbone which could be vulnerable to attacks. Such highly
connected and distributed network environments require frameworks that provide
mechanisms for protecting critical data. This is a typical layout for an interconnected
UAE government department that uses the e-government portal to offer services to
the public.
Meanwhile, Nambiro et al. (2014) assessed the cybersecurity problem in
selected ministries for the Government of Kenya. The authors provide both
descriptive and inferential analysis of cybersecurity assessment in a typical
government setup. They claim that cyberattacks are highly sophisticated to the extent
of troubling many organizations in identifying where the greatest vulnerability lies.
They further reveal that Kenya, together with other African governments, lacks its
own global networks and is thus very vulnerable to cyberattacks since they have to
use communication platforms under the control of external authorities. While this
study provided useful insights into the way that IT personnel can respond to
cyberattacks, it does not address the problem of dealing with typical users. There is
need to put in place an all-embracing model that considers the requirements of
different categories of people in a single robust framework for cybersecurity
effectiveness. In this dissertation, we develop a cybersecurity framework that
considers all users regardless of technical ability.
Their study reveals that 72.1% of the respondents agreed that their
organizations did not have secure cybersecurity infrastructure and 62.8% did not
conduct risk assessments or IT security audits. They go on to propose a cybersecurity
assessment framework based on Karl Pearson correlations between the cybersecurity
challenges and cybersecurity state as indicated in Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6: A Framework for Assessing Cybersecurity Challenges

Results from their study reveal that lack of awareness of cyber and
information security issues formed the greatest threat to the effectiveness of
cybersecurity in many organizations and government entities. This was followed by
insufficient cybersecurity legislation, inadequate funding and hastily changed
technologies all informing the cybersecurity status of the organization. The authors
argue that so long as cybersecurity frameworks fail to emphasize adequate legislation
as well as cybersecurity training and awareness, organizations or government entities
will be highly vulnerable to different forms of attacks (Nambiro et al., 2014). The
cybersecurity assessment framework above proposed for the Kenyan Government
may be applicable as well to the UAE government in prioritizing and emphasising
the most urgent security issues across the Emirates. This would provide a sense of
direction to government planners and legislators when they allocate resources and
compile the government security budget across all departments.
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As already addressed elsewhere in this thesis, it should be noted that the
application of strategic management tools to prepare for and respond to uncertainties
resulting from cybersecurity risks against UAE government entities also raises
awareness of the risks. These then lead to actions being taken organizationally to
prevent such attacks. Furthermore, cybersecurity attacks are usually against critical
national infrastructure, implying that senior management has the responsibility of
demonstrating both “due care” and “due diligence” as established in Federal Law No.
2, 2012 (Al Bawaba, 2012).
Abraham and Nair (2015) also developed a predictive framework for
cybersecurity analytics by applying an attack graph mechanism. Their main aim was
to incorporate informed risk-management decision taking in the dynamic attributes
associated with vulnerabilities that might change over time. They assert that the most
challenging issues regarding security in government systems is their failure to
develop mechanisms to combine the security of all systems in a network in order to
assess the overall security of the interconnected network. In their study, they point
out situational awareness as a universal concept needed to provide organizations with
the ability to identify, comprehend and forecast the integral features of a system.
They propose a situational awareness model below to address this concern as
illustrated in Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7: Cybersecurity Situational Awareness Model. (Source: Abraham and Nair,
2015)

The situational awareness model proposed in Figure 7 above splits the
cybersecurity problem into four major levels (Levels 1-4). The illustration on the left
represents a specific action that could be performed after a cybersecurity incident
while the table on the right suggests technological strategies which could be applied
to each level. For instance, Level-1 deals with the identification and interpretation of
cyberattacks through the application of intrusion detection techniques and other
security monitoring tools; Level-2 deals with techniques to understand and analyse
the cybersecurity problems through the application of security visualization tools and
risk assessment techniques; Level-3 considers mitigation of the cybersecurity risks
once the problems emerge. Finally, Level-4 forecasts incidents by using predictive
models that suggest appropriate corrective and preventive actions by management
and higher authorities in different organizations. This situational awareness model
may also be useful to the Abu Dhabi’s government entities.
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Previous studies show that attackers have radically reviewed their approaches
and therefore developed ways of exploiting the vulnerabilities of most recent
technological innovations through “Zero day” attacks. As a benchmark, governments
need to put in place security teams to focus on activities beyond the expected or
predefined. It is also important to deploy mechanisms for predicting vulnerability
trends and all forms of anticipated security gaps through stochastic models and
observing the life cycles of attacks (Bass, 2000).
Other work on situational awareness reveals that situational awareness plays
a major role in an organization’s decision making process. For instance,
Evangelopoulou et al. (2014) analysed the safety techniques of applications to the
networking environment by concentrating on network Intrusion Detection Systems
and the human factors involved. The proposed three levels in situational awareness
are Perception, Comprehension (to give a more comprehensive picture of what is
happening by combining existing knowledge and new information) and Projection
(which deals with the ability to make predictions based on knowledge assimilated).
Other factors that may influence situational awareness such as experience and
knowledge were also looked into. These writers add that efficiency, safety and
security are the primary goals in this regard, causing a need for situational awareness
measurement. Some of the most commonly used situational awareness techniques
identified are Situational Awareness Global Assessment Techniques (SAGAT); the
use of Simulations, Situational Awareness Rating methods (SART); the use of
Rating Scales (1 – 7) and a Situation Present Awareness Model (SPAM). Such
situation awareness techniques can be applied to Abu Dhabi’s government entities to
assess how far people understand the cybersecurity situation. If more people
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understood this, they would be ready to provide the correct responses to the cyber
and information security challenges affecting their organizations.
Situational awareness techniques may also aid the participants in evaluating
their situational awareness level and therefore increasing the quality of service (Ahn
et al., 2013). For instance, Simulators can be used in the aviation industry and
practices to measure the awareness levels of flight captains; or health informatics for
training and evaluating medical practitioners, among others. Similar techniques can
be applied to Abu Dhabi’s government entities to evaluate the readiness of the
trained cyber and information security professionals in cases of cyber incidents
occurring, to enable them to take preventive and corrective action. Furthermore, the
situational techniques can be implemented for cyberattacks by using receiver
operated characteristic analysis, based on recognition of an attack, faulty perception
of a current attack and the perception of no attack.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a
voluntary risk-based cybersecurity framework which involves a set of industry
standards and a set of best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity
risks. The subsequent framework was created through collaboration between the
government and the private sector and uses a common language to address and
manage cybersecurity risk. This is done in a cost-effective way based on business
needs but without placing additional regulatory requirements on businesses. Its major
focus is on business drivers of cybersecurity activities and it considers cybersecurity
risk as within the organization’s risk assessment process. In the present study, we
incorporate some of these good practices in the NIST framework and several other
frameworks globally, as discussed in the literature, in order to formulate a framework
for evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The
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framework for critical infrastructure support was released in February, 2014 after
President Obama’s Executive order 13636 of 2013 to formulate a framework that
harmonizes consensus and standard industry best practices to provide a flexible and
cost effective approach to enhancing cybersecurity and assist business owners or
operators to manage cybersecurity risks (Shackelford et al., 2014).
The fact that cyberattacks can seriously disrupt or even paralyze segments of
critical national infrastructure implies that an offensive posture or action is required
to confront the many forms of cyber and malware attack. Furthermore, appropriate
strategic management theories and principles are needed to guide the control and
prevention of these attacks (NIST, 2014). To this end, we have analysed the risk
management process in a typical organization from executive, business and
implementation levels through a life cycle assessment, as shown in the Figure 8
below:

Figure 8: Decision Flows in an Organization. (Source: NIST (2014) Framework
Report)
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The decision flows presented in Figure 8 above show that the executive level
staff communicates priorities, available resources and overall risk tolerance to the
business/process level. The business / process level inputs this information into the
risk management process and then collaborates with the implementation or
operations level to communicate the business’s needs and create a profile. The
implementation or operations level in return communicates the progress of profile
implementation to the business/process level. Meanwhile, the business/process level
uses this information to perform an impact assessment. Therefore, understanding
cybersecurity risks presents management with an opportunity to make informed
decisions and devise relevant corrective and preventive actions for the entire
organization. Several authors have advocated inclusion of the NIST technology
framework in cybersecurity strategies due to its technological capabilities and risk
based approach to information security, as detailed in the next section.
2.11.1 NIST Technology Framework and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
Shen (2014) reveals that the NIST framework is flexible, technologically
neutral and can be used by organizations of any size, level of sophistication or degree
of cyber risk. The author adds that the framework is based on Tiers separated from
the core to provide organizations with a means of ranking their own cybersecurity
management practices. The Tiers range from Tier1 (Partial) to Tier 4 (Adaptive),
representing increasing levels of rigour and sophistication in an organization’s
cybersecurity practices. It is claimed that organizations can use the framework to
provide a basic review of their cybersecurity practices by comparing their present
cybersecurity activities with those outlined in the core of the framework; this will
allow the establishment or improvement of the existing cybersecurity programme.
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For instance, they can create a current and target profile, communicate cybersecurity
requirements with stakeholders through a common language and identify
opportunities to revise or create new standards, guidelines and practices. Thus, the
framework is applicable to legislation, contracts, insurance and litigation.
Furthermore, the framework is voluntary and was published as a living
document to allow updates and reviews globally with the aim of improving it to keep
pace with ever changing technology, threats and environmental needs. In this study,
we integrate this framework with additional strategies to generate a new frame for
Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The NIST technology framework is illustrated in
the Figure 9 below.

Figure 9: NIST Technology Framework, Source NIST, (2014)

Figure 9 above shows the NIST technological framework proposed to resolve
cyber threats through identification, protection, detection, response and recovery
from cyberattacks. For instance Shackelford et al. (2014) affirms that the NIST
Framework harmonizes industry best practices by providing a flexible and cost
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effective approach to enhancing and assessing the cybersecurity of an organization
by providing five key functions, namely, (i) Identify (What assets need protection?)
(ii) Protect (What safeguards are available?) (iii) Detect (What techniques can
identify incidents?)

(iv) Respond (What techniques can contain the impact of

incidents?) (v) Recover (What techniques can restore capabilities?) as illustrated in
Figure 9 above. The framework further provides implementation tiers to illustrate
how organizations can manage cybersecurity risks in their enterprise risk
management practices,
The NIST framework is not a checkbox compliance exercise but a result of
work conducted by over three thousand (3000) business leaders and IT experts over a
period of two years with the aim of securing critical infrastructure as compared to
high existing standard such as COBIT, SAS, COSO and ISO 27001. Furthermore,
Ola (2015) emphasizes that every Small and Medium-sized Business (SMB) needs to
use the NIST cybersecurity framework, since it allows organizations to assess risks
based on industry best standards and practices, which helps them prioritise cyber
investment decisions and their management of cyber risks. They stress that C-level
management must participate and take a central role in identifying cyber risk.
Additionally, the (Price, 2014) report shows that the framework offers potential
advances to organizations across industries by offering voluntary guidelines for
taking a risk-based approach to cybersecurity. They could proceed by integrating
leading industry practices developed by internationally prominent bodies such as the
ISO and offering benefits beyond improved cybersecurity for example, effective
collaboration and the communication of security posture with executives to improve
cybersecurity practices and threat intelligence. Therefore, if organizations adopt the
NIST framework at the highest possible risk tolerance level, they would be better
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positioned to comply with cyber and privacy regulations. It is therefore evident that
integration of the NIST cybersecurity framework with the additional strategies
proposed in the present study would provide a stronger platform from which to
evaluate the cybersecurity effectiveness of the Abu Dhabi’s government entities.
Teodore et al. (2015) reveals that the NIST technology framework provides a
platform for evaluating critical infrastructure and predicting cybersecurity risks by
providing a set of core activities required for implementation. They assert that human
resources, processes and technology form a major pillar supporting an organization’s
cybersecurity. However, the authors also reveal some drawbacks to the framework:
the failure to provide a standard reference for organizations to follow and the
concealed cybersecurity maturity gaps in for example employee skills, among others,
may hinder its effectiveness.
The researcher hopes that proposing a new framework that incorporates key
factors proposed in this study like cybersecurity training, cybersecurity awareness,
the role of management, laws and regulations, qualifications of the information
security staff and experience of users, among others, would yield a stronger
framework for assessing cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi’s government
entities.
It is revealed that, even if the cited incentives in the use of the framework
existed, their effectiveness in improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity would
need continuous refinement with future versions integrating new strategies such as
legal requirements and the government’s role. The cybersecurity framework
proposed in this research draws from other frameworks and models reviewed in
literature such as NIST in addition to several factors to contribute a new framework
for evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi government entities. The
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framework does not consider human and organizational factors like, culturally
sensitive training and user awareness programmes, support from senior management,
presence of experienced and competent staff and modern technological
countermeasures all in an updated framework coupled by the use of strategic
management tools to create conditions for enhanced information security across the
different entities. Therefore, the study intends to strengthen the human and
organizational factors discussed in literature together with the risk based
technological strategies proposed in the NIST (2014) technology platform to
formulate a strong framework and checklist for evaluating cybersecurity
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi government entities. Meanwhile, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electro technical
Commission (IEC) and the UAE’s National Electronics Security Authority (NESA)
in collaboration with the Abu Dhabi Systems and Information Centre (ADSIC)
proposed more standards with several strategies for evaluating cyber and information
security status in organizations as briefly discussed in the next sections.
2.11.2 The ISO 27000 Information Security Management Standards
The ISO 27000 family of standards offers a set of specifications, code of
conduct and best practice for organizations to ensure strong IT service management.
It includes standards like ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS which offers specifications for an
effective Information Security Management System, ISO/IEC 27002, which provides
the code of conduct and the recommended best practice by detailing 114 security
controls organized into 14 sectors and 35 control objectives as well as the ISO/IEC
27005 which provides guidelines for Risk Management. These standards were
developed by the joint committee of the International Organization for
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Standardization (ISO) and the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC)
with the objective of defining requirements for successful ISMS delivery through a
process based approach by Establishing, Implementing, Monitoring and Maintenance
of an ISMS grounded on a Plan Do Check Act (PDCA) model. However, many
organizations lack mature management systems with little knowledge on Information
security governance and evaluation of existing mechanisms coupled with the lack of
skilled resources to conduct risk analysis to enable the implementation as well as
maintenance of strong Information Security Management System justifying the need
for a simpler framework to address such concerns. Further, the ISO 27001 standard
allows organizations to explicitly asses their internal processes with a major aim of
presenting to International bodies for certification. This approach implies that
organizations focus mainly on jumping the bar for international competitiveness
ignoring performance evaluation of their internal cybersecurity systems by limiting
the scope to operational standardisation of those well performing functional units
other than evaluating the strength of their organization-wide Cyber and Information
security defences, policies and frameworks with senior Management taking a lead.
This is a major focus of this study research theoretical framework were the research
proposes a simpler framework that Abu Dhabi government entities can embark on to
evaluate and address the missing link in the performance of cybersecurity systems. In
the next section we briefly discuss the ADSIC II and NESA information security
framework guidelines in comparison to this study.
2.11.3 The UAE National Electronics Security Authority (NESA) Standards
The UAE Federal Law No. 3 and No. 5 of 2012, established the National
Electronic Security Agency (NESA) as a federal body tasked with protecting the
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UAE’s national critical infrastructure and improving National Cybersecurity through
development of standards, policies and suggestive legislation as well as guidelines
for securing digital data in all critical sectors of the UAE economy. These standards
were developed with a benchmark on major International standards for information
security like the NIST (2014) Special Publication 800-53: recommended security
controls for federal information systems & organizations, ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS and
ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice for information security management. Compliance
to these standards is mandatory and is determined by ADSIC whose primary
responsibility is to check compliance to the standards by all government entities in
the emirate of Abu Dhabi.
NESA’s threat based approach to information security is managed by
mapping controls to the 24 most recent threats gathered from industry reports since
2012, Alqatawna (2014). Controls in the framework were ranked as P1 representing
the highest to P4 representing lowest impact with definitions for both Management
and Technical oriented controls across 12 domains as shown in Figure 10 below.
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Information Security Governance
Information Security Risk Management

Human Resource Security

Third Party Security

Information Security Training,
Awareness & Communication

Information Asset
Management

Physical & Environmental
Security

Information System Design,
Development & Testing

Identity & Access
Management

Information System
Operations Management

Information Security Incident
Management

Information Systems
Continuity Management

Figure 10: NESA Information Security Standard
Source: ADSIC standards Ver 2.0, Page 5

From Figure 10 above, the NESA framework on information security
incorporates a domain on Awareness, Training and Communication of information
security issues to all stakeholders and emphasizes the recruitment of well qualified
Information security professionals to the level of CISO in every government entity.
This is in support of this study, however, the checklist developed by ADSIC to
implement the proposed framework in Figure 10 is very long and rather complex the
12 domain controls distributed on over 300 pages which makes it very difficult for
organizations to implement or quickly asses their cybersecurity systems and provides
little input towards evaluating relationships between competence of staff, role of
management, level of technology and strategic planning as compared to
cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities. This study is
intended to bridge this gap by contributing a simplified framework and checklist
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specifically for assessing the effectiveness of organization wide cybersecurity
systems for Abu Dhabi government entities.
Meanwhile, the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at the Carnegie Mellon
University developed a model for software development as early as 1980s. This
model was named the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) developed
with the aim of formulating a path for improving organizational software
development processes. The model was formally published in 2002 as CMMI Ver
1.1. (Dong-Young and Gerald, 2010). The CMMI model is widely applicable to
government entities especially when conducting process based assessment for stable
and mature improvement. The model provides a framework mainly used in software
development and maintenance processes based on actual practices that reflect the
needs of individuals performing software process improvement through a hierarchy
of five maturity levels that lay successive foundation for continuous process
improvement, the maturity levels include; 1) Initial, 2) Managed, 3) Defined, 4)
Quantitatively Managed, and 5) Optimizing. These levels are further broken down
into several process areas to reflect areas where an organization needs to focus more
in case of operational process improvement. This research borrows the five maturity
levels from the CMMI model to generate a scoring and measurement technique
based on Likert scale (1-5) for assessing and interpreting organizational
cybersecurity effectiveness in terms of the six factors identified for organizational
cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi Government entities. The modified CMMI
model applicable for this study is as seen in the Figure 11 below:
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Figure 11: Modified Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) Model

The researcher modified the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI)
in the Figure 11 above to come up with a measurement and scoring scale which Abu
Dhabi government entities can use to verify the level of cybersecurity effectiveness
(CSE) in their organizations through which Level 1 indicates that the organization
has taken initial steps towards implementing measures that contribute towards CSE;
Level 2 indicates that these measures are repeatable and; Level 3 indicates that these
CSE measures are defined and can be referenced, Level 4 shows that the
organization has a well-managed CSE operations while the highest level of CSE in
an organization is Level 5 which will demonstrate the department has fully complied
with all the factors for cybersecurity effectiveness.
From the above discussions, the researcher has identified several factors and
strategies for ensuring an effective cybersecurity system. Based on that, the
following hypotheses are proposed for this study:
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2.12 Research Hypotheses
H1:

There is a positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of
staff and cybersecurity effectiveness.

H2: There is a positive relationship between senior management support and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
H3:

There is a positive relationship between level of technology and
cybersecurity effectiveness

H4: There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff
and cybersecurity effectiveness.
H5: There is a positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity
strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber
security and cybersecurity effectiveness
Furthermore, the researcher has identified and responded to several issues and
problems hindering the effectiveness of organization’s cybersecurity
programmes. These problems are presented in the research gap
illustrated in the next section.

2.13 Research Gap
Several cyber and information security frameworks and models reviewed in
literature, provide detailed insights into the research problem and the techniques for
combating existing information security challenges wherever they occur. For
instance, Nambiro et al. (2014) proposes a cybersecurity status assessment
framework for government ministries in a developing country by applying Karl
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Pearson correlation coefficients. However, implementation details for this framework
provide no clear description of its defence capability.

While the NIST (2014)

Technological Framework has been highly rated, particularly for providing
appropriate technological

cybersecurity defences

to

organizations

globally

(Shackelford et al., 2015; Teodoro et al., 2015; Price, 2014; Sage, 2015; Hiller and
Russell, 2015; and among others) it fails to include other important factors to ensure
a strong cybersecurity evaluation system. The framework presents a technologically
centred model whose major focus is on the business drivers of cybersecurity
activities and the consideration of cybersecurity risk as part of an organization’s risk
assessment process. The framework is a risk-based compilation of the guidelines
designed to help organizations to assess their current capabilities and draft prioritised
roadmaps for improved cybersecurity practices. The authors of the framework had as
their major goal the improvement of risk based security, but they did not did not fully
address other critical strategies concerning cyber and information security challenges
to organizations such as culture sensitive user training and awareness programmes,
support from existing laws and regulations, support from senior management and the
competence level of information security staff. Even though we agree that the NIST
technology framework provides a strong technology centred and risk-based approach
through the five key functions (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover) the
researcher argues that other non-technologically focused strategic factors are very
critical for organization’s cybersecurity system and therefore cannot be taken lightly
when evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness of an organization. The researcher
therefore proposes a cybersecurity framework, together with a checklist, that
incorporates all these human and organizational factors that are strategically
important for cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s government entities.
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2.14 Conclusion
In this study, we have critically reviewed the literature concerning the
cybersecurity landscape globally, including technologies, strategic planning
methodologies and several cybersecurity frameworks and models, together with
some strategies for an effective cybersecurity system. Most of the authors
concentrate on technological and situational awareness mechanisms for evaluating
cybersecurity effectiveness and eliminating associated risks (NIST, 2014; Burgers et
al., 2013; Abraham and Nair, 2015; and Nambiro et al., 2014). However, these
mechanisms provide little help for the ever-increasing number of uninformed users,
analysis of the existing legal framework and its implication for cybersecurity
effectiveness or consideration of senior management’s role in preventing
cyberattacks. We have studied the existing literature on the concept of cybersecurity
from a broad perspective through the discussion of several studies and frameworks
concerning cybersecurity defences, major attacks on organizations’ critical
infrastructure, technologies for implementation, and prevention of these attacks, the
role of cybersecurity education, and training and awareness.

Based on the above

discussions in the literature, it is evident that several gaps exist regarding
cybersecurity and effectiveness and therefore we propose further investigation and
analysis of the phenomenon. In the next chapter we present the methodology used to
conduct further research for the study.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive study and the approach taken to
the research problem concerning the evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu
Dhabi’s government entities. The principal objective is to discuss how the underlying
study has been conducted, how the data were collected, analyzed and validated
through reliability statistics. This chapter is presented according to the design
illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 12 below:
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Figure 12: Design of Chapter Three
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Well defined theories and frameworks on cybersecurity in the UAE, the GCC
and elsewhere were consulted through which a detailed review of related literature
was conducted to generate a conceptual model. The following hypotheses were
formulated for this study:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of
staff and cybersecurity effectiveness.
H2: There is a positive relationship between senior management support and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
H3:

There is a positive relationship between level of technology and
cybersecurity effectiveness

H4: There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff
and cybersecurity effectiveness.
H5: There is a positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity
strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber
security and cybersecurity effectiveness

From the above hypotheses we formulated a study framework to guide the
research process and the analysis of the relationships between variables. The latter,
together with the literature review laid a foundation for discussing and formulating a
cybersecurity framework which was used to assess the effectiveness of the
cybersecurity strategies used by Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The formulated
study framework can be seen in Figure 13 below:
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Figure 13: Proposed Study Framework

From Figure 13, the lack of Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE) has been
identified as the key management problem facing organizations worldwide and Abu
Dhabi’s government entities in particular. This lack of cybersecurity effectiveness
creates a knowledge gap in the organizations and is hence a researchable problem for
this study. To fill it, a research framework was formulated, based on a theoretical
foundation in the literature upon which a number of independent variables were
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formulated against the dependent variable Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE).
Analysis of these relationships between variables contributed to several outcomes,
findings and recommendations including the proposed Integrated Cybersecurity
Framework for Abu Dhabi’s government entities. The variables used in the study
were theoretically and operationally defined to provide an insight into the
measurement of variables and our expectations of the study results.

3.2 Definition and Measurement of Variables
In order to guide the analysis of the study all the variables in the study
framework and research hypotheses were theoretically and operationally defined
with theoretical definitions based on the literature, and operational definitions which
were seen from our perspective in analysing and measuring the variables to answer
the research questions and deliver appropriate study results. A five point Likert scale
was used for measuring responses in this research instrument. Below we define the
variables considered in the study:

Independent variable 1 (INDV1): Competence of information security staff
Hypothesis H1. There is a relationship between the Competence/knowledge of
staff and cybersecurity effectiveness.
3.2.1 H1 Theoretical Definition
Gilbert (1978) sees “competence" as a combination of practical and
theoretical knowledge, cognitive skills, behaviour and values used to improve
performance; or as a state of being adequate or well qualified, having the ability to
perform a specific role. For instance, management competency may be determined in
terms of systems thinking, emotional intelligence and having the skills to influence
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or negotiate the highly technical cyber- and information security matters under
review. This hypothesis focuses on the qualifications and experience of cyber- or
information security staff employed in government entities and the way in which it
impacts on their cybersecurity knowledge and skills as well as the effectiveness of
their individual departments.
3.2.2 H1 Operational Definition
In this study, we strongly believe that staff with specialized qualifications and
considerable amounts of experience (say, > = 5 years) in the cyber- and information
security domain in a government department demonstrates more knowledge and
understanding of cybersecurity issues affecting their organizations than do staff
without specialized cybersecurity qualifications and with little or no experience in
the security domain in a government department. That is, the higher the qualification
and experience of cybersecurity staff, the higher the competence level. In this case
we propose using a correlation technique to analyse this relationship.
Experience of cybersecurity staff should be based on the number of years
served in government department while qualification should be based on an
employee’s attainment of internationally recognized cyber and information security
certificates such as Certified Ethical Hacker, Certified Information Security
Professional (CISSP), Certified Information Security Manager (CISM) and Cisco
Certified Internetwork Expert (CCIE) Security, among others. Descriptive and
Inferential statistical tests such as Mean and Standard deviations, Frequency
distributions, Cross tabulations, ANOVA and linear regression analysis were
conducted to test this study hypothesis. The ANOVA test was used to compare
means of more than two groups on the continuous variable, post-hoc comparisons
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were used to find out any significant differences between groups to check the
condition for homogeneity of variance if p-value = 0.05. Further, linear regressions
were conducted to find out the impact of staff competence on cybersecurity
effectiveness (CSE).
Independent Variable 2 (INDV2): Senior management support
Hypothesis H2. There is a relationship between senior management support and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
3.2.3 H2 Theoretical Definition
It is claimed in several studies that cybersecurity is a management issue that
requires management intervention and commitment (Kritzinger and Van Solms,
2010; Al Bawaba, 2012; Rotvold, 2008; and Nigel and Rice, 2011). Therefore,
management support to cyber and information security programmes in and outside
the organization is predicted to provide higher effectiveness for it. That is to say,
senior management needs to understand the cybersecurity risk and its implications
for the organization to enable staff to make informed decisions at the earliest through
strategic thinking and governance. Senior management support in this study context
is operationally defined in the next section.
3.2.4 H2 Operational Definition
Senior management support is evaluated by the presence or absence of well
qualified cyber and information security staff; presence of policies, procedures and
strategic plans which have incorporated cybersecurity planning; and the presence of
approved cybersecurity budgets among others. “The more the support from senior
management, the more the cybersecurity effectiveness”. Descriptive and inferential
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statistics like computations for mean and standard deviations, cross tabulations,
ANOVA including Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance at p - value (p = 0.05)
to check if there exist any statistical significance between groups of departments.
ANOVA and linear regression to be used in determining the influence of the
participants‘ sector on the construct support from senior management, Multiple
comparisons through post-hoc analysis using Tukey HSD test at p-value = 0.05
Independent Variable3 (INDV3): Level of technology
Hypothesis H3. There is a relationship between the level of technology and
cybersecurity effectiveness
3.2.5 H3 Theoretical Definition
There is a claim in the literature that organizations that invest heavily and
deploy strong cybersecurity technologies in their departments’ critical infrastructure
demonstrate greater cybersecurity effectiveness (Symantec, 2016; NIST, 2014;
Gercke, 2014; and Hunter, 2013). Such technologies include the deployment of
strong anti-virus software, firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and
Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS), among others.
3.2.6 H3 Operational Definition
The more organizations deploy strong cybersecurity technologies, the greater
their readiness to combat cyberattacks and the greater the cybersecurity
effectiveness. Therefore, government entities which deploy appropriate technology
for detecting and preventing cyberattacks, will be more effective than those that do
not deploy these technologies. From the responses obtained from the survey
instrument, it is apparent that all the government entities in Abu Dhabi have invested
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heavily in technology. As viewed from the standpoint of the NIST (2014)
framework, a technology framework already exists for identifying, detecting,
responding to and preventing cyber intrusion; hence the present study focused on
adding other human and social factors to technology and measuring them to evaluate
the cybersecurity effectiveness of all the departments. Descriptive and inferential
statistics like computations for mean and standard deviations, cross tabulations,
ANOVA including Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance at p-value (p = 0.05) to
check if there exist any statistical significance between groups of departments. An
F-test at statistical significance p = 0.05 was conducted to determine the coefficient
R2 and determine its variation with the independent variable of cybersecurity
effectiveness, ANOVA and Linear regressions also conducted to check statistical
significance between study groups as related to the dependent variable cybersecurity
effectiveness.
Independent Variable 4 (INDV4): Training of staff
Hypothesis H4. There is a relationship between the cybersecurity training of staff and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
3.2.7 H4 Theoretical Definition
Effective employee training programmes in cybersecurity refers to
programmes that provide staff with information, new skills, or professional
development opportunities in the domain of cyber and information security. The
literature mentions that staff who undergo appropriate cybersecurity training and
awareness programmes demonstrate better understanding of cybersecurity issues and
gain more job skills, leading to cybersecurity effectiveness in their organizations
(Siponnen, 2000; Hight, 2005; Greitzer et al., 2007; Whitmer, 2007; Kritzinger and
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Smith, 2008; and McCrohan, 2010). The researcher analysed and validated this
theoretical claim.
3.2.8 H4 Operational Definition
The more cyber- and information security training programmes employees
undertake, the more knowledge they acquire and the more effective they become;
hence the cybersecurity effectiveness of their organizations. We compared the
cybersecurity knowledge of employees who have attended the required training
programmes to those who have not on a 5 point Likert scale. Descriptive and
inferential statistics like computations for mean and standard deviations, cross
tabulations, ANOVA including Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance at p - value
(p = 0.05) to check if there exist any statistical significance between groups of
departments.

ANOVA and Linear regressions were conducted for groups of

departments to establish the relationship with the dependent variable, cybersecurity
effectiveness (CSE). Further, we used Levene’s statistical test to determine the
homogeneity of variance and check the p-value within and between the departments
or study groups and also compute the means and standard deviations so as to
compare departmental sectors against the study construct and the independent
variable.
Independent Variable 5 (INDV5): Presence of Cybersecurity Strategic Plans
Hypothesis 5. There is a relationship between the presence of cybersecurity strategic
plans and cybersecurity effectiveness.
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3.2.9 H5 Theoretical Definition
Strategic planning is an organization's process of defining its strategy, or
direction, and making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy.
Strategic plans help organizations to improve their cybersecurity arrangements
(Elbanna, 2010; Grant, 2003; and Andrew, 2014), but departments that incorporate
cybersecurity in their strategic plans would be more effective.
3.2.10 H5 Operational Definition
The more organizations incorporate cybersecurity into their strategic planning
programmes, the greater their cybersecurity effectiveness. That is to say, if the
management of a government department considers cybersecurity in all its strategic
planning, policies and frameworks, then we expect more cybersecurity effectiveness
in the department. Descriptive and inferential statistics like computations for mean
and standard deviations, cross tabulations, ANOVA including Levene’s test of
homogeneity of variance at p - value (p = 0.05) to check if there exist any statistical
significance between groups of departments. We considered inter-variable
correlation coefficients for the different groups in the study population and
conducted a linear regression analysis to check the statistical significance of the
study construct at p = 0.05

Independent Variable 6 (INDV6): Awareness of Users
Hypothesis H6. There is a relationship between the awareness of users about
cybersecurity and cybersecurity effectiveness
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3.2.11 H6 Theoretical Definition
User awareness programmes are deliberate efforts by organization to
influence user thinking and behaviour regarding cybersecurity issues. They are
designed to create consciousness in users of the correct behaviours to support the
organization’s cybersecurity efforts. These programmes instil the security principles
that help change user behaviour while helping the organization manage cybersecurity
risks.
3.2.12 H6 Operational Definition
Employee awareness of department policies and procedures is a strong
indication that the organization has an effective cybersecurity programme. That is
“the higher the awareness of users about the organization’s policies and procedures,
the higher the cybersecurity effectiveness of the organization”. Descriptive and
inferential statistics were obtained through cross tabulations, post-hoc analysis using
Tukey’s HSD test, linear regressions and ANOVA test to determine the significance
of the results of Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance at p = 0.05. Smaller
values of R2 represent smaller variations in cybersecurity effectiveness against the
factor.

Next, we discuss the research paradigm employed in this study.

3.3 Research Paradigm
Gallagher et al. (2003) define a paradigm as "a world view". The authors
view it as a basic set of beliefs or assumptions which guide a researcher’s
investigation. It is envisaged that every researcher approaches research with many
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interlocking and sometimes contradicting philosophical assumptions and standpoints.
Yet a paradigm has been defined on the basis of aspects relating to social reality.
Social reality is made up of the materials that construct the social world and impact
on people’s lives, providing them with opportunities and negotiating restrictions,
such as individuals’ motives and social interactions. Meanwhile Creswell and Miller
(2000) indicates that the research design process begins with philosophical
assumptions which enquirers treat as a foundation for making decisions when they
carry out a study. That is to say, researchers convey their own paradigms, or sets of
beliefs, to the research project, and these inform the conduct and writing of the study.
In conducting social science research, two principal and divergent traditions
exist, namely positivism and social constructionism. The positivist approach in the
natural sciences stresses the use of organized methods combining deductive logic
from existing theories with precise empirical observations of individual behaviors, to
formulate and test the study hypotheses. Social constructionism, however, focuses on
explaining why people have different experiences (Hair et al., 2009). In the present
study we employed the positivist paradigm since the logic is based on a critical
review of existing theories and frameworks in the literature and in practice. It is
proposed that the positivist paradigm underpins quantitative methodology owing to
its deductive nature (Tubey et al., 2015).

Meanwhile, the approach used for

conducting research is discussed in the next section.

3.4 Research Strategy
Several strategies and frameworks in the literature were qualitatively assessed
to generate empirical support in formulating a study framework for the present work
(NIST, 2014; Nambiro et al., 2014; Shen, 2014; Burgers et al., 2013; and Abraham
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Nair, 2015). A detailed discussion of the tools, the research design and the data
collection methods is presented. In addition, the units of observation representing the
study population, sampling technique employed, reliability and validity of the
research instrument as well as the questionnaire used to gather findings of the study
are discussed.
While the main strategy in this study was to use a survey approach for
collecting data, first a pilot study was conducted in a mid-sized organization to
establish the role of awareness programmes in cybersecurity issues among
employees. This was necessary to validate whether culturally sensitive cyber and
information security training programmes affect the design of appropriate
cybersecurity programmes. The intention was to examine the relationship between
employee training programmes and employee awareness programmes on
cybersecurity effectiveness in organizations, with reference to research hypotheses
H4 and H6.
Staff in a midsized organization were randomly divided into two groups.
Group one consisting of Indians treated to a cybersecurity training program that is
culturally sensitive conducted in Hindi while the second group consisting different
nationalities from Uganda, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines undertook a generic
one conducted in English. A survey was conducted following the treatments. Results
showed a significant difference in the two dispositions. It was revealed that the group
which undertook a culturally sensitive approach demonstrated better understanding
of cyber and information security issues better than the generically trained group
after a period of one month.
Following the pilot study, we chose the survey approach, since surveys are
easy to manage, effective for a fairly large population and can be administered in
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several ways, such as on line, on paper, via a mobile surveys or a mixture of these.
Both online and paper surveys were administered to the target population of 946
respondents in Abu Dhabi’s government entities to ensure optimum response rates.
We employed a quantitative approach to analyze the strata and this formed the basis
for a discussion of study results and findings. We analyzed the qualifications and
experience (competence) of the information security staff in the Abu Dhabi’s
government entities, reviewed the existing user training and awareness programmes
and the cybersecurity technologies deployed and examined their relationship with the
cybersecurity effectiveness of the selected government entities.
Finally, we examined the relationship between the current laws, management
support and cybersecurity effectiveness as well as the existence of supportive
strategic plans to enhance cybersecurity effectiveness. After a detailed study of
several cybersecurity defense frameworks, and drawing from existing frameworks
such as NIST (2014) and Nambiro et al. (2014), the researcher proposes a framework
that could be utilized by the Abu Dhabi government entities to evaluate their
readiness to defend against cyberattacks.

3.5 Research Design
The research design presents a framework created to seek answers to the
research questions above. It defines the study type (namely, descriptive or
correlational) and sub-type (namely, a descriptive-longitudinal case study), research
question, hypotheses, independent and dependent variables, experimental design,
and, if applicable, data collection methods and the plan for the statistical analysis
proposed.

The design was seen as a blueprint for the logical structure of the

research, which helped to identify the grouping levels of the participants and the data
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collection techniques (Rovai et al., 2014). The relationships between the variables
were studied without controlling participants or study conditions through
experimental or non-experimental techniques.
Survey research was employed to present the findings of this study. It was
structured analytically by presenting its dependent, independent and extraneous
variables. The variables used in this study were classified as shown in the Table 2
below.
Table 2: Study Variables
Variable name
Competence/Knowledge of
Staff
Support from Management

Type
cybersecurity Independent
Independent

Level of Technology

Independent

Training of Staff

Independent

Presence of Strategic Plans

Independent

Awareness of Users
Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CSE)

Independent
Dependent

3.5.1 Population of the Study
The study population consisted of all the 126 Abu Dhabi government
agencies as listed on the e-Government portal (https://www.Abu Dhabi.ae). These
agencies, which were the units of our observation, are organized into the types of
service they provide to the public. The 8 service types are as follows:
Type 1: Social and Civic
Type 2: Culture and Recreation
Type 3: Department of Transport
Type 4: Economic affairs
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Type 5: Health Authority of Abu Dhabi
Type 6: Education Department
Type 7: Public Order
Type 8: Science and Technology
From the target population of 126 we randomly selected at least two (2) units of
observation from each of the eight categories or Types listed above. These units of
observation (Departments) had the following characteristics. First, the smallest ones
had up to 100 employees, the medium-sized ones from 100 – 500 employees and the
large ones had over 500 employees. Second, some of the small entities had one or
two branches only, while the larger ones had offices in all major urban centres of the
Emirate. What was common to most of these entities was that their employees were
mostly UAE nationals.
In total, 32 units of observation were randomly selected to represent the 8
types. The results obtained from these units of observation were generalized to the
population of the 126 government agencies.
3.5.2 Respondent Sample Selection Methodology
In each of the 32 units of observation in the sample, the researcher aimed at
administering the questionnaire to 30 respondents. The total number of respondents
targeted was thus 960. The entities were categorized under the eight types of service
offered (as seen above). The researcher in consultation with the 10 Experts in Abu
Dhabi government entities selected on the basis of subject knowledge and experience
and two academic professors selected the sources of data (respondents).

These

respondents were selected from each of the 32 entities with a major focus on
managerial level and staff with the following titles: Executive Director (CEO or
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GM), Department Manager (CIO/CISO, Consultant, IT Manager etc.) and Section
Manager (Officer, Team member etc.). From the 960 questionnaires distributed to
the entire population, a total of 535 was completed and returned. The actual
respondents to the survey questions remain unnamed because of confidentiality
agreements, which were needed to ensure their maximum cooperation with the
research. Figure 14 below illustrates the sample selection methodology used in the
study.

Figure 14: Sample Selection Methodology
From Figure 14, there are 126 government entities in the Abudhabi
government (the universe of this study) divided into eight types. The researcher
sampled 32 entities from the universe with at least 2 entities from each entity type to
avoid sampling bias. Further, from each of the 32 entities in the sample, a minimum
of 30 respondents was expected to answer the survey questionnaire. After
administering the survey, 535 questionnaires were completed and returned from
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which only 467 were clean for further analysis. The next section discusses how the
respondents sample was selected to ensure objective responses.
3.5.3 Definition of the Respondents
Further, Table 3 and figure 15 below shows how the 960 targeted respondents
were distributed across the 32 government agencies sampled for the study. These
respondents constitute our target population (N= 960). From the 32 units of
observation sampled, all the Executive Directors or equivalent (32), all CIO/CISO
(32) and all IT Managers (32) were targeted. The total targeted from this group of
senior management was 96. The remaining 864 included employees in other ranks or
positions within the organizations, such as business, HR and operations from all the
sampled organizations representing each of the 8 department types across the
Emirate. From this targeted population, a total of 535 respondents in the 32 units of
observation selected for the survey completed and returned their questionnaires to the
researcher for further analysis as indicated in Table 3 below.
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Table 3: Definition of the Study Population, Source: Primary Data
Department
Types

Total
Number
of
Departme
nts
(n1=126)

Depart
ments
in
Study
(n2=32)

Total
Executive
Director or
Equivalent
(n3=32)

Total
CISO/
CIO

Total
IT
Manage
rs
n5=32)

Total NonManageme
nt Staff
(n6=27)

Targeted
Population
(n3+n4+n5)

Returned
Question
naires

Social and
Civic

44

9

9

9

9

243

270

196

Culture and
Recreation

19

4

4

4

4

108

120

72

Transport

9

3

3

3

3

81

90

44

Economic
Affairs

22

5

5

5

5

135

150

62

Health

2

2

2

2

2

54

60

26

Education

6

3

3

3

3

81

90

49

Public Order
and Safety

6

3

3

3

3

81

90

39

Science and
Technology

8

3

3

3

3

81

90

47

Total N

126

32

32

32

32

864

960

535

135

Figure 15: Distribution of the Study Population in Abu Dhabi

Several methods and techniques were applied to gather the research findings
and analyze the study results. After a thorough cleaning of the study strata, 68 cases
of missing values were detected in the final data coding sheet. These cases were
removed before a final analysis, leaving a final complete data set of 467 for further
analysis, as detailed in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, some of the tools and approaches
in the study are discussed in the next section.

3.6 Methodological Approach
3.6.1 Research Instrument
A carefully written and structured questionnaire was used to gather responses
from the target study population. It used a five point Likert scale to guide
respondents in choosing the appropriate answers that would allow their views to be
interpreted. This tool was selected for the present study since it allows respondents
to record in numerical form the degree to which they agree or disagree with a series
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of statements, making it easy to perform statistical analysis. The questionnaire used
was structured into sub sections, each comprising questions relevant to a specific
study hypothesis or area of focus, as detailed in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Questionnaire Structure
Questionnaire Focus
area or Variable
Demographic Data

Competence/
Knowledge of staff

Test Questions (QN)

Target Hypothesis

QN1, QN2, QN3,
QN6, QN7

QN5, Questions used to describe the
study population and
understanding participants
backgrounds
QN4, QN8, QN9, QN10,
H1: There is a positive
QN11, QN12, QN13,
relationship between the
QN14, QN15,
competence/knowledge of staff
QN17,QN18
and cybersecurity effectiveness.

Support from
Management

QN31, QN32, QN33,
QN34, QN35, QN37,
QN41, QN42, QN29

H2: There is a positive
relationship between senior
management support and
cybersecurity effectiveness.

Level of Technology

QN19, QN20, QN22,
QN23, QN24, QN25,
QN26, QN46, QN47,
QN48, QN49

H3: There is a positive
relationship between level of
technology and cybersecurity
effectiveness

Training of Staff

QN54, QN55, QN56,
QN58, QN59, QN60

H4: There is a positive
relationship between
cybersecurity training of staff and
cybersecurity effectiveness.

Presence of Strategic QN37,
QN40
Plans

QN38,

QN39, H5:
There is a positive
relationship between the presence
of cybersecurity strategic plans
and cybersecurity effectiveness

Awareness of Users

QN4 (demographics),
QN8 (demographics),
QN40, QN50, QN51,
QN52, QN53, QN57

Laws and Regulations

QN18, QN30

H6: There is a positive
relationship between awareness
of users about cyber security and
cybersecurity effectiveness
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Table 4 above shows how the questionnaire items were distributed across the
factors of cybersecurity with respect to the different study hypotheses and variables.
The items used to measure the constructs were selected with inputs from the
consulted 10 experts and in consultation with several international cyber and
information security standards like (ADSIC II Information Security Guidelines,
2013, ISO / IEC 27001; 2013; ISMS standard, ISO/ IEC 27032; 2012; Cybersecurity
Standard, NIST (2014) Framework guidelines and ISO / IEC 27035, International
Standard for incident Management checklists).
An online version of this instrument was initially administered through
Survey Monkey to a limited sample to obtain initial results that could be used to
further improve the questionnaire before the actual field survey commenced. From
the results of this limited study, it was determined that changes had to be made, to
improve the clarity of the questions and the response rate of the target population.
The corrections included adding an Arabic version and allowing for hard copies to be
distributed. A copy of the survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix A of this
dissertation. A further discussion of the questionnaire design can be seen in the next
section.
3.6.2 Questionnaire Design
Questions in the research instrument were selected basing on review of
previous studies, review of industry literature and input from cybersecurity
professionals consulted across Abu Dhabi government entities. A total of 57
questions were developed considering the requirements of the different pillars or
variables in the study. For example, questions for “Support from Management” had
statements regarding the importance of setting aside a budget for cybersecurity;
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while those ones concerning “Awareness of Users”, asked whether the respondent
agreed with statements on the importance of regular planned cybersecurity
awareness programs in the organization among others. Most responses in the survey
questionnaire were scored on a 5 - Point Likert scale to capture responses of users to
the different questions in which a score of 1 indicated “Strongly Disagree” and a
score of 5 “Strongly Agreed”. These responses from the target population were
coded into a Statistical Tool for further analysis, generation and Interpretation of
results. For example consider the following tables showing how questionnaire items
were selected by study variable. Other items can be seen in the Appendix B.
Table 5 and Table 6 below present a sample of how the questionnaire items
were carefully selected to address the research questions and study hypotheses. For
every question in the survey instrument, the researcher reviewed related literature
and with consultations from 10 subject matter experts in cyber and information
security and 2 academic professors identified questionnaire items to suit the study
constructs and answer the research questions. A sample of such questions are as seen
below.
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Table 5: Showing sample Questionnaire Items for the Variable Competence/
Knowledge of Staff
Research Question
1. Are the existing
information
security
professionals in
government entities
well qualified and
experienced to
detect and stop
cyber-attacks?

Study
Hypothesis
There is a
relationship
between the
competence/kn
owledge of
staff and cyber
security
effectiveness
(H1)

Literature highlights

Survey Instrument Questions

It is claimed that only graduates
with the right skills and
experience will be able to
resolve the ever rising level of
international cyber conflict (
Dale et al., 2011)

Survey Questions:
2. How many years have you
worked in the government
sector?
8. A cyberattack is a perceived
threat to network security.
9. Our employees do not know
when their computers have
been attacked by a virus.
01. A cyberattack can be
perceived as a threat to data
and information.
00. A Virus attack is a type of
a cyber-attack.
04. Untrustworthy employees
or disgruntled IT insiders can
initiate a cyberattack against
the organization.

As enterprises invest more
resources in data protection,
their main challenge still
remains that of finding top-flight
security practitioners with the
right skills for the job (CSX,
Feb, 2017)
Organizations’ cybersecurity
teams continue to struggle to
convince senior management of
cybersecurity issues.
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Table 6: Questionnaire Items for the Senior Management Support Variable
Research
Question
2. To what extent

Study
Hypothesis
There is a

Literature highlights
Senior management are

Survey Instrument
Questions
Survey Questions:

does senior

positive

required to exercise “due care”

49. All Abu Dhabi

management

relationship

and “due process” in ensuring

government

support the

between senior

CSE of their organizations

organization should

establishment

management

Haris, (2010).

have a budget

and

support and CSE

implementation

(H2)

allocated to strengthen
Prevention of cybersecurity is

cyber-security

of cybersecurity

considered a strategic

measures.

defense

management issue, top

21. Our organization

strategies

management support improves

has invested adequate

effectiveness of organization’s

funds to promote

cybersecurity programmes

countermeasures

through prioritization, funding

against cyberattacks.

and enforcement of security

20. Our organization

policies (Dutton and Duncan,

has invested adequate

1987; Knapp, 2009)

funds towards
increasing employee

Senior management needs to

education as a

take proactive measures in

protection from cyber-

policy enforcement, budgetary

attacks.

support for cyber-security

24. Disaster recovery

technologies and training

is not considered as a

programs (Deloitte Touch,

protection from

2016)

cyberattacks, but
rather a predetermined plan in
case of a
cyberattack.
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Table 6: Questionnaire Items for the Senior Management Support Variable
(Continued)
Research
Question
3. To what extent

Study
Hypothesis
There is a

Literature highlights

Survey Instrument
Questions

does senior

positive

participation in

22. It is important to

management

relationship

information security

have cyber-security

support the

between senior

initiatives has a

incorporated in

establishment

management

significant effect on

organization's strategic

and

support and

employee attitudes,

plans.

implementation

CSE (H2)

behaviours and

23. All employees in our

of cybersecurity

cultural values

organization are aware of

defense

towards compliance

the strategic plan

strategies

with information

implemented to protect

security policies and

against cyber-attacks.

strategies in place (Hu

26. Senior management

et al., 2012)

has an important role in

Senior Management

developing information
security policies for our
organization.
23. The Head of
Information Security of
our organization reports
directly to the highest
official in our
organization
20. It is important to
separate the roles of IT
management and
Information Security
management in our
organization.
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3.7 Analysis Tool
The study employed the IBM 21 Statistical Package for Social Sciences
(SPSS) as the main data analysis tool, especially used for coding and interpretation
quantitative data. This is because SPSS provides a mechanism for statistical analysis,
including data access and preparation, graphics, modelling and analytical reporting.
The tool provides the following advantages:


Faster and easier basic function access, such as descriptive statistics (i.e.
mean, standard deviation or median). Compared to Ms. Excel’s built-in
functions, SPSS provides these basic statistical elements in pull down menus
in addition to a wider variety of graphs and charts which can create complex
graphs, such as contingency tables.



Easier to find statistical tests. While Excel has a wide range of statistical tests
built-in, the pull-down menus in SPSS make for faster access.

3.8 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument
The research instrument used in this study was initially tested for validity and
reliability to ensure inter variable consistency against the study constructs. A
reliability test for variables was conducted by examining values of Cronbach’s alpha
(α: 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1) and factor analysis in order to eliminate variables with low factor
loadings against the required constructs and research hypotheses. A new instrument
was generated after eliminating all questions that did not fit well in specific sections
of the research instrument. Validation of the study provided a means to critically
evaluate and objectively review the results of the main study on cybersecurity. The
findings were presented to a panel of academic and industry experts, nominated
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according to subject knowledge and experience in the security industry, who were
asked to judge and comment on issues pertaining to the research problem. This
presented an opportunity to obtain some independent views on the viability of the
findings which enabled us to add value by decoding and interpreting unexplained
phenomena. The intention was to eliminate all the questions that could not load well
against the study hypotheses. Some of the techniques employed in this study include
the following.
3.8.1 Content validity
The research instrument under consideration was further reviewed by three
(3) experts in cybersecurity practice from different companies and two (2) academic
professors from the UAEU to check the clarity of the questions. Unclear or
ambiguous questions were revised and complex items re-worded. Furthermore,
ineffective and non-functioning questions were omitted from the final survey
instrument. Consultations were made with two more senior information security
professionals from a mid-sized organization in Abu Dhabi to review the instrument
and provide a level of expert support. In addition, more than one person was asked to
conduct the field survey and data collection, to ensure investigator triangulation.
Several surveys were followed up to mitigate the impact of unreturned questionnaires
and to reduce dropout rates. Finally, the sequence of questions in the questionnaire
was aligned with the study constructs.
3.8.2 Internal validity
Both manual and electronic versions of the research instrument were
delivered to different respondents to help increase the response rate. Participatory
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and collaborative measures were also employed to ensure that respondents reached a
consensus, especially for the more technical and challenging sections of the
instrument. Additionally, the sharing of ideas especially on the subject matter made
them clearer to the respondents, which later ensured more accurate results.
3.8.3 Convergent validity
Convergent validity of the scale suggested that all items of the same scale
should be related to each other (Zikmund et al., 2010). In order to establish
convergent validity, the average factor loading of all items of the same scale should
be greater than 0.70. Therefore, in order to establish convergent validity of the study
scales, the researcher calculated the average factor loadings of all scale items used in
the study. The results indicated that the average factor loadings of all scales were
greater than 0.70 and thus convergent validity is established as presented in Table 7
below.
Table 7: Convergent Validity of Scale Items
Scales

Average Factor Loading

Competence of Staff

0.771

Level of technology

0.701

Support from mgt.

0.770

Training of staff

0.751

Strategic plan

0.763

Awareness of users

0.705

Cybersecurity Effectiveness

0.704
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3.8.4 Reliability of the Research Instrument
Reliability measures the inter-item consistency of the instrument. The most
common indicator to measure inter-item consistency is Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.
Ideally, the minimum value of Cronbach’s alpha of a scale should be 0.70 or above
(DeVellis, 2003). However, in case of short scales, the Cronbach’s alpha value of
0.50 is also acceptable (Pallant, 2013). In our study, the Cronbach’s alpha values of
all scales are greater than 0.70 (see Table 8) and therefore reliability is established
for all dependent as well as independent variables and we can rely on the data
obtained using these scales.
A new instrument was generated after elimination of all questions that
couldn’t fit well in specific sections of the research instrument. Validation of the
study provided the means to critically evaluate and objectively review the results of
the main study on cybersecurity. Findings were presented to a panel of academic and
industry experts, nominated according to subject knowledge and experience in the
security industry to ascertain their thoughts and judgement on issues pertinent to the
research problem. This presented an opportunity of obtaining independent views on
the viability of the findings which provided a platform for value addition by
decoding and interpreting unexplained phenomena.
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Table 8: Reliability of Scales
Variables

Alpha

1. Cybersecurity Knowledge (CK)

0.921

2. Support from Management (SM)

0.926

3. Level of Technology (LoT)

0.899

4. Cybersecurity Effectiveness (CE)

0.747

5. Training of Staff (TS )

0.839

6. Strategic Planning (SP)

0.815

7. Awareness of Users (AU)

0.712

Detailed results from the reliability tests conducted and the Exploratory
Factor Analysis (EFA) conducted on the study constructs are shown in Chapter Four
of the study.

3.9 Research Limitations
Since cybersecurity presents a sensitive issue of discussion everywhere, most
of the interviewees hesitated to reveal critical security information pertaining to their
organizations. In addition, the researcher was limited to a few existing research
studies and frameworks on cybersecurity especially concerning Abu Dhabi’s
government entities and even the entire UAE region. This study has been mainly
confined to evidence gathered from other regions such as the USA, Europe and
Africa, whose security status and or objectives may not be the same as in the Middle
East or the United Arab Emirates. Other limitations of concern in this study included
the fact that most of the highly security-sensitive government entities and/or C-level
officers were difficult to access in time. As a mitigation strategy, the researcher
designed two sets of surveys, one electronic and the other on paper for distribution to
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each government department with the help of the research assistant and the Survey
Monkey tool. This enabled us to gather feedback from a representative sample for
data analysis and discussion.

3.10 Ethical Issues
The process of accessing the selected study population in Abu Dhabi’s
government entities was facilitated through personal contacts who acted as
doorkeepers and obtained consent to use their departments as part of our case study.
We made an initial informal request to access individual departments and followed it
by a formal letter presenting the research topic and purpose of the questionnaire.
Formal authorisation from the UAEU had been acquired; provided an introductory
letter which was attached to all questionnaires for specific government entities. Once
access had been officially obtained, the respondents were identified and contacted
through formal emails to make arrangements to receive the survey instrument both in
hard copy and online via the Survey Monkey tool. Each informant was apprised of
the research under study and the purpose of the survey. Guarantees were given to all
respondents that the data would be used solely for the purposes of the dissertation
and that information would not be disclosed to any third parties but would be kept
confidential. Furthermore, individual names would not be revealed after the
completion of the survey instrument.

3.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, the research strategy, paradigm (positivism) and the data
collection tools, approaches and methodology (quantitative), including the
questionnaire structure and presentation of the research instrument were reviewed.
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Further, the study population, the respondents’ sampling methodology, sample
design, definition of respondents and the research variables were defined. In the
same chapter the reliability and validity of the research instrument were looked into,
employing Cronbach’s alpha test to assess the reliability of the measurement scale. It
found all the study variables to be internally consistent with the study construct,
having values of alpha > = 0.59; the details are presented in Chapter Four.
Meanwhile, ethical research considerations were maintained for the entire study and
a correct data collection process was followed. The survey instrument was sent to a
sample of 960 respondents constituting the study population in the selected 8
departmental categories of Abu Dhabi government offices. Of these, 535 completed
and returned questionnaires representing 56.6% of the population were further
validated, yielding a final total of 467 questionnaires to be retained for data analysis
after cleaning and the elimination of duplicated and incomplete questionnaires, as
further discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Analyses and Interpretations of the Data

4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we presented the main strategy and research
paradigm considered for this study. Specifically, the chapter justified the positivist
paradigm and the quantitative methodology that was used for analysing the variables
identified for this study of the cybersecurity effectiveness of Abu Dhabi’s
government entities. Additionally, it also presented a definition of the study
variables, the population, sample size and a discussion of the data collection tools
and approaches. The validity and reliability of the survey items to scale were
assessed, together with ethical issues.
This chapter now turns to a detailed analysis of the data collected from the
study population with the aim of testing the identified study hypotheses, interpreting
the study results obtained from these analyses and answering the research questions.
We used the statistical package for social sciences IBM SPSS 21 in conducting the
data analysis. In the first step, we cleaned the data by assessing their normality,
dealing with missing values, identifying aberrant values and detecting outliers. In the
next step, we performed exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and calculated the
reliabilities of the scale values, followed by a discussion of the descriptive statistics.
Finally, ANOVA, cross tabulation and linear regression were carried out to test the
research hypotheses and interpret the results. The following flow chart in Figure 16
presents the design used for structuring chapter one.
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4.2 Data Screening
Before conducting the data analysis, the strata was cleaned to eliminate
duplication and any form of errors due to missing or erroneous values. The screening
process was performed through the following steps;
i.

Dealing with missing values

ii.

Identifying aberrant values

iii.

Finding outliers/Assessing data normality

4.2.1 Missing Value Analysis
Missing values in a data set is a common phenomenon in social and
behavioural sciences (Hippel, 2004 and Enders, 2001). Missing values in huge
quantity are of serious concern in final data analysis and may generate biased and
unreliable results and when some values are missing, certain statistical tests cannot
be performed. Therefore, it is highly recommended to analyze missing values in a
data set before conducting analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).
All of the study variables have some missing data. From a total of 535 cases,
the result of the missing value analysis showed that the last 68 cases had more than
60% missing data (Table 9). Given the large amount of missing values in these 68
cases, they were removed before conducting a final analysis. The rest of the missing
values in some variables were nominal and were filled in by using the method known
as “replace with series mean”. After removing the cases with many missing values
and filling in a small number of missing values in the remainder, our data set became
free of any missing values. All of the next analyses were performed on all 467 of the
remaining cases.
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Table 9: Case-wise Missing Value Analysis

Valid

00
36
41
47
50
Total

Frequency
467
29
09
19
11
535

Percent
87.28
5.42
1.68
3.55
2.05
100.0

Valid
Percent
87.28
5.42
1.68
3.55
2.05
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
87.28
92.70
94.38
97.93
100.00

4.2.2 Aberrant Values
Aberrant values are those abnormal values that are beyond the normal range.
For example items in the current study were measured on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 thus
any value greater than 5 or lesser than 1 would be considered an aberrant value.
Similarly the categorical variables are measured in terms of 1 and 2, so any value
outside this range would be treated as an aberrant value. Aberrant values usually
arise during data entry and may cause serious issues in data analysis because they
influence the mean of the variable under scrutiny. Therefore it is of the utmost
importance to carefully detect and treat these values before the final data analysis.
In order to identify the aberrant values in our data file, descriptive statistics
was run with minimum and maximum values of the items. Very few aberrant values
were found and they were corrected by identifying the relevant cases.
4.2.3 Normality of Data
Screening the normality of the data is essential for conducting robust
statistical analyses. The normality of the data can be calculated either by statistical or
graphical methods (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and
the Shapiro-Wilks tests are often used to assess the normality of data. The reason is
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that when the data under scrutiny are compared to a normal distribution with the
same mean and standard deviation, a p-value greater than 0.05 confirms the normal
distribution of the data. Although both techniques are used for normality tests, they
become unwieldy and impractical when the dataset for graphical analysis is large.
Thus, we chose the statistical technique to test normality, since the data file of the
present study contains 467 cases.
In the first step Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality
were applied. If the results from these two tests are significant (P < 0.05), then the
data are not normally distributed. If, however, the results are non-significant (P >
0.05), then the data are normally distributed. The results of both the KolmogorovSmirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests shown in Table 10, below, indicate that the values
were significant (P < 0.05), confirming that these data were not normally distributed.

Table 10: Test of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic Df
Sig.
CE_mean1 0.146
467
0.000
CK_mean1 0.119
467
0.000
RoT_mean1 0.092
467
0.000
SM_mean1 0.093
467
0.000
TS_mean1
0.105
467
0.000
AU_mean1 0.095
434
0.000
SP_mean1
0.090
467
0.000

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic Df
0.887
467
0.926
467
0.964
467
0.976
467
0.933
467
0.957
467
0.981
467

Sig.
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Note: CK = Cybersecurity knowledge/competence; SM = Support from
Management, RoT = Role of Technology, CE = Cybersecurity effectiveness, TS =
Training of staff, SP = Strategic Plans, AU = Awareness of users.

In addition to the above tests, it was thought important to examine two
measures of distributions, skewness and kurtosis. Skewness assesses the symmetry of
the distribution. That is, if the distribution of the data is stretched to a right or a left
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tail, then the distribution is considered “skewed”. A skewness value greater than +1
or lower than -1 counts as skewed distribution. Meanwhile, kurtosis checks whether
the distribution is too peaked. Data distribution is considered too peaked if the
kurtosis value generated is more than +1; if it is less than -1, we conclude that the
distribution is too flat and if the values of skewness and kurtosis are close to zero
then the data in question are considered normally distributed. In the present research,
the normality of the data was examined using SPSS statistical software. As shown in
Table 11, both tests revealed a p-value of less than 0.05, indicating that the data were
not normally distributed.
Regarding the skewness measure, as reported in Table 11, below, it is
approximately -1, which reveals that the distribution of the data was skewed and the
kurtosis value of approximately +2 indicated that the distribution was too peaked.
Therefore, both measures affirmed that the data of the present study were not
normally distributed. The values of both skewness and kurtosis for all items fell
between +1.5 and, -1.5 the recommended values. These values established the quasi
normal distribution of the study’s data set.

Table 11: Values of Skewness and Kurtosis
CE_mean

CK_mean

RoT_mean

SM_mean

UTA_mean

SP_mean

Skewness

-1.399

-1.043

-0.652

-0.323

-1.039

-0.411

Std. Error
of
Skewness
Kurtosis

0.113

0.113

0.113

0.113

0.113

0.113

1.131

1.225

1.429

-0.156

1.134

0.232

Std. Error
of Kurtosis

0.225

0.225

0.225

0.225

0.225

0.225
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Finally, the outliers in data were identified by using Mahalanobis distance
measuring method, as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). These writers
argue that cases with a Mahalanobis alpha level of 0.001 should be considered as
outliers. By following Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) guidelines, a critical chi-square
value was calculated by using five independent variables. It was found that no case
had less than 0.001 value, confirming that no outliers were found.

4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
The first step in exploratory factor analysis is to check the adequacy of the
data (Pallant, 2013). For this purpose two tests are commonly used by social
scientists. These are Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
measure of sampling adequacy. Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant if p
< 0.05, while the KMO value should be not less than 0.6 for good factor analysis. In
the present study, the data fulfilled both these requirements, as shown in Table 12

Table 12 : KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.

0.859

Approx. Chi-Square

2681.508

Df
Sig.

190
0.000

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity

Factor analysis was conducted on all the variables studied: “cybersecurity
knowledge/competence”, “support from top management”, “role of technology”,
“awareness of users”, “training of users”, “presence of strategic plans” and
“cybersecurity effectiveness”. To present data more simply, Principal Component
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Analysis (PCA) was used. Varimax rotation was adopted in order to minimize the
chance of cross loading items on more than one factor. Following Comrey and Lee
rule of thumb (1973), items having a loading of 0.45 and a cross loading higher than
0.32 were dropped.
Factor analysis was run on 57 cybersecurity items and combined into seven
factors (Table 13). These factors were labelled “competence/knowledge of staff”,
“support from top management”, “level of technology”, “training of staff”,
“awareness

of

users”,

“presence

of

strategic

plans”

and

“cybersecurity

effectiveness”. The first factor, “competence/knowledge of staff” contained ten
items. Two factors, “support from top management” and “the role of technology”
consisted of twelve items each. Eleven items combined to make up the fourth and
fifth factors, labelled “training of staff” and “awareness of users”. The fifth
independent variable “presence of strategic plans” comprised four items. Finally, the
dependent variable, “Cybersecurity effectiveness” had seven items.
Following Comrey and Lee rule of thumb (1973), four items in total were
deleted due either to small loading value or high cross loading on more than one
factor. Two items were eliminated from the “cybersecurity effectiveness” factor and
two items were removed from the factor “support from top management”. These two
factors were left with five and ten items respectively and the fifty-two items were
considered in the final results. A complete typology classification is given in Table
13.

Table 13: Exploratory Factor Analysis

Items

Component
1. Support from
Management

SM2
SM7
SM8
SM9
SM1
SM4
SM3
SM6
SM10

0.862
0.854
0.843
0.838
0.837
0.814
0.770
0.659
0.624

SM5
CK2
CK1

0.615

2.Competence/
Knowledge of staff

3.Level of
Tech.

4.Training of
Staff

5.Cybersecurity
Effectiveness

6.Strategic Plans

7.Awareness
of users

0.843
0.840

CK5

0.780

CK6
CK4
CK8
CK7
CK10

0.755
0.755
0.739
0.732
0.725

CK9
CK3

0.678
0.675
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Table 13: Exploratory Factor analysis (Continued)

Items

Component
1. Support from
Management

2.Competence/
Knowledge of staff

3.Level of
Tech.

RoT11
RoT6
RoT3
RoT7

0.811
0.806
0.774
0.763

RoT10
RoT4
RoT5
RoT8
RoT12
RoT1

0.759
0.714
0.693
0.692
0.692
0.622

RoT2
RoT9
TS5
TS11
TS7
TS8
TS4
TS6
CE3
CE4
CE7

0.536
0.400

4.Training of
Staff

5.Cybersecurity
Effectiveness

6.Strategic Plans

7.Awareness
of users

0.835
0.815
0.774
0.725
0.695
0.666
0.750
0.737
0.717
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Table 13: Exploratory Factor analysis (Continued)

Items
CE6
CE5
CE2
SP3
SP1
SP2
SP4
AU9
AU2
AU3
AU10
AU1

Component
1. Support from
Management

2.Competence/
Knowledge of staff

3.Level of
Tech.

4.Training of
Staff

5.Cybersecurity
Effectiveness

6.Strategic Plans

7.Awareness
of users

0.671
0.667
0.592
0.819
0.779
0.730
0.724

0.462
0.352

0.801
0.728
0.652
0.590
0.357
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Factor analysis is graphically presented in form of scree plot. Scree plots
show the eigenvalues against all factors and helps to determine which factors to
retain. In this case, the scree plot showed that the curve starts to flatten from factor
seven onward. Further, the eigenvalue of all the factors after factor seven were below
one. Therefore only seven factors were retained as indicated in Figure 17 below.

Figure 17: Scree Plot showing Factors to Retain

4.3.1 Total Variance Explained
Eigenvalues reflect the number of factors extracted for factor analysis. The
result of selecting eigenvalues showed that 7 factors explain 55% of the variance and
the remaining factors remain insignificant. In this case, the first factor accounts for
17.10% of the variance, the second 10.49%, the third 9.84%, the fourth 5.47%, the
fifth 5% and sixth 4.67% of the total variance. Individual and cumulative factor
variance is explained in Table 14 below.
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Table 14: Total Variance Explained
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Initial Eigenvalues
Total
% of Variance
10.10
17.10
6.18
10.49
5.81
9.84
3.23
5.47
2.95
5.00
2.76
4.67
2.00
3.90

Cumulative %
17.10
27.57
37.42
42.89
47.90
52.57
54.57

After successfully completing the factor analyses, we were closer to
understanding the respondents’ characteristics and we then moved towards testing
the hypotheses.

4.4 Respondents’ Characteristics
4.4.1 Sector Representation
Data were collected from 467 respondents working in eight different
government sectors namely, social and civic, culture and recreation, transport,
economic affairs, health, education, public order and science and technology. The
highest representation was from the social and civic department, which contributed
38.54% of all respondents. Those from the culture and recreation department form
the second biggest category, with 14.1%. Of the eight departments in total, the
respondents from the health department showed least representation, 5.14%. A
complete breakdown of the respondents’ profile with reference to their sector
representation is given in Figure 18
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Figure 18: Sector-wise Distribution of Respondents Managerial Level

4.4.2 Respondents’ Managerial Level
The respondents were categorized into five different levels, ranging from
officer to consultant. The data show that 32.76% participants belonged to the
executive or director level, the category that contributed most to the total. It shows
that most of the respondents participating in the survey were at senior management
level. A complete breakdown is given in Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Managerial Level of Respondents

4.5 Group Comparisons of Demographic Variables
4.5.1 Respondents' Managerial Level and Education
Cross tabulation between respondents’ education level and their managerial
level is shown in Table 15. Cross tab analysis shows a direct relationship between
education level and managerial level, that is; the higher the education level, the
higher the managerial level. Respondents with high school education in officer or
team lead level are mostly low in number and no one with this level of education
attains the higher managerial levels, for instance director or consultant. Most of the
senior level positions are filled by respondents with bachelors’ and masters’ degrees.
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Table 15: Respondents' Managerial Level and Education
Managerial Level
Variable

Category

Education
Level

Total

Team
Lead

Officer

CIO

Consultant

Freq

Freq

Freq

%

Freq

%

Freq

High
School

11

21

14

26

7

7

-

-

-

-

32

7

Diploma

9

17

6

11

11

11

6

4

-

-

32

7

Higher
Diploma

3

6

1

2

3

3

8

5

3

3

18

4

Bachelors

25

48

30

55

73

70

100

65

52

51

280

60

Masters

4

8

4

7

10

10

34

22

47

46

99

21

Doctorate

0

-

-

-

-

-

5

3

1

1

6

1

52

52

100

55

100

104

100

153

100

103

100

467

Total

%

Director
%

%

Freq

%

4.5.2 Respondents' Industrial Category and Size
The respondents’ industry and their respective size in terms of number of
employees are cross tabulated in Table 16. The overall representation is highest from
the social and civic sector with 180 participants out of 467 and 66 came from the
culture and recreational sector, the second highest group. It is noted that 135
respondents were from small organizations, i.e. those having fewer than 100
employees.
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Table 16: Respondents’ Representation by Sector and Size
Size (No of Employees)
Vars

Category

<100
count

Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation

Industry

%

count

201-500

%

count

501-999

%

count

>1000

%

count

Total
%

count

%

65

48

38

50

21

28

32

43

24

23

180

39

33

24

7

9

7

9

10

14

9

9

66

14

Transport

16

12

5

7

5

7

6

8

11

11

43

9

Economic
Affairs

9

7

6

8

23

30

5

7

15

14

58

13

Health

2

2

6

8

6

8

2

3

8

8

24

5

Education

2

2

6

8

4

5

11

15

16

15

39

8

5

4

6

8

5

7

3

4

8

8

27

6

3

2

2

3

5

7

5

7

13

13

30

6

135

100

76

100

76

100

74

100

104

100

467

100

Public
Order
Science and
Technology

Total

100-200

4.6 Reliability Analysis and Correlation Matrix
The mean, standard deviation, reliability and correlations of study variables
are presented in Table 17. The results of the reliability analyses showed that all the
study variables had an alpha value greater than 0.7, the minimum threshold for
reliability. The correlation values show that all the independent variables
cybersecurity knowledge/competence, support from top management, role of
technology, training of staff, and awareness of users and presence of strategic plans
were positively correlated with the dependent variable, cybersecurity effectiveness.
These results initially support our hypotheses.
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Table 17: Mean, Standard Deviation, Reliability and Correlations
Variables

Mean

SD

Alpha

CK

SM

RoT

CE

UT

SP

1. CK

4.15

0.56

0.921

1

2. SM

3.72

0.69

0.926

0.243**

1

3. RoT

3.78

0.62

0.899

0.430**

0.243**

1

4. CE

4.13

0.62

0.747

0.397***

0.245*

0.367**

1

5. UT

4.05

4.05

0.839

0.466**

0.122**

0.346**

0.373**

1

6.SP

3.95

3.95

0.815

0.406**

0.275**

0.375**

0.337**

0.244**

1

7. AU

4.01

0.60
1

0.712

0.139**

0.026*

0.133***

0.301***

0.108**

0.074*

A
U

1

* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001
Note: CK = Cybersecurity knowledge/competence; SM = Support from Management, RoT =
Role of Technology, CE = Cybersecurity effectiveness, TS = Training of staff, SP =
Strategic Plans, AU = Awareness of users.

It is also noted that staff competence/cybersecurity knowledge and awareness
of users were highly correlated with cybersecurity effectiveness (r = 0.397, r = 0.301)
at p < 0.001 level and least correlated with support from management (r = 0.245) at p
< 0.05 level. All the other variables showed good positive Pearson correlation value
with the dependent variable of cybersecurity effectiveness. The role of technology,
training of staff and support from management were significantly correlated (r =
0.367, r = 0.373, r = 0.337) with cybersecurity effectiveness at p < 0.01 level. After
finding initial support for our study hypotheses, we further tested with regression
analysis to accurately find the impact of the independent variables on the dependent
variable.

4.7 Study Hypotheses
Hypotheses derived from the literature review state that both organizational
and individual level factors contributed to an effective cybersecurity system. At the

167
organizational level, three factors, support from top management, role of technology
and strategic plans were all positively related to cybersecurity effectiveness. We
hypothesized that organizations with a higher score in these three factors have more
effective

cybersecurity

systems.

Similarly,

at

individual

level,

staff

competency/cybersecurity knowledge, training of staff and awareness of users were
found to be directly associated with cybersecurity effectiveness. Employee
knowledge and awareness about cybersecurity systems is helpful in maintaining an
effective cybersecurity system. Likewise, employees’ training in cybersecurity also
impacts positively such a system. We propose to test the following study hypotheses
through linear and multiple regressions analysis methods to obtain answers to the
study research questions;
H1: There is a positive relationship between the competence/knowledge of staff
and cybersecurity effectiveness.
H2: There is a positive relationship between senior management support and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
H3:

There is a positive relationship between level of technology and
cybersecurity effectiveness

H4: There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity training of staff and
cybersecurity effectiveness.
H5: There is a positive relationship between the presence of cybersecurity
strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness
H6: There is a positive relationship between awareness of users about cyber
security and cybersecurity effectiveness.
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4.8 Hypotheses Testing
This section discusses the results from hypothesis tests conducted for this
study.

The section below contains the general steps taken to arrive at the

conclusions.

4.8.1 Competence/Knowledge of Staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
In order to tell the differences in the competency of staff in the eight different
sectors, an ANOVA test was applied. An ANOVA test is used to compare the means
of more than two groups on a continuous variable (Pallant et al., 2011). AN ANOVA
test helps only by identifying whether or not the group means differ. It does not
indicate the exact differences between groups. To find the significant differences
between groups, post-hoc comparisons are performed.
The basic assumption for applying ANOVA test is to satisfy the condition of
homogeneity of variance. If the p-value of Levene’s statistics in the homogeneity of
variance test is greater than 0.05, the condition of homogeneity of variance is
satisfied and the ANOVA test can be applied. Therefore we conducted a test of
homogeneity of variance and found that the p-value of Levene’s statistics was greater
than 0.05 (Table 18), so we proceeded further to do an ANOVA test.
Table 18: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Staff competence)
Levene Statistic
1.730

df1
7

df2
459

Sig.
0.100

A one way analysis of variance between groups was performed to examine
the effect of an employee’s government sector on his/her competence/ cybersecurity
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knowledge. Respondents were grouped into eight levels according to their relevant
sectors or work departments (Group 1 = Social and Civic; Group 2 = Culture and
Recreation; Group 3 = Transport; Group 4 = Economic Affairs; Group 5 = Health;
Group 6 = Education; Group 7 = Public Order; Group 8 = Science and Technology).
Table 19 presents the result of the ANOVA test. If the sig. (p-value) is less than or
equal to 0.05, it indicates that at least two of the group means are different on a
dependent variable, and the converse (Pallant et al., 2011). In our case, the sig. value
was greater than 0.05 (p = 0.070) which explains that on the dependent variable of
staff competence/cybersecurity knowledge there was no difference between the
employees from the eight departments.

Table 19: ANOVA for staff competence (sector-wise)
Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Between Groups

4.140

7

0.591

1.888

0.070

Within Groups
Total

143.801
147.941

459
466

0.313

We did not perform any post hoc analysis because the results of the ANOVA
reported above supported no difference in staff competence between employees of
different sectors.

4.8.1.1 Regression Analysis for study Hypothesis 1 (H1)
Linear regression analysis was conducted to test the study hypotheses. In
order to find the impact of cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence on
cybersecurity effectiveness, linear regression was conducted. The results of the
ANOVA (see Table 20) show a significant p-value (p = 0.000), enabling us to say
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that the cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence and cybersecurity effectiveness
model is significant.
Table 20: ANOVA for H1
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares Df

Mean Square F

Sig.

28.457
151.673
180.131

28.457
0.326

0.000b

1
465
466

87.244

In order to analyze the variation in cybersecurity effectiveness due to
cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence, we calculated the value of R², which was
0.158 (see Table 21). The value of R² shows that a 15.8% variation in cybersecurity
effectiveness is explained by cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence.

Table 21: Model Summary for H1
Model R
1

0.397a

R
Square

Adjusted
Square

0.158

0.156

R Std. Error of the Estimate
0.57112

Moreover, the Beta value, 0.397 in Table 22 below shows that a one unit
change in cybersecurity knowledge/staff competence can bring a 0.39 unit change in
cybersecurity effectiveness, which is also significant. Hence Hypothesis 1 is
supported by the results of the data analysis.
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Table 22: Coefficients for H1

Model

(Constant)
1

Cybersecurity
Knowledge

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

2.315

0.197

0.439

0.047

0.397

T

Sig.

11.772

0.000

9.340

0.000

4.8.2 Support from Management and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
To analyze the difference between the staff from eight departments in terms of
management support, a test of Homogeneity of Variances was conducted. The value
of Levene’s test is 0.239, greater than 0.05, (Table 23).

It indicates that the

assumption of homogeneity of variance is not violated and an ANOVA test can be
applied.

Table 23: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (support from management)

Levene Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

1.319

7

459

0.239

A one way ANOVA was conducted to gauge the influence of participants’
working sector on support from top management (Table 24). The output of the
ANOVA test shows a significant statistical difference at p = 0.01 in support for the
management scores in the eight sectors: F = 2.634, p = 0.01.
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Table 24: ANOVA for support from management (sector wise)

Between
Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

8.704

7

1.243

2.634

0.011

216.688
225.392

459
466

0.472

The multiple comparisons were conducted by performing post-hoc analysis,
using Tukey’s HSD test. The results of Tukey’s HSD test reveal that the mean score
for the Science and Technology (M = 4.21) group is statistically different from all
the other groups (Social and Civic, Culture and Recreation, Transport, Economic
Affairs, Education, Public Order) except the Health sector. The other groups do not
differ from one another in terms of the same variable as seen in Table 25 and
Table 26.
Table 25: Tuckey HSD
Employee Govt. Sector
Culture and Recreation
Public Order
Transport
Education
Social and Civic
Economic Affairs
Health

Subset for alpha = 0.05
1
3.61
3.64
3.67
3.68
3.69
3.71
3.81

3.81

0.880

4.21
0.165

Science and Technology
Sig.

2
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Table 26: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management

(I) Employ Govt Sector
Culture and
Recreation

Social and Civic

Culture and Recreation

Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social
and
Civic
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social
and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation

Transport

Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social
and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation

Economic Affairs

Transport
Health
Education
Public Order

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

0.085

0.099

0.989

-0.216

0.386

0.021

0.117

1.000

-0.334

0.376

-0.042

0.134

1.000

-0.452

0.367

-0.106
-0.170
-0.233

0.152
0.170
0.188

0.992
1.000
1.000

-0.569
-0.687
-0.805

0.357
0.348
0.338

-0.297

0.205

0.004

-0.922

0.328

-0.361

0.223

0.989

-1.040

0.319

-0.424

0.241

1.000

-1.158

0.309

-0.488

0.259

0.991

-1.276

0.299

-0.552
-0.615
-0.679

0.276
0.294
0.312

.912
1.000
1.000

-1.393
-1.511
-1.629

0.290
0.280
0.271

-0.743

0.330

0.002

-1.747

0.261

-0.807

0.347

1.000

-1.864

0.251

-0.870

0.365

1.000

-1.982

0.242

-0.934

0.383

1.000

-2.100

0.232

-0.998
-1.061
-1.125

0.401
0.418
0.436

0.992
1.000
1.000

-2.218
-2.335
-2.453

0.223
0.213
0.203

-1.189

0.454

0.023

-2.571

0.194

-1.252

0.472

1.000

-2.689

0.184

-1.316

0.489

0.991

-2.806

0.174

-1.380
-1.443
-1.507
-1.571

0.507
0.525
0.543
0.560

1.000
0.999
1.000
1.000

-2.924
-3.042
-3.160
-3.277

0.165
0.155
0.146
0.136

174
Table 26: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management (Continued)

(I) Employ Govt Sector
Science and
Technology

Health

Education

Public Order

Science and Technology

Social
and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social
and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social
and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Science and
Technology
Social
and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.

95%
Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

-1.634

0.578

0.029

-3.395

0.126

-1.698

0.596

.992

-3.513

0.11
7

-1.762

0.614

.912

-3.631

0.107

-1.825

0.631

.992

-3.748

0.097

-1.889

0.649

.999

-3.866

0.088

-1.953
-2.017

0.667
0.685

.995
.987

-3.984
-4.102

0.078
0.069

-2.080

0.703

.415

-4.219

0.059

-2.144

0.720

1.000

-4.337

0.04
9

-2.208

0.738

1.000

-4.455

0.040

-2.271

0.756

1.000

-4.573

0.030

-2.335

0.774

1.000

-4.690

0.020

-2.399
-2.462

0.791
0.809

0.995
1.000

-4.808
-4.926

0.011
0.001

-2.526

0.827

0.034

-5.044

-0.008

-2.590

0.845

1.000

-5.161

-0.018

-2.653

0.862

1.000

-5.279

-0.028

-2.717

0.880

1.000

-5.397

-0.037

-2.781

0.898

1.000

-5.514

-0.047

-2.844
-2.908

0.916
0.933

0.987
1.000

-5.632
-5.750

-0.057
-0.066

-2.972

0.951

0.041

-5.868

-0.076

-3.035

0.969

0.004

-5.985

-0.085

-3.099

0.987

0.002

-6.103

-0.095

-3.163

1.004

0.023

-6.221

-0.105

-3.226

1.022

0.029

-6.339

-0.114

-3.290
-3.354
-3.418

1.040
1.058
1.075

0.415
0.034
0.041

-6.456
-6.574
-6.692

-0.124
-0.134
-0.143
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4.8.2.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2 (H2)
In the regression analysis, the results highlighted the significance value of the
F-test (0.000) in ANOVA as seen in Table 27 below. Results show that support from
top management as compared to cybersecurity effectiveness model is significant.

Table 27: ANOVA for H2
Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

10.792
169.339
180.131

1
465
466

10.792
0.364

29.634

0.000b

Further, the results of the model summary (Table 28) showed an R² value of
0.060. This value of R² demonstrates that 6% of the variation in cybersecurity
effectiveness (CSE) is due to support from top management.

Table 28: Model Summary for H2
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
1
0.245a
0.060
0.058

Std. Error of the Estimate
0.60346

Similarly the standardized beta value (β = 0.245) explains that a one unit
change in support from management can bring a 0.24 unit change in cybersecurity
effectiveness, which is also significant. The results presented in Table 29 provide full
support for Hypothesis 2 (H2)
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Table 29: Coefficients for H2

Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B

1

Standardized
Coefficients

Std. Error

(Constant)

3.321

0.152

Support from
Management

0.219

0.040

T

Sig.

Beta
21.825 0.000
0.245

5.444

0.000

4.8.3 Role of Technology and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
The homogeneity of variance for the role of technology in the eight different
government sectors was calculated through Levene’s statistics. The p-value of
Levene’s statistics (p = 0.066) shows that the assumption of homogeneity of variance
is justified and an ANOVA test can be applied (Table 30).

Table 30: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Role of Technology)
Levene Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

2.171

7

459

0.066

The purpose of the one way analysis of variance between groups was to
explore the impact of government sectors on the role of technology. We observed a
significant difference at p < 0.05 level in the role of technology scores for the eight
government sectors: F = 2.261, p = 0.029. The result specified that at least two of the
government sectors were different from one another with respect to the technology
deployed in these sectors (Table 31).
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Table 31: ANOVA for Role of Technology (sector-wise)

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Between Groups

6.159

7

0.880

2.261

0.029

Within Groups

178.593

459

0.389

Total

184.752

466

The result of the multiple comparisons made using post-hoc analysis shows
that only two sectors, i.e. health and education, were different from each other as
well as from all the others: the p-value between the mean of these two sectors is
somewhat significant (p = 0.057) i.e. slightly above 0.05 (Table 32).

Table 32: Multiple Comparisons for the Level of Technology

Std.
Error

Sig.

-0.067

0.090

1.000

-0.340

0.206

Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health

-0.026

0.106

0.165

-0.349

0.296

0.015

0.122

0.692

-0.357

0.386

0.056

0.138

0.251

-0.365

0.476

Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Transport
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Public Order
Science and
Technology

0.097
0.137

0.154
0.170

1.000
1.000

-0.373
-0.381

0.566
0.656

0.178

0.186

0.999

-0.389

0.746

0.219

0.203

1.000

-0.398

0.836

0.260
1.447

0.219
0.686

0.529
0.346

-0.406
-0.643

0.926
3.536

1.487

0.702

0.818

-0.651

3.626

1.528
1.569

0.718
0.734

0.057
0.999

-0.659
-0.667

3.716
3.806

1.610

0.751

0.997

-0.675

3.896

(I) Employ Govt Sector
Culture and
Recreation

Social and Civic

Culture and Recreation

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

Mean
Difference
(I-J)
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Table 32: Multiple comparison for Level of Technology (Continued)

(I) Employ Govt Sector
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Public Order
Affairs
Health
Education

Science and Technology

Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

Sig.

1.651

0.767

1.000

-0.684

3.986

1.692

0.783

1.000

-0.692

4.076

1.733

0.799

0.867

-0.700

4.166

1.774

0.815

0.998

-0.708

4.256

1.815

0.831

0.812

-0.716

4.346

1.856

0.847

0.999

-0.724

4.436

1.897

0.863

1.000

-0.733

4.526

1.937

0.880

0.999

-0.741

4.616

1.978

0.896

1.000

-0.749

4.706

2.019

0.912

0.888

-0.757

4.796

2.060

0.928

0.999

-0.765

4.886

2.101
2.142
2.183

0.944
0.960
0.976

0.835
0.997
1.000

-0.773
-0.782
-0.790

4.976
5.066
5.156

4.8.3.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 3
The outcome of the F-test was statistically significant at p < 0.001 level,
showing the significant impact of the regression model, meaning that the role of the
technology and cybersecurity effectiveness model is significant (Table 33).

Table 33: ANOVA for H3
Model

1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

24.200
155.931
180.131

1
465
466

24.200
0.335

72.167

0.000
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The R² value indicates that a 13.4% variation in the dependent variable,
cybersecurity effectiveness, is explained by the role of technology, as summarised in
Table 34:
Table 34: Model Summary for H3
Model

R

R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of the
Square
Estimate

1

0.367

0.134

0.132

0.57908

Further, the beta value of 0.367 specifies that a one unit change in technology
deployed by organizations may bring a 0.36 unit change in cybersecurity
effectiveness, which is also significant. The results of regression analysis
summarized in Table 35 highlight the fact that Hypothesis 3 of the study is fully
supported.

Table 35: Coefficients for H3

1

Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std.
Error

(Constant)

2.767

0.163

Role of
Technology

0.362

0.043

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

0.367

T

Sig.

16.947

0.000

8.495

0.000

4.8.4 Training of staff and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
The homogeneity of variance test for the training of staff in the eight different
government sectors was measured by Levene’s statistics. The p-value of Levene’s
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statistics (p = 0.518) is greater than 0.05, satisfying the assumption of homogeneity
of variance (Table 36). Therefore an ANOVA test was a useful technique to find the
difference between different government sectors.

Table 36: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Training of Staff)
Levene Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

0.885

7

459

0.518

The output in Table 37 of a one way ANOVA test shows a significant p-value
(p = 0.014) for between group analysis. It demonstrates that some of the government
sectors are different from one another.

Table 37: ANOVA for Training of Staff (sector-wise)
Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Between Groups

6.986

7

0.998

2.551

0.014

Within Groups
Total

179.576
186.562

459
466

0.391

In order to know precisely which of the government sectors differ in the
training of staff, a Tukey HSD test was conducted. The result shows that only three
sectors are different from one another. From Table 38, it can be observed that there is
a difference between the “culture and recreation” and “science and technology”
sectors (P < 0.05). For further details please refer to Table 38 below.
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Table 38: Multiple Comparisons for Training of Staff

(I) Employ Govt Sector

Social and Civic

Culture
Recreation

Transport

Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public
Order
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Transport
Economic
Affairs
and
Health
Education
Public
Order
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public
Order
Science and
Technology

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound Bound

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std.
Error

0.193

0.090

0.392

-0.082

0.467

-0.111

0.106

0.967

-0.434

0.212

-0.140

0.094

0.818

-0.427

0.148

-0.140
-0.098

0.136
0.110

0.970
0.987

-0.554
-0.434

0.274
0.239

0.139

0.129

0.962

-0.255

0.532

-0.243

0.123

0.502

-0.619

0.132

-0.193

0.090

0.392

-0.467

0.082

-0.304

0.123

0.208

-0.677

0.070

-0.332

0.113

0.065

-0.675

0.011

-0.332
-0.290

0.149
0.126

0.336
0.298

-0.786
-0.675

0.122
0.095

-0.054

0.143

1.000

-0.489

0.381

-0.435

0.138

0.035

-0.855

-0.016

0.111

0.106

0.967

-0.212

0.434

0.304

0.123

0.208

-0.070

0.677

-0.029

0.126

1.000

-0.412

0.355

-0.029
0.013

0.159
0.138

1.000
1.000

-0.514
-0.408

0.456
0.435

0.250

0.154

0.735

-0.218

0.717

-0.132

0.149

0.987

-0.585

0.321

Sig.
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Table 38: Multiple Comparison for Training of Staff (Continued)

(I) Employ Govt Sector

Economic Affairs

Health

Education

Public Order

Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Health
Education
Public
Order
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Education
Public
Order
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Public
Order
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound Bound

0.140

0.094

0.818

-0.148

0.427

0.332

0.113

0.065

-0.011

0.675

0.029
0.000
0.042

0.126
0.152
0.130

1.000
1.000
1.000

-0.355
-0.462
-0.352

0.412
0.462
0.437

0.278

0.146

0.545

-0.165

0.722

-0.103

0.141

0.996

-0.532

0.325

0.140

0.136

0.970

-0.274

0.554

0.332

0.149

0.336

-0.122

0.786

0.029

0.159

1.000

-0.456

0.514

0.000

0.152

1.000

-0.462

0.462

0.042

0.162

1.000

-0.452

0.536

0.278

0.175

0.758

-0.256

0.813

-0.103

0.171

0.999

-0.625

0.418

0.098

0.110

0.987

-0.239

0.434

0.290

0.126

0.298

-0.095

0.675

-0.013

0.138

1.000

-0.435

0.408

-0.042

0.130

1.000

-0.437

0.352

-0.042

0.162

1.000

-0.536

0.452

-0.236

0.157

0.803

-0.241

0.713

-0.146

0.152

0.980

-0.608

0.317

-0.139

0.129

0.962

-0.532

0.255

0.054

0.143

1.000

-0.381

0.489

-0.250

0.154

0.735

-0.717

0.218

-0.278

0.146

0.545

-0.722

0.165

-0.278

0.175

0.758

-0.813

0.256
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Table 38: Multiple Comparison for Training of Staff (Continued)
Mean
Difference
(I-J)

(I) Employ Govt Sector

Education
Science and
Technology
Social and
Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
Education
Public
Order

Science and
Technology

Std.
Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound Bound

-0.236

0.157

0.803

-0.713

0.241

-0.382

0.166

0.295

-0.887

0.124

0.243

0.123

0.502

-0.132

0.619

0.43568*

0.138

0.035

0.016

0.855

-0.132

0.149

0.987

-0.321

0.585

0.103

0.141

0.996

-0.325

0.532

0.103
0.146

0.171
0.152

0.999
0.980

-0.418
-0.317

0.625
0.608

0.382

0.166

0.295

-0.124

0.887

4.8.4.1. Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 4
The linear regression model is presented in Table 39. The significant value of
the F-test shows a statistically significant regression model of training of staff and
cybersecurity effectiveness.

Table 39: ANOVA for H4
Model

1

Regressio
n
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

25.078

1

25.078

75.209

0.000

155.053
180.131

465
466

0.333
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The R² value of 0.139 shows that 13.9% of the variation in cybersecurity
effectiveness is due to the training of staff. These results are presented in Table 40
below.
Table 40: Model Summary for H4
Mode
l

R

R
Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

0.373

0.139

0.137

0.57745

Moreover, the standardized beta value of 0.373 indicates that a one unit
change in training of staff influenced a 0.37 unit change in cybersecurity
effectiveness, which is also significant (Table 41). Therefore it supports our
Hypothesis 4.

Table 41: Coefficients for H4
Model

1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error

(Constant)

2.648

0.174

Training of
staff

0.367

0.042

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

15.26
0.000
1
0.373

8.672 0.000

4.8.5 Strategic Plan and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
The test of homogeneity of variance (see Table 42) showed the significant
value (p = 0.310) to be greater than 0.05 and thus satisfied the condition of applying
an ANOVA test of variance.
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Table 42: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Strategic Plan)
Levene Statistic
1.185

df1
7

df2
459

Sig.
0.310

The p-value of a one way ANOVA test was greater than 0.05 (i.e. p = 0.252),
which confirmed that there was no difference between the eight government sectors
on the basis of strategic plans (see Table 43 below). Since the ANOVA results were
insignificant, no post hoc analysis was performed for this variable.

Table 43: ANOVA for Strategic Plan (sector-wise)

Between Groups

Sum of
Squares
2.720

Df
7

Mean
Square
0.389

Within Groups

137.942

459

0.301

Total

140.662

466

F
1.293

Sig.
0.252

4.8.5.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 5
The significant value of the F-test in ANOVA in Table 44 showed that
government sectors have strategic plans and that the cybersecurity effectiveness
regression model was significant.
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Table 44: ANOVA for H5
Model

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

1
465

20.412
0.343

59.427

0.000

Residual

20.412
159.719

Total

180.131

466

Regression

1

The R² value of 0.113 in Table 45 showed an 11.3% variation in the
dependent variable; cybersecurity effectiveness was explained by the independent
variable, i.e., the strategic plan.

Table 45: Model Summary for H5

Model
1

R
0.337

R Square Adjusted R Square
0.113
0.111

Std. Error of the Estimate
0.58607

The coefficients in the results in Table 46 showing a beta value of 0.337
indicates that a one unit change in strategic plans may affect staff cybersecurity
effectiveness by 0.33 units and this impact is also significant, supporting our
Hypothesis 5. The detailed results are presented in Table 46 below.

Table 46: Coefficients for H5

Model

1

(Constant)
SP_mean1

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
2.629
0.197
0.381
0.049

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
0.337

T

Sig.

13.325
7.709

0.000
0.000
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4.8.6 Awareness of Users and Cybersecurity Effectiveness
The significant value of Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance (greater
than 0.05) in Table 47 endorsed the assumption that an ANOVA test of variance
could be applied.

Table 47: Test of Homogeneity of Variances (Awareness of Users)
Levene Statistic
1.514

df1
7

df2
458

Sig.
0.160

The p-value of a one way ANOVA test was greater than 0.05 (i.e. p = 0.101),
which made it clear that there was no difference between the staff of the eight
government sectors on the basis of awareness about cybersecurity issues (please see
Table 48 below). Therefore, we did not apply a post hoc analysis.

Table 48: ANOVA for Awareness (sector-wise)

Between
Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

4.663

7

0.666

1.726

0.101

176.765

458

0.386

181.427

465

4.8.6.1 Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 6
The impact of the awareness of users about cybersecurity on its effectiveness
was calculated by using linear regression analysis. The regression model shows
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significant value at a p < 0.001 level, indicating the significance of the regression
model of awareness of users and cybersecurity effectiveness (Table 49).

Table 49: ANOVA for H6

Model
Regression
Residual
Total

1

Sum of Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

16.260
163.719
180.131

1
465
466

20.412
0.343

46.427

0.000

Although the F-test showed a significant regression model of independent
and dependent variables, the smaller value of R² showed a smaller variation in
cybersecurity effectiveness due to the awareness of users. There was a 9% change in
the dependent variable due to awareness of users (see Table 50).

Table 50: Model Summary

Model

R

1

0.301

R
Square
0.090

Adjusted R
Square
0.088

Std. Error of the
Estimate
0.59415

The coefficients table, Table 51, shows a beta value of 0.301 significant at
p < 0.001. These results indicate that one unit change in the awareness of
users may affect staff cybersecurity effectiveness by 0.30 units and this impact is
also significant, supporting the study Hypothesis 6. The detailed results are presented
below.
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Table 51: Coefficients for H6

Unstandardized
Coefficients
(Constant)
Awareness of
users

1

B

Std. Error

2.929

0.179

0.299

0.049

Standardized
Coefficients

T

Sig.

Beta
16.325 0.000
0.301

6.709

0.000

4.9 Multiple Regression Analysis
In addition to the above discussions were impact of the six independent
variables on dependent variable (CSE) has been evaluated separately, multiple
regression analysis is also performed to know the combined effect of all independent
variables on dependent variable. The results of multiple regression analysis presented
in Table 52 shows a significant impact (F = 72.167, p = 0.000) of independent
variables on dependent variable, cybersecurity effectiveness.

Table 52: ANNOVA for the Multiple Regression Test
Model

1

Sum of
Squares
Regression
Residual
Total

Df

24.200
1
155.931 465
180.131 466

Mean
Square
24.200
0.335

F

72.167

Sig.

0.000

Furthermore, Table 53 shows the R-square value for the combined model
which is 0.317. This values shows that 31% change in depending variable is
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occurring due to the six (6) independent variables used in current study as seen
below;

Table 53: Model Summary
Model
1

R

R Square

0.563a

0.317

Adjusted R
Square
0.308

Std. Error of the
Estimate
0.51768

Additionally, the individual independent variable effect on dependent
variable is also shown in Table 54. Results suggested that all independent variables
have significant impact on dependent variable. Awareness of users has highest
impact (β = 0.230, p = 0.000) on cybersecurity effectiveness followed by training of
staff (β = 0.192, p = 0.000). Complete detail is given in Table 55 below.

Table 54: Multiple Regression Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
0.348
0.265
Competence/knowle 0.150
0.053
0.136
dge of staff
Level of
0.130
0.045
0.132
Technology
Support from Mgt
0.100
0.037
0.112
Training of Staff
0.188
0.044
0.192
Strategic Plans
0.156
0.050
0.138
Awareness of Users 0.229
0.039
0.230

t

Sig.

1.315
2.818

0.189
0.005

2.921

0.004

2.747
4.314
3.119
5.885

0.006
0.000
0.002
0.000
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4.10 Summary of Hypotheses Testing
A. Research Hypothesis H1: There is a positive relationship between the
Competence/knowledge of staff of information security and cybersecurity
effectiveness.
In addition to demographic statistical results presented previously, linear
regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the relationship between
Competence/knowledge of staff of information security and cybersecurity
effectiveness of their organisations. The significant p-value of F-test shows the
association between competence/knowledge of staff of information security and
cybersecurity effectiveness. Further, the R² value (0.158) shows a direct positive
impact of competence/knowledge of staff of information security on cybersecurity
effectiveness.
In order to generalize our results, the impact of staff competency/knowledge
on cybersecurity effectiveness was compared among eight different departments. The
p-value (0.070) of ANOVA results show that there is no difference among
employees of eight sectors on the basis of their competency/knowledge about cyber
information.

B. Research Hypothesis H2: There is a positive relationship between senior
management support and cybersecurity effectiveness.
Impact of support from top management on employees’ performance is a
widely studied topic in field of management. Support from top management brings
several positive results on employees’ behaviour, their well-being and their
performance which in turn helps organizations to achieve their goals. The empirical
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support for our hypothesis reveal the importance of management support in
generating effective cybersecurity framework. These results were in line with
theoretical deliberations discussed in literature where authors emphasized that;
“cybersecurity is a management issue” which requires management intervention
through establishment of appropriate cyber and information security strategies,
policies and frameworks;
(Asante, 2011; NIST, 2014, Symantec, 2013; and Dutton and Duncan, 1987) among
others. Our results offer interesting findings that establishment of an effective
cybersecurity system does not only require user competency but also demands for
management cooperation.
The comparative ANOVA test is applied on eight different government
entities to analyse if there any difference among the support provided by top
management team. The results of ANOVA test show no difference among all
departments with respect to management support for effective cybersecurity system.
It means employees from all departments need equal support from management for
effective functioning of their information security.

C. Research Hypothesis H3: There is a relationship between role of technology and
cybersecurity effectiveness
New security challenges place significant demands for highly secure software
and hardware platforms to maintain appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity and
access to critical data (Conklin, 2006). In analyzing the factors of developing
effective cybersecurity framework, the most critical factor is the role of technology.
Impact of technology in managing cyber-threats is widely acknowledged among
practitioners and academicians. The application of regression test in current study
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show statistically significant p-value (p < 0.001) of F-test. We can infer from these
results that role of technology has a direct positive impact on cybersecurity
effectiveness model. It includes all sort of measures i.e. use of antivirus, firewalls
etc.
Unlike other factors, the impact of role of technology on cybersecurity
system shows difference among some departments. The significant p-value of
ANOVA test indicates that at least two of the departments are differ with respect to
their use of technology. The post-hoc analysis further discloses that two of the
departments, health and education are different with each other on role of
technology. It might be the difference in types of technology two departments
deployed.

D. Research Hypothesis H4: There is a positive relationship between cybersecurity
training of staff and cybersecurity effectiveness.
Training of staff enriches end user security knowledge which in turn help
them to manage cyber-threats effectively. Scholars agree that training of staff
enhances their capacity to handle cyberattacks. The significant value of F-test shows
a statistically significant regression model of training of staff and cybersecurity
effectiveness. This significance level supports the study hypothesis H4. From the
study results, it eminent that management in Abu Dhabi government entities needs to
establish and maintain appropriate cybersecurity training program for all employees
to enable acquisition of cybersecurity knowledge especially for the less experienced
workers with little or no knowledge of cyber and information security skills.
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E. Research Hypothesis H5. There is a positive relationship between the presence
of cybersecurity strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness
Impact of strategic plans on cybersecurity effectiveness is not clearly known.
Past studies on this issue presented a mixed view. The results of linear regression
shows a significant positive relationship between cybersecurity strategic plans and
cybersecurity effectiveness. Moreover, the data collected from eight different
departments also show similar findings with regard to the relationship between
cybersecurity strategic plans and cybersecurity effectiveness. These regression
results were in support of the study hypothesis H5 which confirms that when
developing strategic plans, all Abu Dhabi government entities need to consider
cybersecurity as part of the planning process to ensure effectiveness of the
established cyber and information security defences. In the next section we discuss
the recommendations of this study on cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi
government entities.

F. Research Hypothesis H6. There is a positive relationship between awareness of
users about cybersecurity and cybersecurity effectiveness
Users’ awareness about cybersecurity can be helpful in managing cyberthreats and maintaining effective cybersecurity system. The impact of awareness of
users about cybersecurity on its effectiveness was calculated by using linear
regression analysis. The regression model shows significant value at p < 0.001 level
indicating the significant regression model of awareness of users and cybersecurity
effectiveness. Although the F-test shows a significant regression model of
independent and dependent variable, the smaller value of R² shows a smaller
variation in cybersecurity effectiveness due to awareness of users. There is 9%
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change in dependent variable due to awareness of awareness of users.

4.10.1 Comparison of Departments based on Cybersecurity Effectiveness
A departmental comparison based on the performance of the different
government entities in terms of cybersecurity effectiveness is shown in Table 55
below. For this study, the data were collected from eight different public sector
departments of the Abu Dhabi government. It is interesting to investigate whether or
not these departments are different in terms of effectiveness with regard to their
cybersecurity system. We divide cybersecurity effectiveness into three categories
(low, medium and high. The departments with cybersecurity mean ranges from 1 to 3
are classified as low while departments with a cybersecurity mean value greater than
3 but less than 4 are classified as medium. Finally, the departments with a
cybersecurity mean value greater than 4 are considered highly effective in terms of
their cybersecurity system. It is worth noting that all public sector departments are
highly effective as regards their cybersecurity system except the public order
department, which is in the medium category of cybersecurity effectiveness. The
comparison also reveals that no department shows low effectiveness in this regards.
Full details of the departmental cybersecurity comparison are given below.
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Table 55: Department Wise Effectivity of Cybersecurity System

Department

N

Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Transport
Economic Affairs

180
66
43
58
24

Health

CE
Mean
4.09
4.07
4.24
4.25
4.21

Std.
Deviation
0.65
0.55
0.43
0.59
0.44

39
4.08
0.75
Education
27
3.83
0.76
Public Order
Science
and 30
4.37
0.50
Technology
467
4.13
0.62
Total
Note: CE Mean 1-3 = Low effectiveness, CE Mean > 3
effectiveness, CE Mean > 4 = High effectiveness

High/Medium/
Low
High
High
High
High
High
High
Medium
High
High
but < 4 = Medium

Table 55 above and Figure 20 below present that, while all departments show
high performance, four departments in particular stand out when it comes to
Cybersecurity Effectiveness. The departmental results show that Science and
Technology (M = 4.37), Economic Affairs (M = 4.25), Transport (M = 4.24) and
Health (M = 4.21) performed better in terms of cybersecurity effectiveness than did
the Social and Civic, Culture and Recreation, Education and Public Order
departments. This is attributed to the strong cybersecurity systems established in
these departments and the highly qualified staff employed there.

197

Level of Cybersecurity Effectiveness
4.5
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.1
4
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.5

Figure 20: Departmental Cybersecurity Effectiveness comparison

4.11 Summary of the Results
The detailed analyses were performed using IBM SPSS 21. All the
hypotheses were tested using linear regression. Table 56 below provides a summary
of the hypotheses testing, which shows that all the proposed hypotheses were
supported by the empirical data. This exhibits the important role of the predictors
proposed in our model in developing cybersecurity effectiveness.
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Table 56: Summary of Results
Hypothesis

Variables

Beta Value

Significance

H1

Competence
CSE
Support from
mgt. CSE
Role of tech.
CSE
Training of
staff CSE
Strategic plan
CSE
Awareness of
users CSE

0.397

0.000

Accepted
/Rejected
Accepted

0.245

0.000

Accepted

0.367

0.000

Accepted

0.373

0.000

Accepted

0.337

0.000

Accepted

0.301

0.000

Accepted

H2
H3
H4
H5
H6

4.12 Conclusion
The

empirical

evidence

showed

that

all

the

six

factors

(staff

competency/knowledge, support from top management, role of technology, training
of staff, strategic plans and awareness of users) play a significant role in developing
effective cybersecurity systems. The support for the proposed hypotheses reveals that
for an effective cybersecurity system all six factors are equally important for the
eight sectors. This study has several important implications for both practitioners and
academics. These are discussed in detail in Chapter five below.
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Chapter 5: Discussions and Implications of the Study

5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented results of data analysis process through
descriptive and inferential statistics. Several statistical tests have been conducted
including post-hoc analysis, One Way ANOVA, linear regression and multiple
regressions to assess the statistical significance of the casual relationships between
different study constructs with the goal of testing the different study hypotheses and
answering of the research questions.
In this chapter, the researcher presents a discussion and summary of findings
from the survey results presented in the previous chapter in comparison with the key
research hypotheses as well as study objectives and deduces the overall contribution
and implication of the study compared to the theoretical and practical frameworks
and strategies critically reviewed in literature. Further, the chapter highlights the
contributions of the study and provides recommendations to managers and future
directions to the researchers bearing in mind limitations of the study. Finally, a
summary of chapters and conclusion is provided at the end. The design of the chapter
is presented Figure 21 below:
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Chapter 3 ( Research Methodology;
Definition & Measurement of Variables,
Research Strategy, etc
Chapter 4 Data analyses and
Interpretations

Introduction
Discussion

Study Contributions


Study Implications



CSE Theoretical
Framework
CSE Checklist



Study Recommendations

Limitations and Future
Research directions

Summary of findings

Conclusions

References

Appendices

Figure 21: Design of Chapter Five

Theoretical
Implications
Practical
Implications
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5.2 Discussion
Safe and secure management of the cyberspace system is critically important
for information centered organizations. Although most of these organizations have
equipped themselves with the latest technologies for prevention of cyberattacks and
other vulnerabilities, incidences of cyber intrusions are still evident globally and the
UAE in particular. Therefore, this study has focused on identifying additional human
and organizational factors responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of a
cybersecurity system in an organization. More specifically, areas of end-user security
competency and senior management support provided to the system have attained
higher attention in various organizations. In a cybersecurity framework, observing
end-user security competence is very much challenging due to the divergent views
and preferences.
In this dissertation, the researcher developed and tested a theoretical
framework with a checklist for enhancing cybersecurity effectiveness in government
organizations (the case study of Abu Dhabi government entities). Impact of end-user
capacity building factors were examined to enrich readers’ understanding of
employee compliance to cybersecurity policies. Based on the data collected and
analyzed from the eight different entity types, the model was tested empirically.
Study findings advocate that security behaviors can be predisposed through extrinsic
as well as intrinsic motivators. Similarly, the staff competency to handle
cybersecurity issues is also controlled by their individual as well as organizational
factors. Further, implications of the study results are discussed for theory and
practice.
The major goal of this study was to develop a framework for the evaluation
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of cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government entities. Specifically, the
study was intended to identify the factors that contribute to cybersecurity
effectiveness of an organization more especially determining the role of management
in the prevention of cyberattacks, the role of training and awareness in resisting
cyberattacks, the role of technology level in building defences against cyberattacks,
and examining the relationship between the competence/ knowledge of employees
and cybersecurity effectiveness as well as the role cybersecurity strategic planning in
ensuring an effective cybersecurity system.
Moreover, this study validates the critical role of some human and
organizational factors that help in augmenting the effectiveness of cybersecurity
defence system. Acknowledging the idiosyncratic features of UAE public
organizations, the researcher, based on the findings of the study in consultation with
10 experts in the practice and 2 academic professors, proposed a set of factors
responsible for improving cybersecurity effectiveness. The research postulated that
competence/knowledge of staff, support from senior management, level of
technology, training of staff, cybersecurity strategic planning and awareness of users
about cybersecurity have significant bearing on bringing effectiveness to the
cybersecurity defence system of an organization.
The survey, conducted in eight different public sector organizations of the
Abu Dhabi government, revealed some important findings; first, when establishing
an effective cybersecurity framework, both human as well as organizational level
variables are important. At individual level, employees need to have sufficient
knowledge and awareness about cybersecurity issues to tackle cyberattacks. Further,
the research also found out that cybersecurity training to employees especially the
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information security staff provides an imperative element in developing effective
cybersecurity defense. In addition to individual level factors, this study highlighted
some important organizational level factors contributing towards operative
cybersecurity system. The researcher found that support from senior management
and organization’s strategic plans about cybersecurity help employees in effective
implementation of cybersecurity plans and policies. Finally, this research supports
the previous study, (Rowe et al., 2011) that different technological tools (firewalls,
data

encryption,

anti-malware,

anti-spyware

and

anti-virus

scanners)

are

indispensable in generating effective cybersecurity model. Findings of other authors
have also lent support for the above finding observed in this research study (Rees,
2011; NIST, 2014; and Hiller and Russell, 2015) among others.
A second significant upshot that emerges from this research is the
generalizability of all antecedents to the eight different sectors. The data was
collected from eight different public sector entities including social and civic, culture
and recreation, transport, economic affairs, health, education, public order and
science and technology. The results from ANOVA, linear and multiple regression
tests show that all six factors are equally important in the eight different entities in
framing an effective cybersecurity system.

5.3 Contributions
Despite the high rate of cybersecurity problems, systems administrators and
information security professionals continue to take few effective precautions. During
interviews and discussions with the experts as well as organizations functionaries it
was observed that this lack of precaution was partly because of the lack a meaningful
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tool or framework as well as checklist to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity
system within the different government entities. In order to gain an effective security
position, organizations must overcome this drawback with effective measures. This
study therefore, contributes to literature by providing a useful framework and
checklist for evaluation of cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government
entities. A gap was revealed in literature concerning existing cybersecurity
frameworks that majorly focus on technological mechanisms for identification,
detection, prevention and analysis of associated risks, while others were found
inadequate with a focus on the European or American standards which may not fully
address cyber and information security issues in cultural setup of the region.
Additionally these frameworks were found complex especially when it comes to
interpretation and implementation. Therefore, the researcher proposed additional
strategies to strengthen the existing technological strategies including the
introduction

of

culturally sensitive

cybersecurity

training

and

awareness

programmes, ensuring strong legal framework, strong management support, and
attracting and retaining experienced information technology professionals in
government entities and incorporation of cybersecurity strategic planning in the
organization wide planning.
An important contribution of this study is the comparison of effective
cybersecurity measures in eight different public entities in Abu Dhabi government
out of which Science and Technology, Economic affairs, Transport and Health
showed better performance and readiness in terms cybersecurity counter measures in
place. The results from multiple regressions conducted on all the six study factors
combined in a single model showed that all six factors make a significant difference
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to firms’ cybersecurity system with the R-square value of 0.317 for the combined
model signifying that 32% change in an organization’s cybersecurity effectiveness
(CSE) is occurring due to the six independent variables in the study combined with
standardised coefficients showing awareness of users (β = 0.230, p = 0.000) and
training of staff (β = 0.192, p = 0.000) contributing the highest impact to an
organization’s cybersecurity system. All eight entities have different culture, values
and cybersecurity issues which enhances the generalizability and reliability of study
results by confirming that six factors are critical in developing effective
cybersecurity defence mechanism in line with several scholars previously reviewed
in literature, (Nambiro et al., 2014; Abawajy, 2014; Ahn et al., 2013; Aloul, 2010
and Asante et al., 2011) among others.
The current research focuses on recommending new ways of approaching
cybersecurity risks. A major goal of the research was to analyse if employee
development and organizational support systems are effective in improving
cybersecurity system. Application of different factors to the eight different entities
highlighted that both employee effectiveness and organizational effectiveness are
essential in managing cybersecurity issues.
Although the sensitivity of information security is well acknowledged among
IT professionals, managers and government entities, information is often protected
without considering its form or location or the competencies of the people involved
in protection. Cybersecurity deals not only with the protection of information but
also with security and development of the person using it (Von Solms and Van,
2013).
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5.4 Study Implications
5.4.1 Theoretical Implications
In this study, a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the existing
cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi government entities has been proposed. The
framework is based on six major factors; 1: Competency/ Knowledge of information
security staff, 2: Senior management support, 3: Level of technology deployed 4:
Training of staff, 5: Presence of cybersecurity strategic plans and 6: Awareness of
users in addition to the existing Laws and regulations that support and protect
cybersecurity.
The present study has several theoretical implications in cybersecurity
regulations literature. It is among the few endeavours to investigate the antecedents
of effective cybersecurity system. Past researches mainly emphasized technology as
the major variable in cybersecurity with little or no focus on human and
organizational factors. This research adds to this body of knowledge by proposing
that, in addition to technological sophistication, organizations should focus on human
factors as well including; (competency/knowledge of staff, awareness of users about
cybersecurity, regulations and the training of staff) for examining effectiveness of
cybersecurity issues. Therefore, this research opens new dimensions for future
scholars to view cybersecurity issue from a different angle.
The necessity for a behaviourally-rooted cybersecurity framework is
addressed in this research. Drawing on intrinsic motivation theory, the researcher
endeavours to analyse cybersecurity related employee and organizational
competencies in organizations. The findings of the study confirms that there exists a
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real necessity for effective enhancement of employee’s capacity to manage
cybercrimes, in the organizations under study. Kshetri (2005) explains that
employees’ behaviour for doing a task is affected by two motivation factors: (1)
intrinsic and (2) extrinsic. In cybersecurity context, results of this study confirm the
role of intrinsic as well as extrinsic motivating factors in strengthening security
behaviours of firms.

5.5 Proposed Framework
The cybercrime threats force policymakers to suggest new regulations in
order to prevent from cyberattacks. The framework proposed in this study consists of
strategies beneficial to such stakeholders. The government policy makers can utilize
the findings of our study for defining crucial policies on cybersecurity regulations.
Our research guides lawmakers to consider some factors more critically than others
while formulating cybersecurity regulations.
The framework proposed in this study is worthwhile for organizational
managers, leaders and executives. These people are supposed to implement
cybersecurity policies in their organizations. For that reason, this study leads them in
implementing cybersecurity strategies while considering different individual and
organizational level factors. The management of organization must know that in
order to implement cybersecurity strategies effectively, their employees must be
competent enough and have sufficient training and should be well aware of
cybersecurity issues. Further, the study findings helps managers in supporting their
team while efficiently applying cybersecurity regulations. Finally, the research
outcomes are equally important for information security consultants and trainers.
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Trainers can use this research for making a broad checklist of competencies that need
to be developed by IT personnel. IT personnel equipped with capabilities like
cybersecurity knowledge, awareness and training can handle cybersecurity issues
better.
Below, we present the proposed theoretical framework for evaluating the
effectiveness of cybersecurity systems that could be used by authorities in Abu
Dhabi government entities. The framework has been based on the six factors, as
summarised in Figure 22 below after which the factors are related to the proposed
checklist to enable evaluation in terms of CSE as discussed in section 5.5.1.

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Level of Technology

CSE

Support from Management

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Figure 22: Proposed Theoretical Framework

Refer to Section
5.5.1
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Furthermore, Figure 23 below shows the proposed research framework from
which the entire study has been grounded.

INDEPENDENT VARIABES
IND V-1

Competency/
Knowledge of staff

IND V-2

Senior Management
Support

IND V-3

Level of Technology

IND V-4

Training of Staff

IND V-5

IND V-6

Cybersecurity
Strategic Plans

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Cybersecurity
Effectiveness (CSE)

Dep V

CSE Level
H1 Competency of Staff
H2

Senior Management
support

H3 Technology Deployed

HCSE

>4

>3&
<4

MCSE

H4 Training of Staff

H5

Cybersecurity
Strategic Plans

H6

Awareness of Users

Awareness of Users

1-3
LCSE

Figure 23: Proposed Research Framework

In the next section, we discuss the proposed CSE checklist with respect to the
proposed pillars in details.
5.5.1 Cybersecurity Checklist
The checklist proposed in tables 57- 60 for this study was developed in
consultation with 10 experts in the subject area within the Abu Dhabi Government,
guidelines from 2 academic Professors, the researcher’s vast experience of 17 years
in region’s cyber and information security domain, empirical evidence revealed from
international standards on cyber and information security such as the ADSIC II
Information Security Guidelines, 2013, ISO / IEC 27001; 2013; ISMS standard, ISO/
IEC 27032; 2012; Cybersecurity Standard, ISO / IEC 27035, International Standard
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for incident management and the NIST (2014) risk based framework for information
security implementation and process improvement to enable Abu Dhabi government
entities assess the status of their existing cybersecurity defences, the severity of
potential security breaches and analyse the potential cyber and information security
risks associated with their entities to ensure appropriate resource allocation and
overall improvement of their entity’s cybersecurity systems. The checklist was
formulated basing on the six (6) pillars (factors) for evaluation of cybersecurity
effectiveness in Abu Dhabi government entities as cited in the proposed
cybersecurity theoretical framework.
Furthermore, to establish an appropriate CSE evaluation scale, the researcher
modified the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) software process
evaluation scaling technique explained earlier in the literature to come up with a
measurement scale that government entities can use to verify their level of
cybersecurity effectiveness (CSE). According to this modified scale for the study
checklist, a Level of 1 indicates that the organization has taken initial steps towards
implementing measures that contribute towards CSE; Level of 2 indicates that these
measures are repeatable and show evidence of improvement; Level 3 indicates that
these CSE measures are defined and can be referenced and evidenced in the
organization’s process assets. Meanwhile, Level 4 shows that the organization has
well managed CSE operations and the highest level of CSE evaluation in an
organization is Level 5, which shows that the all the six factors in addition to a strong
technology foundation are optimized and understood by all users in the organization.
In addition, as previously presented in Chapter 4, departmental cybersecurity
effectiveness is considered low if the scores are 1 – 3; medium if they are greater
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than 3 but less than 4 and high wherever they are greater than 4 with a score of 5
being maximum to scale. It is the researcher’s hope that assessors of cybersecurity
preparedness in Abu Dhabi government entities can apply or modify this scale to
evaluate their cybersecurity effectiveness levels. The checklist has been organized
according to the pertinent factors to ease implementation and allow focus by
different departmental groups to different areas of concern.

For instance, to

complete and evaluate the competency/knowledge of information security staff
pillar, the assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor then
calculates the average for the factor. At the end of the evaluation process, the level of
Competency/knowledge of Information Security will have a cybersecurity
effectiveness level of between 1 and 5 as indicated in the Table 57.
Meanwhile, for Support from Management factor on the checklist, the
assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor then calculates
the average for the factor. At the end of the evaluation process, Support from
Management factor on the scale will have a cybersecurity effectiveness level
between 1 and 5 representing the performance level of the organization to scale in
terms of CSE as seen in Table 58.
Below, the researcher presents the CSE evaluation checklist proposed for the
study based on the six pillars; 1) Competence/ Knowledge of staff, 2) Support from
Management, 3) Level of Technology, 4) Training of Staff, 5) Strategic Plans and 6)
Awareness of Users as described in the study theoretical framework in Figure 22.
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Table 57: Competence/Knowledge of Staff Checklist

CSE Evaluation Pillars

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Support from Management

Level of Technology

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Proposed Abu Dhabi
Government Department
CSE-Checklist based on 6 Pillars

Check
Options
I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitative
ly Managed;
O=Optimized

Pillar 1:
Competence/Knowledge of Staff I M D
Organization has well
qualified and experienced
staff assigned to
i. cybersecurity functions.
Most Cybersecurity staff
have relevant industry
certifications academic
credentials on Cyber and
ii. information security.
Cybersecurity staff
maintain up to date
iii industry knowledge in
.
their domain of expertise.
Cybersecurity staff have
membership in
iv international professional
.
organizations.
Experienced staff are
retained in the
v organization
The organization has
subscribed and can access
up to date Libraries on
cyber and Information
vi security.
Average
for
Competence/
Knowledge of Staff

Q
M

O
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Table 58: Support from Management Checklist

Proposed Abu Dhabi Government
Department CSE-Checklist based
on 6 - Pillars

CSE Evaluation Pillars
Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Support from Management

Pillar 2: Support from
Management

Development and Communication of

i.

Organization has developed
cybersecurity policies.

ii.

Cybersecurity policies are
approved by the Chief Executive
Officer or equivalent

iii
.

The policies are published within
the organization in places where
they are easily seen.

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

I= Initial;
M= Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitative
ly Managed;
O=Optimized
I

A Cybersecurity Security Policies
Level of Technology

Check
Options

Awareness of Users

iv
.
v.

The policies are communicated
to all employees when they are
first hired and on a regular basis
thereafter
The policies are shared with all
relevant external parties.

Review and updating of
B Cybersecurity Policies
Cybersecurity
policies
are
revised at least once a year and
i. whenever need arises

ii.

Changes to policies are approved
by senior management and
communicated to all the staff

M

D

Q
M

O
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Table 58: Support from Management Checklist (Continued)

Proposed Abu Dhabi Government
Department CSE-Checklist based
on 6 - Pillars
CSE Evaluation Pillars

I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitativ
ely Managed;
O=Optimized
I

Pillar 2: Support from Management
Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Check
Options

C

Cyber Security Roles and
Responsibilities
Chief Information Security Officer
roles are well defined.
i. (CISO)
I

Support from Management

There is clear segregation between
ii. CISO
i and IT roles and
responsibilities
in the organization.
i

Level of Technology

The cybersecurity department in the
organization maintains contact and
engagement with relevant UAE
organizations such as NESA, AEiii. Cert and ADSIC.

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

The CISO in the organization
reports directly to the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) or
iv. equivalent.

Awareness of Users

The Information Security
department maintains contacts with
v. relevant external organizations.
Information Security requirements
are integrated into project
vi. management functions.
d
D

D

Budget

i.

The organization has an annual line
item on cybersecurity activities.

ii.

Budgets for IT Cybersecurity
equipment is separated from other
general budget and allocated
appropriately to purchase the latest
Cyber Intrusion hardware.

M

D

Q
M

O
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Table 58: Support from Management Checklist (Continued)

Check
Options
Proposed Abu Dhabi Government
Department CSE-Checklist based
on 6 - Pillars
CSE Evaluation Pillars
Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

I

M

D

Q
M

O

Pillar 2: Support from
Management
E.

Support from Management

Level of Technology

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitati
vely Managed;
O=Optimized

F.

Planning
i.

Organization has established
strategic plans.

ii.

Cybersecurity measures and
efforts are explicitly stated in
the strategic plans.

iii
.

Cybersecurity plans are
documented and distributed
within the organization.

iv
.

Cybersecurity plans are
reviewed and updated
annually.

Cyber Security Key Performance
Indicators

i.

Organization has metrics that
measures performance of
cyber security activities

Organization has established
overall monitoring tools for
ii. cyber-security performance.
Average for Support of Management

For the Level of Technology factor on the checklist, the assessor enters a
score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor then calculates the average for
the factor.

At the end of the evaluation process, the level of Technology will have a

cybersecurity effectiveness level assessed between 1 and 5 as indicated in Table 59
below.
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Table 59: Level of Technology Deployed Checklist

Proposed Abu Dhabi
Government Department
CSE-Checklist based on 6 Pillars
CSE Evaluation Pillars

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Support from Management

Level of Technology

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Pillar 3: Level of Technology
A. Operations Management
Organization has
annual budget for
information security
i. technology
Organization has
implemented
technology for
detection of cyber
ii. breaches
Technology has been
implemented to prevent
cybersecurity breaches
from happening in the
iii. organization
Our organization has
effective backup
policies, procedures
iv. and technology.
Our organization has
established technology
to test and evaluate
v. cybersecurity breaches.
Network or system
access by all users are
logged, regularly
reviewed and
monitored for
vi. cybersecurity breaches.
Our organization has
implemented processes
vii for change management

B. Vulnerability Management
Reports generated from
the penetration tests are
presented and discussed
and senior management
i. meetings.

Check
Options
I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitatively
Managed;
O=Optimized
I

M

D

QM

O
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Table 59: Level of Technology Deployed Checklist (Continued)

Proposed Abu Dhabi
Government Department
CSE-Checklist based on 6 Pillars
CSE Evaluation Pillars

Pillar 3: Level of Technology
Organization has policies
and procedures for
connection of personal
devices to the corporate
network.

ii.

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Support from Management

Level of Technology

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Actions taken to mitigate
information security
vulnerabilities are
planned, documented and
monitored for
iii. effectiveness.
Organization has policies
and procedures that
govern user installation
iv. of software.
Our organization uses
third parties to conduct
penetration testing of its
information systems
v. environment.
C Incident Management
Organization has
designated roles for
cybersecurity incident
i. management.
Organization has
established plans,
policies and procedures
for handling cyber
ii. security incidents.

D. Business Continuity
Organization has
established a framework
for business continuity in
i. the case of cyberattacks.
There is a redundant site
for recovery in case of
ii. major cyber-attack.

Check
Options
I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitatively
Managed;
O=Optimized
I

M

D

QM

O
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Table 60: Training of Staff and CSE Checklist

CSE Evaluation Pillars

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Support from Management

Level of Technology

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Proposed Abu Dhabi
Government Department
CSE-Checklist based on 6 Pillars
Pillar 4: Training of Staff
The organization has
implemented a regular
user training program on
cyber security for all its
i. employees.
User training programs
implemented takes into
consideration the cultural
diversity of the
ii. workforce.
Monitoring and
measurement tools are in
place to evaluate the
iii effectiveness of staff
.
training programs.
All staff cybersecurity
training programmes are
reviewed at least once a
iv year or whenever the
.
security need arises
Our induction training
programmes include
culturally sensitive
session on cyber and
v information security

Check
Options
I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitatively
Managed;
O=Optimized
I

M

D

Q
M

O

Average for training of staff

For the Training of Staff factor, to use the checklist in Table 60 above, the
assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column and then calculates the average for
the factor. At the end of the evaluation process, the contribution of Training of Staff
to cybersecurity effectiveness will be evaluated between 1 to 5.
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Finally the strategic planning pillar checklist is further presented on Table 61
below and the assessor enters a score of 1 – 5 on the last column for each sub-factor
then calculates the average for the factor after which an average value will be
computed to attain the final CSE level for the factor.

Table 61: Checklist for Strategic Planning Pillar

CSE Evaluation Pillars

Proposed Abu Dhabi
Government Department
CSE-Checklist based on 6 Pillars

Check
Options
I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitatively
Managed;
O=Optimized

Pillar 5: Strategic Planning
I

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff
i.

Support from Management

Level of Technology

ii.
iii
.

Training of Staff

iv
.

M

D

Q
M

A cybersecurity budget
has been incorporated into
our organization’s
strategic plan
Information and
cybersecurity policies are
reviewed at least once in a
year and whenever need
arises to ensure
effectiveness
All employees can access
the organization’s
strategic plans
Strategic plans guide our
organization to implement
cybersecurity measures

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Average for Cybersecurity Strategic
Planning

O
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Next, for the Awareness of Users factor the relationship with the checklist is
indicated in Table 62. At the end of the evaluation process, the level of User
Awareness will have a cybersecurity effectiveness (CSE) level of between 1 and 5.

Table 62: Awareness of Staff and CSE Checklist

CSE Evaluation Pillars

Competence/ Knowledge of
Staff

Support from Management

Level of Technology

Training of Staff

Cybersecurity Strategic
Plans

Awareness of Users

Proposed Abu Dhabi
Government Department
CSE-Checklist based on 6 Pillars
Pillar 6: Awareness of Staff
All employees are made
aware of information
security policies upon
i. joining.
Organization's policies on
information awareness are
ii. strictly enforced.
The organization has a
formal and documented
disciplinary policy for
information security
iii breaches adhered to by all
.
staff.
The organization
consistently applies the
iv disciplinary measures on
.
cybersecurity breaches.
Periodic campaigns are
held by the organization
to communicate,
emphasize and reinforce
cyber security readiness
v. within the organization.

Check
Options
I=Initial;
M=Managed;
D=Defined;
QM=Quantitatively
Managed;
O=Optimized
I

M

Average for Awareness of Staff

D

Q
M

O
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5.6 Limitations and Future Research Directions
In this study, a framework for examining the effectiveness of cybersecurity
defences in Abu Dhabi government entities has been proposed.

In future, the

researcher intends to examine applicability of the proposed framework to private
sector organizations, the Abu Dhabi government and globally. This study covers the
cybersecurity aspects of only UAE public organizations. Comparing cybersecurity
regulations, cybersecurity attack patterns and way of tackling these threats in other
countries of the world would offer more insights to the issue at hand. This
comparison study would also provide more detailed knowledge about cybersecurity
regulations and methods of prevention from data breach.
The study findings are based on cross sectional data. Future studies may bring
more comprehensive findings about patterns of cybersecurity issues by adopting
longitudinal data collection at two different points of time. Similarly, use of
experimental design by incorporating experiment and control group can give more
robust picture about the influential factors responsible for effective cybersecurity
system. Such studies will help in concluding causal relationship among different
factors of cybersecurity effectiveness.
The current study focused both human and organizational level factors that
contribute towards cybersecurity effectiveness. Future research, however, should
include factors that are beyond human and organizational control; for example
government support, government policies regarding use of information technology,
external political influence among others.
The system of cybersecurity effectiveness is analysed in the light of several
practicable factors. In this study, all these factors are supposed to have a positive
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effect in enhancing the effectiveness of cybersecurity system. Further research is
required to examine those factors that can deteriorate the potential capacity of
cybersecurity system. These may be poor working conditions, lack of employee
engagement among others. Such type of research will guide managers and policy
makers to avoid those factors that can be a hindrance to effective management of
cybersecurity systems.

5.7 Summary of the Study
The major goal of this study was to propose a framework for evaluation of
cybersecurity defences in Abu Dhabi government entities. A cybersecurity
framework consisting of key factors for evaluation of cybersecurity defences has
been proposed by this study. This framework has been developed basing on the six
key factors proposed for evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness in Abu Dhabi
government entities. These factors are; 1) Competence/ Knowledge of Information
security staff 2) Support from senior management 3) Level of technology deployed
4) training of staff 5) cybersecurity strategic plans and 6) Awareness of users. The
proposed framework provides systematic guidelines to executive level management
in different departments for preparation, protection and prevention of their
departments from any form of cyber and information security attacks. A chapter wise
overview of the study is summarized below:
In chapter one, the researcher introduced the study on cybersecurity globally
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. Several research glitches,
research objectives, the research questions were formulated grounded on the fact that
the UAE has become a target for a multitude of cyberattacks recently.
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In chapter two, the researcher reviewed literature from several existing
studies, journals, and published conference papers, among others, concerning the
subject matter, which enabled identification of the research gap and the six study
hypotheses for further analysis.
Chapter three presented the methodological approach undertaken to address
the research questions and study hypotheses. A detailed discussion of the research
strategy, tools and the research design was presented in detail. The chapter further
presented various tests conducted to validate and ensure reliability of the research
instrument and to test the hypotheses of the study.
In chapter four, the researcher presented the data analysis and study results
including the method of analysis, reliability and validity checks, demographic
statistical results and correlation results linear and multiple regression. In the same
chapter the results were presented to provide answers to the different research
questions identified in chapter one.
Finally, chapter five discussed the research contributions and presented a
framework with checklist for cybersecurity assessment with the aid of key check
points to evaluate effectiveness and readiness of a department’s cybersecurity
programme as well as study recommendations and areas of future research.
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Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire

A Framework for the Evaluation of Cybersecurity Effectiveness
أمن المعلومات

إطار لتقييم فاعلية
مقدمة

Introduction:

I am currently enrolled into the DBA
program at the UAE University. As
part of my studies I am conducting
research on cybersecurity in Abu
Dhabi government agencies.
The
purpose of this questionnaire is to
collect data for this research. The
names of the participants or the
agencies they work for will not be
identified anywhere in this survey or
the dissertation to follow. This
survey will not take more than 15
minutes. Thank you for participating.

أنا ملتحق حاليا في برنامج الدكتوراه في إدارة
 و،األعمال بجامعة اإلمارات العربية المتحدة
اطروحتي تتناول مجال أمن المعلومات اإللكتروني
 الغرض،في المؤسسات الحكومية في إمارة أبوظبي
من هذا االستبيان هو جمع معلومات إلعداد هذه
 و لن ُتذكر أسماء المشاركين أو المؤسسات،الدراسة
التي يعملون فيها في أي مكان من الدراسة أو من
 لن يستغرق هذا،األطروحة التي سيتم إعدادها الحقا
 شكرا لكم على، دقيقة51 االستقصاء أكثر من
.مشاركتكم

General information:
:المعلومات العامة
1. What is your age?
 ماهو عمرك؟.1





Less than 25 years
25 - 30 years
30 - 40 years
More than 40 year

. سنة52 أقل من
 سنة03 و52 بين
 سنة03 و03 بين
 سنة03 أكثر من






2. What is your educational background? [Indicate major course work where
applicable]
) ما هو مستواك التعليمي؟ ( مع ذكر التخصص إن وجد.5
 High School
 Diploma

 ثانوية عامة
 دبلوم
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 Higher Diploma

 دبلوم عالي

 Bachelors

 بكالوريوس

 Masters

 ماجستير

 Doctorate

 دكتوراه

3. What is your major?






No Major
Computer or IT related
Engineering related
Business relater
Others
(………………………)

 ما هو تخصصك؟.0
 بدون تخصص
 مرتبط بمجال الكمبيوتر أو تقنية المعلومات
 مرتبط بمجال الهندسة
 مرتبط بمجال اإلدارة و األعمال
آخر

)........................................................... (

0. How many years have you worked in the government sector?
 كم سنة عملت في القطاع الحكومي؟.0
 0 – 5 years
 5 - 10 years
 More than 10 years

 سنوات2  إلى3  من
 سنوات13  إلى2  من
 سنوات13  أكثر من

5. What is your managerial level?
 ماهو مستواك اإلداري؟.2
 Team Member/ Officer
 Section Manager/ Team Lead
Department
Manager/
CIO/
CISO/ IT manager
 Executive Director/CEO/GM
 Consultant


 موظف/ عضو فريق
 مدير فريق/ مدير قسم
 مدير إدارة
 مدير عام/ مدير تنفيذي
 مستشار
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6. How many employees does your organization have?
 كم عدد الموظفين الذين يعملون في المؤسسة؟.6
Less than 100

100 – 200

133 اقل من

533  إلى133 من





201 – 500

500 - 999

 إلى531 من
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 إلى233 من
999


Greater than
1000
1333 أكثر من


7. How would you rate your understanding of cybersecurity?
 كيف تصنف فهمك ألمن المعلومات اإللكتروني (األمن السيبراني)؟.7





ال يوجد
ضعيف
جيد
ممتاز

None
Poor
Good
Excellent






8. A cyberattack is a perceived threat to network security.
. القرصنة (اإلختراق اإللكتروني) تشكل تهديدا ألمن الشبكات.8
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


9. Our employees do not know when their computers have been attacked by a
virus.
. موظفونا ال يعلمون متى تعرضت أجهزة الكمبيوتر الخاصة بهم لفيروس إليكتروني.9
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


13. A cyberattack can be perceived as a threat to data and information
. القرصنة (اإلختراق اإللكتروني) تشكل تهديدا للبيانات والمعلومات اإللكترونية.13
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة
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11. A Virus attack is a type of a cyber-attack.
.) الهجوم الفيروسي نوع من أنواع الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.11
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


15. Untrustworthy employees or disgruntled IT insiders can initiate a
cyberattack against the organization.
 يمكن أن يشن الموظفون غير الموثوق بهم أو مختصو تقنية المعلومات المخوليين و غير الراضيين عن.15
.  هجمات اإللكترونية ( قرصنة) ضد المؤسسة،العمل
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
ال أوافق بشدة
ال أوافق
محايد
أوافق
أوافق بشدة





10. Website defacing is a type of a cyber-attack
.) تخريب مواقع اإلنترنت نوع من أنواع الهجوم اإللكتروني أو (القرصنة.10
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة









10. I completely understand what email client vulnerability is.
Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail  أدرك تماما تواجد الثغرات لدى موفري خدمات البريد اإللكتروني ( مثل.10
.).إلخ
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


12. I understand the importance of choosing a strong password
. أدرك أهمية اختيار كلمة السر المنيعة و صعبة التخمين.12
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة
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16. The vulnerability of an organization can be decreased by implementing
appropriate security countermeasures
. يمكن الحد من ضعف المؤسسة األمني من خالل تطبيق اإلجراءات األمنية و التنظيمية المالئمة.16
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة











17. Our organization understands the risk of cyberattacks and the importance
of implementing safeguarding techniques.
. تدرك مؤسستنا خطورة الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) ومدى أهمية تطبيق تقنيات لحمايتها.17
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


18. Cyberattacks may disrupt organizational activities.
. يمكن للهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) أن تعرقـل نشاط المؤسسة.18
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


19. Legal consequences against attackers may deter cyberattacks.
.) المساءلة القانونية لمرتكبي الهجمات قد تردع عمليات القرصنة (الهجمات اإللكترونية.19
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة


ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة


53. Cyber-attackers focus on targets such as networks, servers and routers.
. يركز مرتكبي الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) على أهداف مثل الشبكات والخوادم و نقاط التوجيه. 53
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة
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51. Please check below what type of attack your organization has experienced
over the last 1 – 3 years?
 أي نوع من الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) تعرضت له مؤسستكم؟. 51






Denial of Service (DOS)
Virus Attack
Worm Attack
Industrial Sabotage
Insider Attack



Denial of access to your email or
computer systems
Website defacing



Others: (Please specify)
_____________________________
___________

الحرمان من الخدمات
الهجوم الفيروسي
هجوم بواسطة دودة الكمبيوتر
تخريب صناعي
الهجمات الداخلية
الحرمان من الوصول لخدمات البريد
اإلليكتروني أو خدمات األنظمة
تخريب الموقع اإللكتروني









)أخرى (يرجى التحديد
_________________________
___________

55. When was this information about the attack disclosed to the
public/customers? (In days, weeks etc.)
/ العمالء (باأليام/  متى تم اإلعالن عن هذه المعلومة عن الهجمة اإللكترونية (القرصنة) للجمهور. . 55
.) إلخ.../األسابيع





في نفس اليوم
خالل اسبوع
خالل شهر
لم يتم اإلعالن عنها

On the same day
Within a week
Within a month
Never been disclosed






23. To what degree did the attacks reduce the availability of your network?
 إلى أي درجة تسببت الهجمات اإللكترونية ( القرصنة) في فقدان نظام الشبكة الخاصة بكم؟.50
I Don’t
No Effect
Some
Considerable
Catastrophic
know
Effect
Effect
Effect
ال أعلم
بدون تأثير
بعض التأثير
تأثير بالغ
تأثير مأساوي





24.
To what degree did the attacks reduce the availability of your
data/information?
المعلومات اإللكترونية؟/ إلى أي درجة تسببت الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) في تقليل توافر البيانات.50
I Don’t
know
ال أعلم


No Effect

Some Effect

بدون تأثير


بعض التأثير


Considerable
Effect
تأثير بالغ


Catastrophic
Effect
تأثير مأساوي
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25. To what degree did the attacks reduce your ability to collaborate by email?
 إلى أي درجة تسببت الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) في تقليل قدرتكم على التواصل بواسطة البريد.52
اإللكتروني؟
I Don’t
know
ال أعلم


No Effect

Some Effect

بدون تأثير


بعض التأثير


Considerable
Effect
تأثير بالغ


Catastrophic
Effect
تأثير مأساوي


26. To what degree did the attacks reduce the overall operations of your
organization?
 إلى أي درجة تسببت الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) في تعطيل نشاط مؤسستكم؟.56
I Don’t
know
ال أعلم


No Effect

Some Effect

بدون تأثير


بعض التأثير


Considerable
Effect
تأثير بالغ


Catastrophic
Effect
تأثير مأساوي


27. To what degree did the attacks reduce employee productivity in your
organization?
 إلى أي درجة تسببت الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) في تقليل إنتاجية موظفي مؤسستكم؟.57
I Don’t
know
ال أعلم


No Effect

Some Effect

بدون تأثير


بعض التأثير


Considerable
Effect
تأثير بالغ


Catastrophic
Effect
تأثير مأساوي


58. Disclosing to the public that an organization has experienced a cyberattack
may negatively impact its reputation.
 اإلعالن بأن المؤسسة قد تعرضت لهجمات إلكترونية (عمليات القرصنة) قد يؤثـر سلبا على سمعتها؟. 58
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة
ال أوافق
محايد
أوافق
أوافق بشدة






59. All Abu Dhabi government organization should have a budget allocated to
strengthen cybersecurity measures.
 يجب أن تخصص ميزانية لتعزيز اإلجراءات األمنية اإللكترونية (األمن، جميع مؤسسات حكومة أبوظبي. 59
.)السيبراني
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة
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03. Our organization has invested adequate funds to promote countermeasures
against cyberattacks.
.) استثمرت مؤسستنا أمواال كافية لترقية تدابير مضادة ضد الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.03
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


01. Our organization has invested adequate funds towards increasing
employee education as a protection from cyberattacks.
) استثمرت مؤسستنا أمواال كافية في تعليم موظفيها كوسيلة لحمايتها من الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.01
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة


05. Disaster recovery is not considered as a protection from cyberattacks, but
rather a pre-determined plan in case of a cyberattack.
 بل خطة إحتياطية مسبقة في،) "خطط التعافي من الكارثة" ال تعتبر حماية من الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.05
.)حالة حدوث أي هجمة إلكترونية (القرصنة
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة


00. In our organization, government practices and guidelines has helped us in
safeguarding against cyberattacks.
) ساعدتنا الممارسات و اإلجراءات الحكومية في مجال األمن اإللكتروني (األمن السيبراني، في مؤسستنا.00
.)لحمايتها من الهجمات إلكترونية (القرصنة
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagre
e
ال أوافق


Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة
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00. It is important to have cybersecurity incorporated in organizations
Strategic plans.
 من المهم دمج و تضمين مسألة األمن اإللكتروني ( األمن السيبراني) ضمن مخططات المؤسسة.00
.االستراتيجية
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagre
e
ال أوافق


Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة


02. All employees in our organization are aware of the strategic plan
implemented to protect against cyberattacks
.) كل العاملين في مؤسستنا على إدراك بالخطة اإلستراتيجية للحد من الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.35
Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة


Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


06. Senior management has an important role in developing information
security policies for our organization.
.) لإلدارة العليا في مؤسستنا دور مهم في تطوير سياسات أمن المعلومات اإلليكترونية (األمن السيبراني.36
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة


ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


أوافق بشدة


07 . The Head of Information Security of our organization reports directly to
the highest official in our organization
. رئيس أمن المعلومات في مؤسستنا على اتصال مباشر بأعلى سلطة في المؤسسة.37
Strong
ly
Disagr
ee
ال أوافق
بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة
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08. It is important that information security policies are reviewed on a regular
basis to ensure their effectiveness in our organization.
 من المهم مراجعة سياسات و إجراءات أمن المعلومات اإللكتروني (األمن السيبراني) بصفة منتظمة لضمان.38
.فعاليتها في مؤسستنا
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
ال أوافق
ال أوافق
محايد
أوافق
أوافق بشدة
بشدة






09. Strategic plans guide our organization to implement cybersecurity measures
.) الخطة اإلستراتيجية توجه مؤسستنا نحو تطبيق تدابير األمن اإللكتروني (األمن السيبراني.39
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


03. Cybersecurity generally should be the responsibility of the IT department.
. ينبغي أن يكون أمن المعلومات اإللكتروني (األمن السيبراني) عموما من اختصاص إدارة تقنية المعلومات.40
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة









01. It is important to separate the roles of IT management and Information
Security management in our organization.
 من المهم الفصل بين دور إدارة تقنية المعلومات ودور إدارة أمن المعلومات اإللكترونية (األمن السيبراني) في.41
.مؤسستنا
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة
ال أوافق
محايد
أوافق
أوافق بشدة










05. Budget al.,location is not important when it comes to cybersecurity
strategies for our organization.
.عندما يتعلق األمر باستراتيجيات أمن المعلومات بالنسبة لمؤسستنا فليس من المهم تخصيص ميزانية.42
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة
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00. Our organization has implemented software solutions to protect against
cyberattacks.
.) تعمل مؤسستنا على تطبيق حلول برمجية للحماية من الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.00
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


00. Our organization has implemented an effective anti-virus software program
to safeguard against cyberattacks.
 تعمل مؤسستنا على تطبيق عملية منهجية و فعالة (برنامج مكافحة الفيروسات) للحماية من الهجمات.00
)اإللكترونية (القرصنة
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


02. Our organization has implemented an effective up-to-date software
patching procedure to safeguard against cyberattacks.
 تعمل مؤسستنا على تطبيق إجراءات منهجية و فعالة (تحديث برامج مكافحة الفيروسات) للحماية من.02
.)الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


06. Our organization has installed the following items as safeguards against
cyberattacks. (Check all that apply)
.) تعتمد مؤسستنا العناصر التالية للحماية من الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة) (يرجى اختيار ما هو مطبق.06
 Anti-Virus software’s
 Firewalls
 Proxy Servers

 برامج مكافحة الفيروسات
 الجدران النارية
 خوادم البروكسي

 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

 انظمة كشف التسلل

 Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS)

 أنظمة الحماية من التسلل

 Data Encryption
 Digital Signature Certificates

 تشفير البيانات
 الشهادات الرقمية/  التوقيعات الرقمية
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 سياسات كلمة المرور

 Password Policies
 I don’t know

 ال أعرف

07. Within our organization, we have implemented Employee Awareness
programs/strategies in order to minimize some vulnerabilities that facilitate
cyberattacks.
 استراتيجيات توعوية للموظفين بغرض الحد من بعض نقاط الضعف التي/  قمنا بتنفيذ برامج، في مؤسستنا.07
.)تسهل الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة











08. Within our organization, we have implemented a s t r o ng Organizational
Security Policies on employee awareness program s in cybersecurity.
 قمنا بتطبيق سياسات أمن المعلومات (األمن السيبراني) ضمن برامج توعوية للموظفين في، في مؤسستنا.08
.)مجال األمن اإللكتروني (األمن السيبراني

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة











09. Within our organization, an increase in Employee Awareness has
minimized some vulnerabilities that facilitate cyberattacks.
 ساهمت زيادة وعي الموظفين في الحد من بعض نقاط الضعف التي تسهل الهجمات، في مؤسستنا.09
.)اإللكترونية (القرصنة
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة
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23. Our employees know what to do and whom to contact in case of a
cybersecurity breach in our Organization
 موظفينا يعـلمون ما الذي يجب القيام به والجهة التي يجب االتصال بها في حال حدوث خرق أمني إلكتروني.23
(القرصنة) في المؤسسة
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة











21. All employees who join our organization m u s t go through a cybersecurity
awareness training.
 كل الموظفين الذين يلتحقون بمؤسستنا يجب عليهم االلتحاق بدورة تدريبية و توعوية حول األمن اإللكتروني.21
.)(األمن السيبراني
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


25. Most employees generally understand the different types of cyberattacks.
.) معظم الموظفين على دراية بمختلف أنواع الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.25
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة


20. Weak passwords by employees is not a threat to network systems.
. كلمات المرور الضعيفة و السهلة التي يستخدمها الموظفون ال تشكل تهديدا لنظم الشبكة.20
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
ال أوافق بشدة
ال أوافق
محايد
أوافق
أوافق بشدة





20. Employees in our organization understand their responsibility in
preventing against cyberattacks
.) يُدرك الموظفون في مؤسستنا مسؤوليتهم في منع الهجمات اإللكترونية (القرصنة.20
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

ال أوافق


محايد


أوافق


Strongly
Agree
أوافق بشدة
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22. Our employees are able to tell when their computers have been infected by
viruses.
. موظفونا قادرون على تحديد متى تعرضت أجهزة الكمبيوتر الخاصة بهم إلصابة بفيروسات. 22
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة











26. Our employees know the importance of keeping their passwords secret.
. يُدرك موظفونا أهمية الحفاظ على سرية كلمات المرور الخاصة بهم. 26
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

ال أوافق بشدة

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة











27. Our employees understand the importance of not connecting their
personal devices (smartphones etc.) on corporate network systems.
)إلخ...، و األجهزة اللوحية، يُدرك موظفونا أهمية عدم توصيل أجهزتهم الشخصية (مثل الهواتف الذكية. 27
.بنظم شبكة المؤسسة اإللكترونية
Strongly
Disagree
ال أوافق
بشدة


Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

ال أوافق

محايد

أوافق

أوافق بشدة









Thank you for participating!
،،،نشكركم على مشاركتكم
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Appendix 2: Ethics Application

247

Appendix 3: Letter of Introduction
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Appendix 4: Consent Form

Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
- Consent to Participate in a Research StudyPlease read carefully before signing the Consent Form!

A Framework for the Evaluation of Cyber-Security Effectiveness of
Abu Dhabi Government Entities

You will be asked to provide or deny consent after reading this form.
Topic of the research, the researcher(s) and the location
You have been invited to take part in a study to investigate
Cybersecurity Effectiveness of Abu Dhabi Government Entities

This study will be conducted by Mr. Abdulla Al Neaimi] in DBA Program
of UAEU.
The study will take place via survey monkey. Participants will receive
email inviting them to this study if they choose. The questionnaire will take
approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Benefit of the research
It is hoped that the results of this study will be beneficial in two main ways:
1. Provide a uniform way of evaluating cybersecurity effectiveness in
government entities.
2. Provide a basis which cybersecurity can be enhanced in government
departments.
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Procedure/setting
The online survey can be done by using any device that has internet
connection (phone, ipad, computer etc).
Confidentiality and Privacy Information
No names of participants or the agencies they work for will be collected or
used in this study.
Right to Withdraw
Participants are free to withdraw from this study at any time.
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Informed Consent
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the above information sheet and have
had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw.
3. I understand that my data will be kept confidential and if published, the data will
not be identifiable as mine.

I agree to take part in this study:

(Name and signature of participant)

(Date)

(Name and signature of person taking
consent)

(Date)

(Name and signature of witness (if
participant unable to read/write)

(Date)

(Name
and
signature
of
parent/guardian/next of kin (when
participant unable to give consent due
to age or incapacity)

(Date)
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Appendix 5: Statistical Tables and Analysis
Table 63: Descriptive Statistics-Education Background Vs Managerial Level
What is your Education Background * Your Managerial Level Crosstabulation
Count
Your Managerial Level
1
2 Station
3
4 ExecOffice manager/ CIO/CI Director
r
Team
SO
Leader
1
High
School
2 Diploma
3
Higher
What is your Education Diploma
Background
4 Bachelors
5 Masters
6 Doctorate
or PHD
Total

Total
5
Consulta
nt

1

19

12

0

0

32

9

0

13

10

0

32

3

0

0

12

3

18

189
56

81
43

0
0

0
0

10
0

280
99

0

6

0

0

0

6

258

149

25

22

13

467

Table 64: Descriptive Statistics- Gov't Sector Vs. Number of Employees
Employ Govt Sector * Number of Employees Crosstabulation
Count
Number of Employees
1 <100
1 Social and Civic

21

32

24

180

33

7

7

10

9

66

16

5

5

6

11

43

4 Economic Affairs

9

6

23

5

15

58

5 Health

2

6

6

2

8

24

6 Education

2

6

4

11

16

39

7 Public Order

5

6

5

3

8

27

3

4

5

5

13

30

135

78

76

74

104

467

8
Science
Technology
Total

5
>1000

38

and

3 Transport
Govt

4 501 –
999

3 201 500

65

2
Culture
Recreation

Employ
Sector

2 100 200

Total

and
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Table 65: Descriptive Statistics-Education Background vs Managerial Level
What is your Education Background * Your Managerial Level Crosstabulation
Count
Your Managerial Level
1
2 Station
3
4 ExecOffice manager/ CIO/CI
Director
r
Team
SO
Leader
1
High
School
2 Diploma
3
Higher
What is your Education Diploma
Background
4 Bachelors
5 Masters
6 Doctorate
or PHD
Total

Total
5
Consulta
nt

11

14

7

0

0

32

9

6

11

6

0

32

3

1

3

8

3

18

25
4

30
4

73
10

100
34

52
47

280
99

0

0

0

5

1

6

52

55

104

153

103

467

Table 66: Descriptive Statistics-Gov't Experience Vs Managerial Level
Your Govt Experience * Your Managerial Level Crosstabulation
Count
Your Managerial Level
1
2 Station
3
4 ExecOfficer manager/Te CIO/CIS
Director
am Leader
O
1
0
-5
years
Your
Govt 2 5 - 10
Experience
years
3
>10
Years
Total

Total
5
Consultant

30

22

44

31

2

129

19

4

37

96

25

181

3

29

23

26

76

157

52

55

104

153

103

467

Table 67: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Education Background
What is your Education Background
Frequency
Percent

Valid

Missing

1 High School
2 Diploma
3 Higher Diploma
4 Bachelors
5 Masters
6 Doctorate or PHD
Total
System
Total

32
32
18
280
99
6
467
133
600

5.3
5.3
3.0
46.7
16.5
1.0
77.8
22.2
100.0

Valid Percent
6.9
6.9
3.9
60.0
21.2
1.3
100.0

Cumulative Percent
6.9
13.7
17.6
77.5
98.7
100.0
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Table 68: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Major
What is your major
Frequency

1 No Major

Cumulative
Percent

2.2

2.8

2.8

145

24.2

31.0

33.8

70

11.7

15.0

48.8

158

26.3

33.8

82.7

81

13.5

17.3

100.0

Total

467

77.8

100.0

System

133

22.2

600

100.0

3 Engineering Related
4 Business Related
5 Others

Missing

Valid Percent

13

2 Computer or IT related
Valid

Percent

Total

Table 69: Descriptive Statistics- Study Population by Education by Experience

Frequency

Valid

Missing
Total

Percent

1 0 -5 years
2 5 - 10 years

129
181

21.5
30.2

3 >10 Years

157

Total

467

System

133

22.2

600

100.0

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

27.6
38.8

27.6
66.4

26.2

33.6

100.0

77.8

100.0
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Table 70: Descriptive Stats - Correlation Results
Correlations

Pearson Correlation

CE_mean CK_me RoT_mean1 SM_mean1 UT_mean
1
an1
1
.397**
.367**
.245**
.373**
.000

CE_mean1 Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
CK_mean
1

467

467

467

467

466

.430**

.243**

.466**

.406**

.139**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.003

467

467

467

467

466

1

**

**

**

.133**

.000

.004

N

**

**

.367

.000

.430

.000

.243

.346

.000

.000

.375

467

467

467

467

467

467

466

.245**

.243**

.243**

1

.122**

.275**

.026

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.008

.000

.573

N

467

467

467

467

467

467

466

.373**

.466**

.346**

.122**

1

.244**

.108*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.000

.008

.000

.019

N

467

467

467

467

467

467

466

**

**

**

**

**

1

.074

Pearson Correlation
SP_mean1 Sig. (2-tailed)

.337

.000

.406

.000

.375

.000

.275

.244

.000

.000

.113

467

467

467

467

467

467

466

.301**

.139**

.133**

.026

.108*

.074

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.003

.004

.573

.019

.113

N

466

466

466

466

466

466

N
Pearson Correlation
UA_mean

.000

1

467

Pearson Correlation
UT_mean

.000

467

467

Pearson Correlation
SM_mean
1

.000

467

.000

RoT_mean
Sig. (2-tailed)
1
N

.000

.337**

UA_
mean
.301**

.397**

Sig. (2-tailed)

Pearson Correlation

.000

SP_mean1

466

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 71: Descriptive - Stats (Mean and Standard Deviation)
Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

CE_mean1

4.1352

.62173

467

CK_mean1

4.1501

.56344

467

RoT_mean1

3.7804

.62965

467

SM_mean1

3.7212

.69547

467

UT_mean

4.0557

.63273

467

SP_mean1

3.9543

.54941

467

UA_mean

4.0012

.62463

466
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Table 72: Reliability Statistical results: Cronbach Alpha and PCA
Cronbach alpha-Rotated Component Matrix

1
SM9
SM1
SM8
SM7
SM2
SM3
SM4
SM6
SM10
SM5
CK1
CK2
CK5
CK4
CK8
CK6
CK10
CK7
CK9
CK3
RoT11
RoT6
RoT7
RoT3
RoT10
RoT8
RoT12
RoT4
RoT5
RoT1
RoT2
RoT9
UTA5
UTA11
UTA4
UTA7
UTA8
UTA10

UTA6

.720
.714
.706
.704
.697
.666
.662
.621
.580
.491
-.390
-.423
-.400
-.415
-.418
-.410
-.425
-.412
-.322
-.342

2

Component Matrixa
Component
3
4

5

6

7

.321
.303
.334
.325
.357
.320
.349

.642
.616
.566
.559
.556
.544
.539
.520
.507
.504
-.409
-.412
-.352
-.421
-.421
-.330
-.330
-.367
-.348
-.322

.327
.301
.308
.347

.327
.686
.680
.673
.652
.628
.614
.614
.612
.593
.520
.473
.338
.739
.709
.693
.691
.647
.643

.627

-.304
-.305

.311
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Table 72: Reliability Statistical results: Cronbach Alpha and PCA
Cronbach alpha-Rotated Component Matrix (Continued)
UTA3
.529
CE3
CE4
-.316
CE7
-.336
CE6
CE5
CE2
UTA1
SP3
SP1
-.302
SP2
-.327
SP4
-.323
UTA9
.442
UTA2
.394
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. 7 components extracted.

.412
.684
.671
.606
.604
.599
.533
.341
.656
.623
.575
.565
.599
.534

Table 73: Component Transformation Matrix-Varimax Rotation
Component Transformation Matrix
Component

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

.804

-.489

-.033

-.097

-.250

.181

-.091

2

.381

.705

-.489

-.190

-.145

-.230

-.094

3

.273

.381

.865

-.007

-.091

-.153

-.003

4

.201

.108

-.103

.871

-.033

.014

.421

5

.298

.067

.000

-.071

.937

.141

.057

6

-.064

.306

.028

.126

-.103

.872

-.338

7

-.016

.093

.008

-.418

-.134

.332

.829

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table 74: Reliability Statistics-Rotated component Matrix-Cumulative Variance
Component

Initial Eigenvalues
Total

% of
Variance

Cumulat
ive %

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total

% of
Variance

Cumulative %

Rotation Sums of Squared
Loadings
Total

% of
Variance

Cumula
tive %

1

6.791

12.814

12.814

6.791

12.814

12.814

6.174

11.648 11.648

2

6.344

11.971

24.784

6.344

11.971

24.784

5.899

11.130 22.778

3

5.767

10.881

35.665

5.767

10.881

35.665

5.886

11.106 33.884

4

4.183

7.893

43.558

4.183

7.893

43.558

3.822

7.210 41.094

5

2.843

5.363

48.922

2.843

5.363

48.922

3.163

5.969 47.063

6

2.206

4.163

53.084

2.206

4.163

53.084

2.621

4.944 52.007

7

1.748

3.298

56.383

1.748

3.298

56.383

2.319

4.375 56.383

8

1.616

3.049

59.432

9

1.224

2.310

61.742

10

1.134

2.140

63.882

11

1.046

1.974

65.857

12

1.037

1.957

67.814

13

.928

1.750

69.564

14

.873

1.647

71.211

15

.862

1.626

72.837

16

.827

1.561

74.398

17

.770

1.453

75.851

18

.680

1.282

77.134

19

.664

1.254

78.387

20

.653

1.231

79.619

21

.643

1.212

80.831

22

.610

1.150

81.981

23

.590

1.113

83.094

24

.563

1.063

84.156

25

.530

1.001

85.157

26

.512

.967

86.124

27

.498

.940

87.064
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Table 74: Reliability Statistics-Rotated Component Matrix-Cumulative Variance
(Continued)
28
.452 .853
87.917
29
.446 .841
88.758
30
.428 .808
89.566
31
.424 .801
90.367
32
.421 .794
91.161
33
.384 .724
91.885
34
.368 .695
92.580
35
.353 .665
93.245
36
.350 .661
93.906
37
.341 .643
94.549
38
.333 .628
95.177
39
.299 .565
95.742
40
.270 .509
96.251
41
.257 .484
96.735
42
.247 .466
97.201
43
.224 .422
97.623
44
.218 .410
98.033
45
.203 .383
98.416
46
.194 .366
98.782
47
.171 .322
99.104
48
.150 .282
99.386
49
.120 .226
99.612
50
.104 .196
99.808
51
.102 .192
100.000
52
.000 .000
100.000
53
.000 .000
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 75: ANOVA Group Comparison Results for Competence of Staff (CK)
CK_mean1
Sum of Squares
Between

df

Mean Square

4.140

7

.591

143.801

459

.313

147.941

466

Groups
Within
Groups
Total

F
1.888

Sig.
.070
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Table 76: Regression analysis Results for Competence of Staff – CK
Descriptives
CK_mean1
N

Social and

Mean

180

Std.

95% Confidence

Minimu

Maxim

Deviation

Error

Interval for Mean

m

um

4.084

Civic
Culture

Std.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

.59740 .04453

3.9970

4.1727

2.00

5.00

.59223 .07290

3.9726

4.2638

2.00

5.00

.44909 .06849

4.1920

4.4684

3.40

5.00

.51687 .06787

4.0920

4.3638

2.00

5.00

.35047 .07154

4.2270

4.5230

3.60

5.00

.68664 .10995

3.8338

4.2790

2.00

5.00

.45341 .08726

3.9614

4.3201

3.20

5.00

.50291 .09182

3.9655

4.3411

3.20

5.00

.56344 .02607

4.0988

4.2013

2.00

5.00

8
66

4.118

and

2

Recreation
Transport
Economic

43

4.330
2

58

4.227

Affairs
Health

Education
Public

9
24

4.375
0

39

4.056
4

27

4.140

Order
Science

7
30

4.153

and

3

Technolog
y
Total

467

4.150
1

CK_mean1
Levene

df1

df2

Sig.

Statistic
1.730

7

459

.100
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Table 77: Post Hoc Test Results for Competence of Staff- CK
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: CK_mean1
LSD
(I) Employ (J) Employ Govt
Mean
Std.
Govt Sector Sector
Difference Error
(I-J)
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic Affairs
Social
and
Health
Civic
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Transport
Economic Affairs
Culture and Health
Recreation
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Economic Affairs
Transport
Health
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Health
Affairs
Education
Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Health
Transport
Economic Affairs
Education

-.03336 .08054

Sig.

.679

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound Bound
-.1916 .1249

-.24541*
-.14308
-.29018*
.02841
-.05592
-.06851

.09501
.08451
.12163
.09886
.11552
.11038

.010
.091
.017
.774
.629
.535

-.4321 -.0587
-.3092 .0230
-.5292 -.0512
-.1659 .2227
-.2829 .1711
-.2854 .1484

.03336
-.21205
-.10972
-.25682
.06177
-.02256
-.03515

.08054
.10969
.10074
.13342
.11305
.12787
.12325

.679
.054
.277
.055
.585
.860
.776

-.1249
-.4276
-.3077
-.5190
-.1604
-.2738
-.2774

.1916
.0035
.0883
.0054
.2839
.2287
.2070

.24541* .09501
.21205 .10969

.010
.054

.0587
-.0035

.4321
.4276

.10233
-.04477
.27382*
.18949
.17690

.11264
.14262
.12377
.13744
.13315

.364
.754
.027
.169
.185

-.1190
-.3250
.0306
-.0806
-.0848

.3237
.2355
.5170
.4596
.4386

.14308 .08451
.10972 .10074

.091
.277

-.0230
-.0883

.3092
.3077

.11264
.13585
.11591
.13040
.12588

.364
.279
.140
.504
.554

-.3237
-.4141
-.0563
-.1691
-.1728

.1190
.1199
.3993
.3434
.3219

.29018* .12163
.25682 .13342

.017
.055

.0512
-.0054

.5292
.5190

.04477 .14262
.14710 .13585
.31859* .14521

.754
.279
.029

-.2355
-.1199
.0332

.3250
.4141
.6040

-.10233
-.14710
.17149
.08716
.07457
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Table 77: Post hoc Test Results for Competence of Staff (CK-Continued)
Public Order
Science
and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture
and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Education
Affairs
Health
Public Order
Science
and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture
and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Public Order
Affairs
Health
Education
Science
and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture
and
Recreation
Transport
Science and Economic
Technology Affairs
Health
Education

.23426 .15703
.22167 .15329

.136
.149

-.0743
-.0796

.5428
.5229

-.02841 .09886
-.06177 .11305

.774
.585

-.2227
-.2839

.1659
.1604

-.27382* .12377
-.17149 .11591

.027
.140

-.5170 -.0306
-.3993 .0563

-.31859* .14521
-.08433 .14013
-.09692 .13593

.029
.548
.476

-.6040 -.0332
-.3597 .1910
-.3640 .1702

.05592 .11552
.02256 .12787

.629
.860

-.1711
-.2287

.2829
.2738

-.18949 .13744
-.08716 .13040

.169
.504

-.4596
-.3434

.0806
.1691

-.23426 .15703
.08433 .14013
-.01259 .14848

.136
.548
.932

-.5428
-.1910
-.3044

.0743
.3597
.2792

.06851 .11038
.03515 .12325

.535
.776

-.1484
-.2070

.2854
.2774

-.17690 .13315
-.07457 .12588

.185
.554

-.4386
-.3219

.0848
.1728

-.22167 .15329
.09692 .13593
.01259 .14848

.149
.476
.932

-.5229
-.1702
-.2792

.0796
.3640
.3044

Public Order
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 78: ANOVA and Regression Results for Level of Technology (RoT)

Descriptives
RoT_mean1
N

Social and Civic

Mean

Std.

Std.

95% Confidence Interval

Minimu

Maximu

Deviation

Error

for Mean

m

m

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

180

3.6989

.66538

.04959

3.6010

3.7967

1.17

5.00

66

3.7660

.50284

.06190

3.6423

3.8896

2.50

5.00

Transport

43

3.7250

.73832

.11259

3.4978

3.9523

1.83

5.00

Economic Affairs

58

3.8957

.42203

.05542

3.7847

4.0066

2.67

4.83

Health

24

4.1655

.50166

.10240

3.9536

4.3773

3.00

5.00

Education

39

3.7735

.70034

.11214

3.5465

4.0005

1.50

5.00

Public Order

27

3.7346

.74716

.14379

3.4390

4.0301

1.17

5.00

30

3.9000

.61370

.11205

3.6708

4.1292

2.83

5.00

467

3.7804

.62965

.02914

3.7231

3.8377

1.17

5.00

Culture

and

Recreation

Science

and

Technology
Total

ANOVA
RoT_mean1
Sum of

Df

Mean

Square

F

Sig.

2.26

.029

Square

s
Between

6.159

7

.880

Groups
Within

1
178.593

459

184.752

466

Groups
Total

.389
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Table 79: Multiple Comparisons with Post hoc Test for Level of Technology (RoT)
Education

-.07463 .11017

.498

-.2911

.1419

Public Order

-.03570 .12873

.782

-.2887

.2173

-.20113 .12301

.103

-.4429

.0406

Social and Civic

.06708 .08976

.455

-.1093

.2435

Transport

.04091 .12225

.738

-.1993

.2811

-.12970 .11227

.249

-.3503

.0909

.14869

.007

-.6917

-.1073

-.00755 .12598

.952

-.2551

.2400

.03138 .14250

.826

-.2486

.3114

-.13405 .13735

.330

-.4040

.1359

.02617 .10588

.805

-.1819

.2342

-.04091 .12225

.738

-.2811

.1993

-.17061 .12553

.175

-.4173

.0761

Science

and

Technology

Economic Affairs
Culture

and Health

Recreation

-.39952

Education
Public Order
Science

and

*

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

Recreation
Economic Affairs
Transport

*

Health

-.44043

.15894

.006

-.7528

-.1281

Education

-.04846 .13793

.725

-.3195

.2226

Public Order

-.00953 .15316

.950

-.3105

.2915

-.17496 .14839

.239

-.4666

.1166

Science

and

Technology
*

Social and Civic

.19678

.09418

.037

.0117

.3819

Culture

.12970 .11227

.249

-.0909

.3503

.17061 .12553

.175

-.0761

.4173

-.26981 .15140

.075

-.5673

.0277

Education

.12215 .12917

.345

-.1317

.3760

Public Order

.16109 .14532

.268

-.1245

.4467

-.00435 .14028

.975

-.2800

.2713

and

Recreation
Transport
Economic Affairs

Health

Science

and

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

*

.13555

.001

.2002

.7330

*

.14869

.007

.1073

.6917

*

.46659
.39952

Recreation
Health

Transport

.44043

.15894

.006

.1281

.7528

Economic Affairs

.26981 .15140

.075

-.0277

.5673

Education
Public Order

*

.16183

.016

.0739

.7100

*

.17499

.014

.0870

.7748

.39196
.43090
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Table 79: Multiple Comparisons with Post hoc test for Level of Technology (RoT)
(Continued)
Social and Civic

.07463

.11017

.498

-.1419

.2911

Culture

.00755

.12598

.952

-.2400

.2551

.04846

.13793

.725

-.2226

.3195

-.12215

.12917

.345

-.3760

.1317

*

.16183

.016

-.7100

-.0739

.03894

.15616

.803

-.2680

.3458

-.12650

.15148

.404

-.4242

.1712

.03570

.12873

.782

-.2173

.2887

-.03138

.14250

.826

-.3114

.2486

.00953

.15316

.950

-.2915

.3105

-.16109

.14532

.268

-.4467

.1245

Health

-.43090

*

.17499

.014

-.7748

-.0870

Education

-.03894

.15616

.803

-.3458

.2680

-.16543

.16547

.318

-.4906

.1597

Social and Civic

.20113

.12301

.103

-.0406

.4429

Culture

.13405

.13735

.330

-.1359

.4040

.17496

.14839

.239

-.1166

.4666

.00435

.14028

.975

-.2713

.2800

-.26547

.17083

.121

-.6012

.0702

Education

.12650

.15148

.404

-.1712

.4242

Public Order

.16543

.16547

.318

-.1597

.4906

and

Recreation
Transport
Education

Economic Affairs
Health

-.39196

Public Order
Science

and

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

Recreation
Transport
Public Order

Economic Affairs

Science

and

Technology

and

Recreation
Science
Technology

and Transport
Economic Affairs
Health

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 80: Regression and ANOVA Test Results for Awareness of Users (UA)
Model Summary Table
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.013

a

.000

-.002

.75323

a. Predictors: (Constant), UA_mean
b. Dependent Variable: CE_mean
Residuals Statistics
Minimum
Predicted Value

Maximum

a

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

2.7701

2.8164

2.8005

.00982

466

-1.81175

1.79904

.00000

.75242

466

Std. Predicted Value

-3.094

1.612

.000

1.000

466

Std. Residual

-2.405

2.388

.000

.999

466

Residual

a. Dependent Variable: CE_mean
a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares
Regression

1

Residual
Total
Dependent Variable: CE_mean

Df

Mean Square

.021

1

.021

263.276

464

.567

263.297

465

F

Sig.
.037

.847

b

Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: CE_mean1
LSD
(I) Employ Govt Sector

Social and Civic

Culture and Recreation

(J) Employ Govt Sector

Mean
Std. Error
Difference (IJ)

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-.1093
.2793

Culture and Recreation

.08503

.09887

.390

Transport

.02134

.11663

.855

-.2078

.2505

Economic Affairs

-.01878

.10374

.856

-.2226

.1851

Health

-.12158

.14931

.416

-.4150

.1718

Education

.01237

.12136

.919

-.2261

.2509

Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic

.05040

.14180

.722

-.2283

.3291

*

.13550

.000

-.7834

-.2509

-.08503

.09887

.390

-.2793

.1093

-.06368

.13465

.636

-.3283

.2009

Transport

-.51718
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Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE (Continued)
-.02134

.11663

.855

-.2505

.2078

.06368

.13465

.636

-.2009

.3283

Economic Affairs

-.04012

.13827

.772

-.3118

.2316

Health

-.14293

.17507

.415

-.4870

.2011

Education

-.00898

.15193

.953

-.3075

.2896

.02906

.16871

.863

-.3025

.3606

*

.16345

.001

-.8597 -.2173

.01878

.10374

.856

-.1851

.2226

.10381

.12366

.402

-.1392

.3468

Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport

Public Order

Economic Affairs

Health

Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport

-.53852

.04012

.13827

.772

-.2316

.3118

Health

-.10280

.16676

.538

-.4305

.2249

Education

.03115

.14228

.827

-.2485

.3108

Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport

.06918

.16008

.666

-.2454

.3837

*

.15452

.001

-.8020 -.1947

.12158

.14931

.416

-.1718

.4150

.20661

.16378

.208

-.1152

.5285

.14293

.17507

.415

-.2011

.4870

Economic Affairs

.10280

.16676

.538

-.2249

.4305

Education

.13395

.17826

.453

-.2163

.4842

Public Order
Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation

.17198

.19276

.373

-.2068

.5508

*

.18817

.036

-.7654 -.0258

-.01237

.12136

.919

-.2509

.2261

.07266

.13877

.601

-.2000

.3454

.00898

.15193

.953

-.2896

.3075

Economic Affairs

-.03115

.14228

.827

-.3108

.2485

Health

-.13395

.17826

.453

-.4842

.2163

.03803

.17202

.825

-.3000

.3761

*

.16686

.002

-.8574 -.2016

-.49840

-.39559

Transport
Education

Public Order
Science
Technology

and

-.52954
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Table 81: Multiple Comparisons-Tukeys HSD Results for CSE (Continued)
Social and Civic

-.05040

.14180

.722

-.3291

.2283

.03463

.15696

.825

-.2738

.3431

Transport

-.02906

.16871

.863

-.3606

.3025

Economic Affairs

-.06918

.16008

.666

-.3837

.2454

Health

-.17198

.19276

.373

-.5508

.2068

Education

-.03803

.17202

.825

-.3761

.3000

-.56757

*

.18227

.002

-.9258 -.2094

.51718

*

.13550

.000

.2509

.7834

.60220

*

.15129

.000

.3049

.8995

.53852

*

.16345

.001

.2173

.8597

.49840

*

.15452

.001

.1947

.8020

.39559

*

.18817

.036

.0258

.7654

.52954

*

.16686

.002

.2016

.8574

.56757

*

.18227

.002

.2094

.9258

Culture and
Recreation

Public Order

Science and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Science and
Technology

Transport
Economic Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 82: ANOVA and Regression Results for Training of Staff
Descriptives
UT_mean
N

Social
and
180
Civic
Culture
and
66
Recreation
Transport
43
Economic
58
Affairs
Health
24
Education
39
Public Order
27
Science
and
30
Technology
Total
467
UT_mean
Levene
df1
Statistic
.885
7

Mean

Std.
Deviatio
n

Std.
Error

95% Confidence Minim Maxim
Interval for Mean
um
um
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
3.9349
4.1298
1.00
5.00

4.0324

.66254

.04938

3.8399

.61062

.07516

3.6898

3.9900

2.00

5.00

4.1434
4.1721

.53702
.54649

.08189
.07176

3.9781
4.0284

4.3087
4.3158

2.83
2.40

5.00
5.00

4.1722
4.1299
3.8938
4.2756

.55696
.71781
.74627
.47107

.11369
.11494
.14362
.08601

3.9370
3.8972
3.5986
4.0997

4.4074
4.3626
4.1890
4.4515

3.00
2.00
2.00
3.17

5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

4.0557

.63273

.02928

3.9982

4.1132

1.00

5.00

df2

Sig.
459

.518
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Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: UT_mean
LSD
(I)
Employ (J) Employ Govt
Mean
Govt Sector
Sector
Difference
(I-J)

and

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
.0156
.3694

.19251* .09001

.033

Transport

-.11103 .10617

.296

-.3197

.0976

Economic Affairs

-.13968 .09444

.140

-.3253

.0459

Health

-.13984 .13592

.304

-.4069

.1273

Education

-.09753 .11048

.378

-.3146

.1196

.13856 .12909

.284

-.1151

.3922

-.24317* .12335

.049

-.4856

-.0008

-.19251* .09001

.033

-.3694

-.0156

-.30353* .12258

.014

-.5444

-.0626

-.33218* .11258

.003

-.5534

-.1110

-.33235* .14909

.026

-.6253

-.0394

-.29004* .12633

.022

-.5383

-.0418

Culture
Recreation

Social
Civic

Std.
Error

and

Public Order
Science
and
Technology
Social and Civic
Transport
Culture
and
Economic Affairs
Recreation
Health
Education
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Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff
(Continued)
-.05395

.14289

.706

-.3348

.2269

*

.13773

.002

-.7063

-.1650

.11103

.10617

.296

-.0976

.3197

*

.12258

.014

.0626

.5444

Economic Affairs

-.02865

.12587

.820

-.2760

.2187

Health

-.02881

.15937

.857

-.3420

.2844

Education

.01350

.13831

.922

-.2583

.2853

Public Order

.24958

.15359

.105

-.0522

.5514

-.13214

.14879

.375

-.4245

.1603

.13968

.09444

.140

-.0459

.3253

*

.11258

.003

.1110

.5534

.02865

.12587

.820

-.2187

.2760

-.00016

.15181

.999

-.2985

.2982

Education

.04215

.12953

.745

-.2124

.2967

Public Order

.27823

.14572

.057

-.0081

.5646

-.10349

.14066

.462

-.3799

.1729

.13984

.13592

.304

-.1273

.4069

*

.14909

.026

.0394

.6253

Transport

.02881

.15937

.857

-.2844

.3420

Economic Affairs

.00016

.15181

.999

-.2982

.2985

Education

.04231

.16227

.794

-.2766

.3612

Public Order

.27840

.17547

.113

-.0664

.6232

-.10333

.17130

.547

-.4400

.2333

.09753

.11048

.378

-.1196

.3146

*

.12633

.022

.0418

.5383

Transport

-.01350

.13831

.922

-.2853

.2583

Economic Affairs

-.04215

.12953

.745

-.2967

.2124

Health

-.04231

.16227

.794

-.3612

.2766

.23609

.15659

.132

-.0716

.5438

Public Order
Science

and

-.43568

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

.30353

Recreation

Transport

Science

and

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

.33218

Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs

Health

Science

and

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

.33235

Recreation

Health

Science

and

Technology
Social and Civic
Culture

and

.29004

Recreation
Education

Public Order
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Table 83: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Training of Staff
(Continued).

Public Order

Science
and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture
and
Recreation

-.14564

.15190

.338

-.4441

.1529

-.13856

.12909

.284

-.3922

.1151

.05395

.14289

.706

-.2269

.3348

Transport

-.24958

.15359

.105

-.5514

.0522

Economic Affairs

-.27823

.14572

.057

-.5646

.0081

Health

-.27840

.17547

.113

-.6232

.0664

Education

-.23609

.15659

.132

-.5438

.0716

*

.16593

.022

-.7078

-.0557

.24317*

.12335

.049

.0008

.4856

*

.13773

.002

.1650

.7063

.13214

.14879

.375

-.1603

.4245

.10349

.14066

.462

-.1729

.3799

Health

.10333

.17130

.547

-.2333

.4400

Education

.14564

.15190

.338

-.1529

.4441

.38173*

.16593

.022

.0557

.7078

Science
and
Technology
Social and Civic
Culture
and
Recreation

-.38173

.43568

Transport
Science
and
Economic Affairs
Technology

Public Order

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 84: ANOVA and Regression Results for Support from Management
Descriptives
SP_mean1
N

Mean

Std.
Deviatio
n

Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Minim Maxim
Interval for Mean
um
um
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
3.8261
3.9863
2.00
5.00

180 3.9062

.54478 .04061

66 3.8811

.55958 .06888

3.7435

4.0187

2.60

5.00

43 3.9831

.58383 .08903

3.8035

4.1628

2.75

5.00

58 4.0985

.50790 .06669

3.9649

4.2320

2.63

5.00

24 4.0813

.48808 .09963

3.8752

4.2873

3.13

5.00

Education

39 3.9936

.52796 .08454

3.8224

4.1647

2.63

5.00

Public Order
Science and
Technology
Total

27 3.8722

.44199 .08506

3.6974

4.0471

3.13

5.00

30 4.0057

.70206 .12818

3.7435

4.2678

2.38

5.00

467 3.9543

.54941 .02542

3.9044

4.0043

2.00

5.00

Social and Civic
Culture and
Recreation
Transport
Economic
Affairs
Health
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Table 85: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Support from Management
SP_mean1
Levene Statistic
1.185

df1

df2
7

Sig.
459

.310

Table 86: Multiple Comparisons for Support from Management
Culture and Recreation

.21739*

.09867

.028

.0235

.4113

Transport

.11534

.11032

.296

-.1015

.3321

Health

.01723

.13305

.897

-.2442

.2787

Education

.10489

.11352

.356

-.1182

.3280

Public Order
Science
Technology
Social and Civic

.22626

.12772

.077

-.0247

.4772

.09280

.12328

.452

-.1495

.3351

.17507

.11913

.142

-.0590

.4092

Culture and Recreation

.20016

.13067

.126

-.0566

.4570

Transport

.09811

.13968

.483

-.1764

.3726

-.01723

.13305

.897

-.2787

.2442

Education

.08766

.14222

.538

-.1918

.3672

Public Order
Science
Technology
Social and Civic

.20903

.15379

.175

-.0932

.5113

.07557

.15013

.615

-.2195

.3706

.08741

.09683

.367

-.1029

.2777

Culture and Recreation

.11250

.11072

.310

-.1051

.3301

Transport

.01045

.12122

.931

-.2278

.2487

Economic Affairs

-.10489

.11352

.356

-.3280

.1182

Health

-.08766

.14222

.538

-.3672

.1918

.12137

.13725

.377

-.1483

.3911

-.01209

.13313

.928

-.2737

.2495

Economic Affairs

Health

Education

Public Order
Science
Technology
Social and Civic

Public Order

and

and

and

-.03396

.11314

.764

-.2563

.1884

Culture and Recreation

-.00887

.12524

.944

-.2550

.2372

Transport

-.11092

.13461

.410

-.3754

.1536

Economic Affairs

-.22626

.12772

.077

-.4772

.0247

Health

-.20903

.15379

.175

-.5113

.0932

-.12137

.13725

.377

-.3911

.1483

-.13346

.14542

.359

-.4192

.1523

Education
Science
Technology
Social and Civic

Science
Technology

and

and

.09951

.10811

.358

-.1129

.3120

Culture and Recreation

.12460

.12071

.303

-.1126

.3618

Transport

.02254

.13041

.863

-.2337

.2788

Economic Affairs

-.09280

.12328

.452

-.3351

.1495

Health

-.07557

.15013

.615

-.3706

.2195

Education

.01209

.13313

.928

-.2495

.2737

Public Order

.13346

.14542

.359

-.1523

.4192
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Table 87: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for User Awareness
UA_mean
Levene Statistic

df1

1.514

df2
7

Sig.
458

.160

Table 88: Test of Homogeneity of Variances for Cybersecurity Effectiveness
Variable
CE_mean1
Levene Statistic
1.894
CE_mean1

df1

df2
7

Sig.
.069

459

Sum of Squares

Df

Mean Square

Between Groups
Within Groups

6.286
173.844

7
459

Total

180.131

466

.898
.379

F

Sig.

2.371

.022

Table 89: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Cybersecurity Effectiveness
(CSE)
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: CSE_mean1
(I) Employ Govt Sector (J)

Employ

Govt

Sector

Culture and

Mean Difference

Std.

(I-J)

Error

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

.02374

.08856

.789

-.1503

.1978

Transport

-.15005

.10446

.152

-.3553

.0552

Economic Affairs

-.16158

.09292

.083

-.3442

.0210

Health

-.12020

.13374

.369

-.3830

.1426

Education

.00928

.10870

.932

-.2043

.2229

Public Order

.25943*

.12701

.042

.0098

.5090

-.27687*

.12136

.023

-.5154

-.0384

Social and Civic

-.02374

.08856

.789

-.1978

.1503

Transport

-.17378

.12061

.150

-.4108

.0632

Economic Affairs

-.18531

.11076

.095

-.4030

.0324

-.14394

.14670

.327

-.4322

.1443

-.01445

.12430

.907

-.2587

.2298

.23569

.14059

.094

-.0406

.5120

-.30061*

.13551

.027

-.5669

-.0343

Recreation

Social and Civic

Science

and

Technology

Culture
Recreation

and Health
Education
Public Order
Science
Technology

and
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Table 89: Multiple Comparisons using Tukeys HSD for Cybersecurity Effectiveness
(CSE)- (Continued)

Transport

Economic Affairs

Health

Education

Public Order

.15005
.17378
-.01153
.02984
.15933
.40947*
-.12682
.16158
.18531
.01153
.04137
.17086
.42100*
-.11529
.12020
.14394
-.02984
-.04137
.12949
.37963*
-.15667
-.00928
.01445
-.15933
-.17086
-.12949
.25014
-.28615
-.25943*
-.23569
-.40947*
-.42100*
-.37963*
-.25014
-.53630*
.27687*
.30061*

.10446
.12061
.12385
.15681
.13609
.15111
.14640
.09292
.11076
.12385
.14937
.12744
.14338
.13840
.13374
.14670
.15681
.14937
.15966
.17265
.16854
.10870
.12430
.13609
.12744
.15966
.15407
.14945
.12701
.14059
.15111
.14338
.17265
.15407
.16326
.12136
.13551

.152
.150
.926
.849
.242
.007
.387
.083
.095
.926
.782
.181
.003
.405
.369
.327
.849
.782
.418
.028
.353
.932
.907
.242
.181
.418
.105
.056
.042
.094
.007
.003
.028
.105
.001
.023
.027

-.0552
-.0632
-.2549
-.2783
-.1081
.1125
-.4145
-.0210
-.0324
-.2318
-.2522
-.0796
.1392
-.3873
-.1426
-.1443
-.3380
-.3349
-.1843
.0403
-.4879
-.2229
-.2298
-.4268
-.4213
-.4432
-.0526
-.5799
-.5090
-.5120
-.7064
-.7028
-.7189
-.5529
-.8571
.0384
.0343

.3553
.4108
.2318
.3380
.4268
.7064
.1609
.3442
.4030
.2549
.3349
.4213
.7028
.1567
.3830
.4322
.2783
.2522
.4432
.7189
.1745
.2043
.2587
.1081
.0796
.1843
.5529
.0075
-.0098
.0406
-.1125
-.1392
-.0403
.0526
-.2155
.5154
.5669

.12682

.14640

.387

-.1609

.4145

.11529

.13840

.405

-.1567

.3873

Health

.15667

.16854

.353

-.1745

.4879

Education

.28615

.14945

.056

-.0075

.5799

*

.16326

.001

.2155

.8571

Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Economic Affairs
Health
Education
Public Order
Science and Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Transport
Health
Education
Public Order
Science and Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Transport
Economic Affairs
Education
Public Order
Science and Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Transport
Economic Affairs
Health
Public Order
Science and Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Transport
Economic Affairs
Health
Education
Science and Technology
Social and Civic
Culture and Recreation
Transport

Science and Technology Economic Affairs

Public Order
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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